

NISTIR 7628 Revision 1

# Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity

## Volume 3 - Supportive Analyses and References

**The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel  
– Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee**

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U. S. Department of Commerce  
*Penny Pritzker, Secretary*

National Institute of Standards and Technology  
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## **Reports on computer systems technology**

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### **Abstract**

This three-volume report, *Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity*, presents an analytical framework that organizations can use to develop effective cybersecurity strategies tailored to their particular combinations of smart grid-related characteristics, risks, and vulnerabilities. Organizations in the diverse community of smart grid stakeholders—from utilities to providers of energy management services to manufacturers of electric vehicles and charging stations—can use the methods and supporting information presented in this report as guidance for assessing risk and identifying and applying appropriate security requirements. This approach recognizes that the electric grid is changing from a relatively closed system to a complex, highly interconnected environment. Each organization's cybersecurity requirements should evolve as technology advances and as threats to grid security inevitably multiply and diversify.

### **Keywords**

advanced metering infrastructure; architecture; cryptography; cybersecurity; electric grid; privacy; security requirements; smart grid

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>OVERVIEW AND REPORT ORGANIZATION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
Report Overview .....	1
Audience.....	1
Content of the Report .....	1
<b>CHAPTER 6 VULNERABILITY CLASSES .....</b>	<b>3</b>
6.1 Introduction.....	3
6.2 People, Policy & Procedure .....	3
6.3 Platform Software/Firmware Vulnerabilities .....	9
6.4 Platform Vulnerabilities .....	24
6.5 Network .....	28
6.6 References.....	32
<b>CHAPTER 7 BOTTOM-UP SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SMART GRID .....</b>	<b>34</b>
7.1 Scope.....	34
7.2 Evident and Specific Cybersecurity Problems .....	34
7.3 Nonspecific Cybersecurity Issues .....	41
7.4 Design Considerations .....	46
7.5 References.....	53
<b>CHAPTER 8 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT THEMES FOR CYBERSECURITY IN             THE SMART GRID .....</b>	<b>55</b>
8.1 Introduction.....	55
8.2 Device-Level Topics—Cost-Effective Tamper-Resistant Device Architectures .....	56
8.3 Cryptography and Key Management .....	56
8.4 Systems-Level Topics - Security and Survivability Architecture of the Smart Grid .....	59
8.5 Networking Topics.....	62
8.6 Other Security Issues in the Smart Grid Context .....	63
<b>CHAPTER 9 OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS REVIEW .....</b>	<b>76</b>
9.1 Objective.....	76
9.2 Review Process .....	76
9.3 SGCC Standards Assessment Concepts .....	77
9.4 SGCC Standards Assessment Template.....	81
<b>CHAPTER 10 KEY POWER SYSTEM USE CASES FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>82</b>
10.1 Use Case Source Material .....	82
10.2 Key Security Requirements Considerations.....	83
10.3 Use Case Scenarios .....	85
<b>APPENDIX H ANALYSIS MATRIX OF LOGICAL INTERFACE CATEGORIES .....</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>APPENDIX I MAPPINGS TO THE HIGH-LEVEL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>138</b>
I.1 Vulnerability Classes .....	138
I.2 Bottom-up Topics .....	145
I.3 R&D Topics.....	149
<b>APPENDIX J GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS .....</b>	<b>154</b>
<b>APPENDIX K SGIP-CSWG AND SGIP 2.0-SGCC MEMBERSHIP .....</b>	<b>166</b>

## **LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 9-1 ISO/OSI 7-Layer Reference Model and GWAC Stack Reference Model .....	78
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## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table H-1 Interface Attributes and Descriptions .....	131
Table H-2 Analysis Matrix of Security-Related Logical Interface Categories, Defined by Attributes.....	133
Table I-1 Mapping of Vulnerability Classes to High-Level Security Requirements Families....	138
Table I-2 Mapping of Bottom-Up Topics to the High-Level Security Requirements Families .	145
Table I-3 Mapping of R&D Topics to the High-Level Requirements Families .....	149

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# OVERVIEW AND REPORT ORGANIZATION

## REPORT OVERVIEW

This document (the original NISTIR and Revision 1) is the product of a participatory public process that, starting in March 2009, included workshops as well as weekly and bi-weekly teleconferences, all of which were open to all interested parties. Drafts of the three volumes have undergone at least one round of formal public review before final publication. The public review cycle were announced in The Federal Register in advance.

## AUDIENCE

This report is intended for a variety of organizations that may have overlapping and different perspectives and objectives for the smart grid. For example—

- Utilities/asset owners/service providers may use this report as guidance for a specific smart grid information system implementation;
- Industry/smart grid vendors may base product design and development, and implementation techniques on the guidance included in this report;
- Academia may identify research and development topics based on gaps in technical areas related to the functional, reliability, security, and scalability requirements of the smart grid; and
- Regulators/policy makers may use this report as guidance to inform decisions and positions, ensuring that they are aligned with appropriate power system and cybersecurity needs.

## CONTENT OF THE REPORT

- Volume 1 – Smart Grid Document Development Strategy, Architecture, and High-Level Requirements
  - Chapter 1 – *Document Development Strategy* includes background information on the smart grid and the importance of cybersecurity in ensuring the reliability of the grid and the confidentiality of specific information. It also discusses the strategy used to develop this document.
  - Chapter 2 – *Logical Architecture and Interfaces of the Smart Grid* includes a high level diagram that depicts a composite high level view of the actors within each of the smart grid domains and includes an overall logical reference model of the smart grid, including all the major domains. The chapter also includes individual diagrams for each of the 22 logical interface categories. This architecture focuses on a short-term view (1–3 years) of the smart grid.
  - Chapter 3 – *High-Level Security Requirements* specifies the high-level security requirements for the smart grid for each of the 22 logical interface categories included in Chapter 2.

- Chapter 4 – *Cryptography and Key Management* identifies technical cryptographic and key management issues across the scope of systems and devices found in the smart grid along with potential alternatives.
- Appendix A – *Crosswalk of Cybersecurity Documents*
- Appendix B – *Example Security Technologies and Services to Meet the High-Level Security Requirements*
- Volume 2 – Privacy and the Smart Grid
  - Chapter 5 – *Privacy and the Smart Grid* includes a privacy impact assessment for the smart grid with a discussion of mitigating factors. The chapter also identifies potential privacy issues that may occur as new capabilities are included in the smart grid.
  - Appendix C – *Changing Regulatory Frameworks*
  - Appendix D – *Recommended Privacy Practices for Customer/Consumer Smart Grid Energy Usage Data Obtained Directly by Third Parties*
  - Appendix E – *Privacy Use Cases*
  - Appendix F – *Summary of Smart Grid High-Level Consumer-to-Utility Privacy Impact Assessment*
  - Appendix G – *Privacy Related Definitions*
- [Volume 3](#) – Supportive Analyses and References
  - [Chapter 6](#) – *Vulnerability Classes* includes classes of potential vulnerabilities for the smart grid. Individual vulnerabilities are classified by category.
  - [Chapter 7](#) – *Bottom-Up Security Analysis of the Smart Grid* identifies a number of specific security problems in the smart grid.
  - [Chapter 8](#) – *Research and Development Themes for Cybersecurity in the Smart Grid* includes R&D themes that identify where the state of the art falls short of meeting the envisioned functional, reliability, and scalability requirements of the smart grid.
  - [Chapter 9](#) – *Overview of the Standards Review* includes an overview of the process that is being used to assess standards against the high-level security requirements included in this report.
  - [Chapter 10](#) – *Key Power System Use Cases for Security Requirements* identifies key use cases that are architecturally significant with respect to security requirements for the smart grid.
  - Appendix H – *Analysis Matrix of Interface Categories*
  - Appendix I – *Mappings to the High-Level Security Requirements Families*
  - Appendix J – *Glossary and Acronyms*
  - Appendix K – *SGIP-CSWG and SGIP 2.0 SGCC Membership*

# CHAPTER 6

## VULNERABILITY CLASSES

### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

This section is intended for use by those responsible for designing, implementing, operating or procuring any part of the electric grid. This section contains a list of four classes of potential vulnerabilities with descriptions of specific areas that can make an organization vulnerable as well as the possible impacts to an organization should the vulnerability be exploited. For the purpose of this document, a vulnerability class is a category of weakness which could adversely impact the operation of the electric grid. A vulnerability is a weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source. The following list of vulnerabilities is best used as a stimulus for detailed risk analysis of real or proposed systems since it was created from many sources of vulnerability information, including NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-82 Revision 1, *Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security* [§6.6-3], and 800-53 Revision 4, *Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations* [§6.6-2], Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) vulnerabilities [§6.6-1], Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) vulnerabilities [§6.6-4], attack documentation from Idaho National Laboratory (INL), input provided by the NIST CSWG Bottom-Up group, and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection Standards (NERC CIP) [§6.6-6].

### 6.2 PEOPLE, POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Policies and procedures are the documented mechanisms by which an organization operates, and people are trained to follow them. Policies and procedures lay the groundwork for how the organization will operate; adequate training ensures that people understand their role/responsibility in implementing the policy and procedures. Policy, procedures and adequately trained people are not effective without each other and should not be implemented as discreet elements. This section discusses cases where a failure in, lack of, or deficiency in policies and procedures can lead to security risks for the organization. An organization's policies and procedures are often the final protective or mitigating control against security breaches, and those policies and procedures should be examined closely to ensure that they are consistent with both the inherent business objectives and secure operations.

#### 6.2.1 Training

This category of vulnerabilities is related to personnel security awareness training associated with implementing, maintaining, and operating systems.

##### 6.2.1.1 Insufficiently Trained Personnel

###### Description

Sufficiently trained personnel is critical to ensure that everyone in organization has a clear understanding of the importance of cybersecurity, understands their role in cybersecurity, and the importance of each role in supporting cybersecurity within the organization. Throughout the

entire organization, all personnel should have a level of security awareness training based on the individual organizational and/or the critical asset responsibilities.

### **Examples**

- Freely releasing information of someone's status, i.e., away on vacation, not in today, etc.,
- Opening emails and attachments from unknown sources,
- Posting passwords for all to see,
- Allowing people to dumpster-dive without alerting security, and
- Failure to notice inappropriate or suspicious network cables/devices outside the building.

### **Potential Impact:**

Social engineering is used in acquiring as much information as possible about people, organizations and organizational operations. Insufficiently trained personnel may inadvertently provide the visibility, knowledge and opportunity to execute a successful attack.

#### **6.2.1.2 Inadequate Security Training and Awareness Program**

##### **Description**

Lack of an adequate security training and security awareness program can result in insufficiently trained personnel that do not know or understand an organization's policy framework to guard against vulnerabilities, leading to the risk of mishandled or inappropriately used information, unauthorized access to information and systems, and potentially damage to profit and organizational reputation. Security training and security awareness programs should be an ongoing effort and also include a continuous retraining effort over an organization-defined period of time to reflect new procedures, new technologies, and reinforcement of the importance of the cybersecurity program.

##### **Potential Impact**

An inadequately trained workforce will not be aware of the policies and procedures necessary to secure organizational information and equipment, resulting in the potential for weaknesses to be exploited, for example:

- Inserting malicious USB sticks found in the parking lot into machines with access to control systems providing adversaries control over the control systems.
- Holding the door for potential adversaries carrying a big box entering a "secured premise," allowing them unauthorized access and physical proximity to critical/control systems.
- Surfing porn sites, which often contain zero-day exploits that can compromise workstations with bots or worms.
- Failing to respond to someone capturing wireless network traffic on the front lawn or parked in the guest parking lot, and

- Lack of care with identification badges and credentials, which can be leveraged to gain partial or complete access to critical/control systems.

## **6.2.2 Policy and Procedures**

### **6.2.2.1 Insufficient Identity Validation and Background Checks**

#### **Description**

Insufficient identity validation and background checks may result in additional organization risk, such as theft or corporate espionage, workplace safety, unqualified or under-qualified personnel, and damage to organizational reputation. Identity validation and background checks should be based on the individual's area of responsibility, the physical facilities/hardware/systems, and the type of information authorized to access. The more sensitive information available to an individual, the deeper and more detailed the identity validation and background check process should be.

#### **Potential Impact**

The risk of insider threat, a current or former employee or Third Party who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, systems, and data and intentionally misused that access, is potential impact of insufficient identity validation and background checks.

### **6.2.2.2 Inadequate Security Policy**

#### **Description**

An inadequate security policy does not clearly or sufficiently define the organization's cybersecurity purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and compliance. Security policies must be structured with several key elements, be well-understood, embody a practical approach, be well practiced and monitored, and be enforceable. An inadequate security policy is also not reviewed and/or updated on an organizational-defined basis to allow for continuous improvement.

#### **Potential Impact**

Vulnerabilities are often introduced due to inadequate development of, implementation of, or the lack of policies. Policies should drive operating requirements and procedures, including security training.

### **6.2.2.3 Inadequate Privacy Policy**

#### **Description**

An inadequate privacy policy does not clearly or sufficiently define the manners in which an organization gathers, uses, discloses, manages, and protects private/personal information to ensure that data is not exposed or shared unnecessarily, and what to do in the event of a breach.

#### **Potential Impact**

Insufficient privacy policies can lead to unwanted exposure of employee or personal information, leading to both business risk and security risk.

#### **6.2.2.4 Inadequate Patch Management Process**

##### **Description**

An inadequate patch management process does not sufficiently ensure that software and firmware are kept current to remediate against known vulnerabilities, or that proper risk analysis and mitigation process are in place when patches cannot be promptly installed.

##### **Potential Impact**

Missing patches on firmware and software have the potential to present serious risk to the affected system without additional mitigations.

#### **6.2.2.5 Inadequate Change and Configuration Management**

##### **Description**

Lack of adequate change and configuration management processes can result in system configuration that are not governed appropriately, lacking control processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of products and systems throughout the system development lifecycle).

##### **Examples**

- Changing software configuration enables an insecure profile,
- Adding vulnerable hardware/software/firmware,
- Changing network configuration that reduces the security profile of the system,
- Introducing tampered devices into the system,
- Not having a sign-off approval in the configuration management process included in the security organization, and
- Making a change to network configuration or software and failing to document that change.

##### **Potential Impact**

Improperly configured software/systems/devices added to existing software/systems/devices can lead to insecure configurations and increased risk of vulnerability.

#### **6.2.2.6 Unnecessary System Access**

##### **Description**

Unnecessary system access allows users or processes acting on behalf of users to access systems and information that is not essential to accomplishing assigned duties and tasks as required by organizational mission/business functions. System access should be managed, monitored, and enforced based on individual or process access requirements.

## **Potential Impact**

System access that is not managed, including removal of access and accounts upon termination or transfer of personnel, can result in personnel obtaining, changing or deleting information they are no longer authorized to access, as well as:

- Administrators with false assumptions of what actions any one user may be capable of;
- Individual users with sufficient access permissions to cause complete failure or failure of large portions of the electric grid;
- The inability to prove responsibility for a given action or hold a party accountable;
- Accidental disruption of service by untrained individuals; and
- Raised value for credentials of seemingly insignificant personnel.

### **6.2.3 Risk Management**

Deficiencies in a risk management program can lead to vulnerabilities throughout the organization. A properly implemented risk management program facilitates more informed decision making throughout an organization, leading to more effective resource allocation, operational efficiencies, and the ability to mitigate and rapidly respond to cybersecurity risk. Ultimately, the goal of a risk management program is to reduce the likelihood and impact of a cyber event to an organization's operations, assets, and individuals.

#### **6.2.3.1 Inadequate Periodic Security Audits**

##### **Description**

An independent security audit, conducted as part of the organization's continuous monitoring program, should include review and examination of a system's records and activities to determine the adequacy of system security requirements, ensure selected security requirements are in place and operating as intended, and ensure compliance with established security policies and procedures. Audits should also be used as one of multiple security mechanisms to detect breaches in security services and recommend changes, which may include making existing security requirements more robust and/or adding new security requirements. Audits should not rely exclusively on interviews with system administrators; rather, be holistic reviews of processes, procedures, personnel actions, physical and network based resources that can be accomplished using automated mechanisms.

##### **Potential Impact**

The audit process can be used to continuously evaluate the status of the implemented security program in terms of conformance to policy, determine whether there is a need to enhance policies and procedures, and evaluate the robustness of the implemented security technologies.

#### **6.2.3.2 Inadequate Security Oversight by Management**

##### **Description**

Inadequate oversight and commitment by management can result in a suboptimal security cyberculture throughout the organization. Optimal risk management practices begin from the top

tier of the organization. Without senior management oversight and ownership, it is very difficult to maintain and fund a successful cybersecurity security program.

### **Potential Impact**

Lack of clear senior management ownership of a security program makes it almost impossible to enforce the provisions of the program in the event of a policy being compromised or abused.

### **6.2.3.3 Inadequate Continuity of Operations or Disaster Recovery Plan**

#### **Description**

An inadequate continuity of operations/disaster recovery plan can result in lacking or no procedures in place to ensure the continuation or restoration of operations in the event of a security incident. A continuity of operations/disaster recovery plan should include roles, responsibilities, training, periodic testing and exercises, and continuity of operations/disaster recovery plan updates, as well as identification of alternative storage sites, alternative command and control centers and methods, recovery and reconstitution, as well as fail-safe responses.

#### **Potential Impact**

An inadequate continuity of operations or disaster recovery plan could result in longer than necessary recovery from a possible plant or operational outage.

### **6.2.3.4 Inadequate Risk Assessment Process**

#### **Description**

Lack of a robust risk assessment process can result in an inaccurate risk determination. This risk determination ultimately impacts the organization's understanding of what risks it faces and the associated policies, processes, and security mitigations that are implemented. A documented risk assessment process should include consideration of business objectives, the impact to the organization if vulnerabilities are exploited, and the determination of the acceptable risk level.

#### **Potential Impact**

Lack or misapplication of adequate risk assessment processes can lead to poor decisions based on inadequate understanding of actual risk.

### **6.2.3.5 Inadequate Incident Response Process**

#### **Description**

An inadequate incident response process will not ensure proper notification, response, and recovery of operations and systems, and is not adequately coordinated with continuity of operations and disaster recovery capabilities.

#### **Potential Impact**

Without a sufficient incident response process, critical actions may not be completed in a timely manner, leading to increased duration of risk exposure or loss of business function.



## 6.3 PLATFORM SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE VULNERABILITIES

Software and firmware are the programmable components of a computing environment. Errors or oversights in software and firmware design, development, and deployment may result in unintended functionality that allows adversaries or other conditions to affect, via programmatic means, the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information. These errors and oversights are discovered and reported as vulnerability instances in platform software and firmware. Discovering and reporting of vulnerability instances occur continuously and the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) specification establishes a common identifier for known vulnerability instances [§6.6-5]. The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [§6.6-4] and the Vulnerability Categories defined by OWASP [§6.6-1] are two taxonomies which provide descriptions of common errors or oversights that can result in vulnerability instances. Using the CWE and OWASP taxonomies as a guide this subsection describes classes and subclasses of vulnerabilities in platform software and firmware.<sup>1</sup> The taxonomy provides a way of describing the causes of vulnerabilities, which are largely independent of the operational environment, whereas the impact of these vulnerabilities may differ in a smart grid environment compared to a traditional IT enterprise.

### 6.3.1 Software Development

Applications being developed for use in the smart grid should make use of a secure software development life cycle (SDLC). Vulnerabilities in this category can arise from a lack of oversight in this area, leading to poor code implementation and vulnerability.

#### 6.3.1.1 Code Quality Vulnerability (CWE-398)

##### Description

“Poor code quality,” states the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP),<sup>2</sup> “leads to unpredictable behavior. From a user’s perspective that often manifests itself as poor usability. For an attacker it provides an opportunity to stress the system in unexpected ways” [§6.6-1].

##### Examples

- Double free() errors (CWE-415),
- Failure to follow guideline/specification (CWE-573),
- Leftover debug code (CWE-489),
- Memory leak (CWE-401),
- Null dereference (CWE-476, CWE-690),
- Poor logging practice (CWE-778),
- Portability flaw (CWE-474, CWE-589),

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<sup>1</sup> The OWASP names are generally used with the exact or closest CWE-ID(s) match in parentheses. The mappings are informational only and are not to be considered authoritative.

<sup>2</sup> OWASP is a worldwide, not-for-profit charitable organization focused on improving the security of software. For more information on OWASP, refer to [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main\\_Page](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page).

- Undefined behavior (CWE-475),
- Uninitialized variable (CWE-457),
- Unreleased resource (CWE-404),
- Unsafe mobile code (CWE-490),
- Use of obsolete methods (CWE-477),
- Using freed memory (CWE-416), and
- Buffer overflow (CWE-120).

### 6.3.1.2 Authentication Vulnerability (CWE-287)

#### Description

Authentication is the process of proving an identity to a given system. Users, applications, and devices may all require authentication. This class of vulnerability leads to authentication bypass or other circumvention/manipulation of the authentication process.

#### Examples [§6.6-1]

- CVE-2013-2820 - The Sierra Wireless AirLink Raven X EV-DO gateway 4221\_4.0.11.003 and 4228\_4.0.11.003 allows remote attackers to reprogram the firmware via a replay attack using UDP ports 17336 and 17388.
- CVE-2012-3024 - Tridium Niagara AX Framework through 3.6 uses predictable values for (1) session IDs and (2) keys, which might allow remote attackers to bypass authentication via a brute-force attack;
- CVE-2012-1799 - The web server on the Siemens Scalance S Security Module firewall S602 V2, S612 V2, and S613 V2 with firmware before 2.3.0.3 does not limit the rate of authentication attempts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via a brute-force attack on the administrative password;
- CVE-2012-1808 - The web server in the ECOM Ethernet module in Koyo H0-ECOM, H0-ECOM100, H2-ECOM, H2-ECOM-F, H2-ECOM100, H4-ECOM, H4-ECOM-F, and H4-ECOM100 does not require authentication, which allows remote attackers to perform unspecified functions via unknown vectors;
- Allowing password aging (CWE-263),
- Authentication bypass via assumed-immutable data (CWE-302),
- Empty string password (CWE-258),
- Failure to drop privileges when reasonable (CWE-271),
- Hard-coded password (CWE-259),
- Not allowing password aging (CWE-262),
- Often misused: authentication (CWE-247),
- Reflection attack in an auth protocol (CWE-301),

- Unsafe mobile code (CWE-490),
- Using password systems (CWE-309),
- Using referrer field for authentication or authorization (CWE-293), and
- Using single-factor authentication (CWE-308).

### **Potential Impact**

Access is granted without official permission.

#### **6.3.1.3 Authorization Vulnerability (CWE-284)**

### **Description**

Authorization is the process of assigning correct system permissions to an authenticated entity. This class of vulnerability allows authenticated entities the ability to perform actions which policy does not allow.

### **Examples**

- Access control enforced by presentation layer (CWE-602, CWE-425),
- File access race condition: time-of-check, time-of-use (TOCTOU) (CWE-367),
- Least privilege violation (CWE-272),
- Often misused: privilege management (CWE-250),
- Using referrer field for authentication or authorization (CWE-293),
- Insecure direct object references (CWE-639, CWE-22), and
- Failure to restrict universal resource locator (URL) access (CWE-425, CWE-288).

#### **6.3.1.4 Cryptographic Vulnerability (CWE-310)**

### **Description**

Cryptography is the use of mathematical principles and their implementations to ensure that information is hidden from unauthorized parties, the information is unchanged, and the intended party can verify the sender. The security of the key information may be reliant on the implementation of the mechanism (software-based vs. hardware-based) to protect the key. This vulnerability class includes issues that allow an attacker to view, modify, or forge encrypted data or impersonate another party through digital signature abuse.

### **Examples**

- CVE-2012-4899 - WellinTech KingView 6.5.3 and earlier uses a weak password-hashing algorithm, which makes it easier for local users to discover credentials by reading an unspecified file;
- CVE-2012-3025 - The default configuration of Tridium Niagara AX Framework through 3.6 uses a cleartext base64 format for transmission of credentials in cookies, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network;

- Failure to encrypt data (CWE-311),
- Insecure Randomness (CWE-330),
- Insufficient Entropy (CWE-332),
- Insufficient Session-ID Length (CWE-6),
- Key exchange without entity authentication (CWE-322),
- Non-cryptographic pseudo-random number generator (CWE-338),
- Not using a random initialization vector with cipher block chaining mode (CWE-329),
- PRNG Seed Error (CWE-335),
- Password Management: Weak Cryptography (CWE-261),
- Reusing a nonce, key pair in encryption (CWE-323),
- Testing for SSL-TLS (OWASP-CM-001) (CWE-326),
- Use of hard-coded cryptographic key (CWE-321),
- Using a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm (CWE-327), and
- Using a key past its expiration date (CWE-324).

#### **6.3.1.5 Environmental Vulnerability (CWE-2)**

##### **Description**

“This category,” states OWASP, “includes everything that is outside of the source code but is still critical to the security of the product that is being created. Because the issues covered by this kingdom are not directly related to source code, we separated it from the rest of the kingdoms” [§6.6-1].

##### **Examples**

- ASP.NET misconfigurations (CWE-10),
- Empty string password (CWE-258),
- Failure of true random number generator (CWE-333),
- Information leak through class cloning (CWE-498),
- Information leak through serialization (CWE-499),
- Insecure compiler optimization (CWE-14),
- Insecure transport (CWE-319, CWE-5),
- Insufficient session-ID length (CWE-6),
- Insufficient entropy in pseudo-random number generator (CWE-332),
- J2EE misconfiguration: unsafe bean declaration (CWE-8),
- Missing error handling (CWE-7),

- Publicizing of private data when using inner classes (CWE-492),
- Relative path library search (CWE-428),
- Reliance on data layout (CWE-188),
- Relying on package-level scope (CWE-487),
- Resource exhaustion (CWE-400), and
- Trust of system event data (CWE-360).

#### **6.3.1.6 Error Handling Vulnerability (CWE-703)**

##### **Description**

Error handling refers to the way an application deals with unexpected conditions - generally syntactical or logical. Vulnerabilities in this class provide means for adversaries to use error handling to access unintended information or functionality.

##### **Examples**

- ASP.NET misconfigurations (CWE-10),
- Catch NullPointerException (CWE-395),
- Empty catch block (CWE-600),
- Improper cleanup on thrown exception (CWE-460),
- Improper error handling (CWE-390),
- Information leakage (CWE-200),
- Missing error handling (CWE-7),
- Often misused: exception handling (CWE-248),
- Overly-broad catch block (CWE-396),
- Overly-broad throws declaration (CWE-397),
- Return inside finally block (CWE-584),
- Uncaught exception (CWE-248),
- Unchecked error condition (CWE-391), and
- Unrestricted File Upload (CWE-434).

#### **6.3.1.7 General Logic Error (CWE-691)**

##### **Description**

Logic errors are programming missteps that allow an application to operate incorrectly, but usually without crashing. This vulnerability class covers those error types that have security implications.

## Examples

- Addition of data-structure sentinel (CWE-464),
- Assigning instead of comparing (CWE-481),
- Comparing instead of assigning (CWE-482),
- Deletion of data-structure sentinel (CWE-463),
- Duplicate key in associative list (CWE-462),
- Failure to check whether privileges were dropped successfully (CWE-273),
- Failure to de-allocate data (CWE-401),
- Failure to provide confidentiality for stored data (CWE-493),
- Guessed or visible temporary file (CWE-379),
- Improper cleanup on thrown exception (CWE-460),
- Improper error handling (CWE-390),
- Improper temp file opening (CWE-378),
- Incorrect block delimitation (CWE-483),
- Misinterpreted function return value (CWE-253),
- Missing parameter (CWE-234),
- Omitted break statement (CWE-484),
- Passing mutable objects to an untrusted method (CWE-375),
- Symbolic name not mapping to correct object (CWE-386),
- Truncation error (CWE-197),
- Undefined Behavior (CWE-475),
- Uninitialized Variable (CWE-457),
- Unintentional pointer scaling (CWE-468),
- Use of sizeof() on a pointer type (CWE-467), and
- Using the wrong operator (CWE-480).

### 6.3.1.8 Business Logic Vulnerability

#### Description

Business logic vulnerabilities occur when the legitimate processing flow of an application is used in a way that results in an unintended consequence. Discovering and testing of this vulnerability class tends to be specific to an application under analysis and require detailed knowledge of the business process. Additional information on this vulnerability may be found at [§6.6-10].

## Examples

- Purchase orders are not processed before midnight,
- Written authorization is not on file before web access is granted, and
- Transactions in excess of \$2000 are not reviewed by a person.

### 6.3.1.9 Input and Output Validation (CWE-20 AND CWE-116)

#### Description

Input validation is the process of ensuring that the user-supplied content contains only expected information. Input validation covers a wide assortment of potential exploitation but requires caution. Failing to properly validate external input may allow execution of unintended functionality—and often “arbitrary code execution”. Output validation is encoding or escaping data during the preparation of a structured message for communication with another component. Improper output validation can allow adversaries to change or replace the commands sent to other components.

#### Examples

- CVE-2012-3026 - rifsrvd.exe in the Remote Interface Service in GE Intelligent Platforms Proficy Real-Time Information Portal 2.6 through 3.5 SP1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and service crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via long input data,
- CVE-2012-3021 - APIFTP Server in Optimalog Optima PLC 1.5.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a malformed packet,
- Buffer overflow (CWE-120),
- Format string (CWE-134),
- Improper data validation (CWE-102, CWE-103, CWE-104, CWE-105, CWE-106, CWE-107, CWE-108, CWE-109, CWE-110),
- Log forging (CWE-117),
- Missing XML validation (CWE-112),
- Process control (CWE-114),
- String termination error (CWE-158),
- Unchecked return value: missing check against null (CWE-690, CWE-252),
- Unsafe Java Native Interface (JNI) (CWE-111),
- Unsafe reflection (CWE-470),
- Validation performed in client (CWE-602),
- Unvalidated redirects and forwards (CWE-819), and
- Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax (CWE-664).

#### **6.3.1.10 Logging and Auditing Vulnerability (CWE-778 and CWE-779)**

##### **Description**

Logging and auditing are common system and security functions aiding in system management, event identification, and event reconstruction. This vulnerability class deals with issues that either aid in an attack or increase the likelihood of its success due to logging and auditing.

##### **Examples**

- Addition of data-structure sentinel (CWE-464),
- Logging of excessive data (CWE-779),
- Information leakage (CWE-200),
- Log forging (CWE-117),
- Log injection (CWE-117),
- Poor logging practice, and
- Cross-site scripting via HTML log-viewers (CWE-79, CWE-117).

#### **6.3.1.11 Password Management Vulnerability (CWE-255)**

##### **Description**

Passwords are the most commonly used form of authentication. This class of vulnerabilities deals with mistakes in handling passwords that may allow an attacker to obtain or guess them.

##### **Examples**

- CVE-2012-4879 - The Linux Console on the WAGO I/O System 758 model 758-870, 758-874, 758-875, and 758-876 Industrial PC (IPC) devices has a default password of wago for the (1) root and (2) admin accounts, (3) a default password of user for the user account, and (4) a default password of guest for the guest account, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain login access via a TELNET session,
- CVE-2012-3013 - WAGO I/O System 758 model 758-870, 758-874, 758-875, and 758-876 Industrial PC (IPC) devices have default passwords for unspecified Web Based Management accounts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain administrative access via a TCP session,
- CVE-2012-3014 - The Management Software application in GarrettCom Magnum MNS-6K before 4.4.0, and 14.x before 14.4.0, has a hardcoded password for an administrative account, which allows local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors,
- Empty string password (CWE-258),
- Hard-coded password (CWE-259),
- Not allowing password aging (CWE-262),
- Password management: hardcoded password (CWE-259),



- Password management: weak cryptography (CWE-261),
- Password plaintext storage (CWE-256),
- Password in configuration file (CWE-260),
- Using password systems (CWE-309), and
- Use of default passwords.

#### **6.3.1.12 Path Vulnerability (CWE-21)**

##### **Description**

“This category [Path Vulnerability],” states OWASP, “is for tagging path issues that allow adversaries to access files that are not intended to be accessed. Generally, this is due to dynamically construction of a file path using unvalidated user input” [§6.6-1].

##### **Examples**

- Path traversal attack (CWE-22),
- Relative path traversal attack (CWE-23),
- Virtual files attack (CWE-66),
- Path equivalence attack (CWE-41), and
- Link following attack (CWE-59).

#### **6.3.1.13 Protocol Errors (CWE-254, CWE-573, CWE-668)**

##### **Description**

Protocols are rules of communication. This vulnerability class deals with the security issues introduced during protocol design.

##### **Examples**

- Failure to add integrity check value (CWE-353),
- Failure to check for certificate revocation (CWE-299),
- Failure to check integrity check value (CWE-354),
- Failure to encrypt data (CWE-311),
- Failure to follow chain of trust in certificate validation (CWE-296),
- Failure to protect stored data from modification (CWE-766, CWE-767),
- Failure to validate certificate expiration (CWE-298),
- Failure to validate host-specific certificate data (CWE-297),
- Key exchange without entity authentication (CWE-322),
- Storing passwords in a recoverable format (CWE-257),

- Trusting self-reported domain name service (DNS) name (CWE-292),
- Trusting self-reported IP address (CWE-291),
- Use of hard-coded password (CWE-798, CWE-259),
- Insufficient transport layer protection (CWE-818),
- Use of weak secure socket layer / transport layer security (SSL/TLS) protocols (CWE-757),
- SSL/TLS key exchange without authentication (CWE-322),
- SSL/TLS weak key exchange (CWE-326), and
- Low SSL/TLS cipher strength (CWE-326).

### **Potential Impact**

The compromise of security protocols such as TLS.

#### **6.3.1.14 Range and Type Error Vulnerability (CWE-118, CWE-136)**

### **Description**

Range and type errors are common programming mistakes. This vulnerability class covers the various types of errors that have potential security consequences.

### **Examples**

- Access control enforced by presentation layer (CWE-602, CWE-425),
- Buffer overflow (CWE-120),
- Buffer underwrite (CWE-124),
- Comparing classes by name (CWE-486),
- De-serialization of untrusted data (CWE-502),
- Doubly freeing memory (CWE-415),
- Failure to account for default case in switch (CWE-478),
- Format string (CWE-134),
- Heap overflow (CWE-122),
- Illegal pointer value (CWE-466),
- Improper string length checking (CWE-135),
- Integer coercion error (CWE-192),
- Integer overflow (CWE-190, CWE-680),
- Invoking untrusted mobile code (CWE-494),
- Log forging (CWE-117),

- Log injection (CWE-117),
- Miscalculated null termination (CWE-170),
- Null dereference (CWE-476, CWE-690),
- Often misused: string management (CWE-251),
- Reflection injection (CWE-470),
- Sign extension error (CWE-194),
- Signed to unsigned conversion error (CWE-195),
- Stack overflow (CWE-121),
- Truncation error (CWE-197),
- Trust boundary violation (CWE-501),
- Unchecked array indexing (CWE-129),
- Unsigned to signed conversion error (CWE-196),
- Using freed memory (CWE-416),
- Validation performed in client (CWE-602), and
- Wrap-around error (CWE-128).

### 6.3.1.15 Sensitive Data Protection Vulnerability (CWE-199)

#### Description

OWASP describes the sensitive data protection vulnerability as follows:

This category is for tagging vulnerabilities that lead to insecure protection of sensitive data. The protection referred here includes confidentiality and integrity of data during its whole life cycles, including storage and transmission.

Please note that this category is intended to be different from access control problems, although they both fail to protect data appropriately. Normally, the goal of access control is to grant data access to some users but not others. In this category, we are instead concerned about protection for sensitive data that are not intended to be revealed to or modified by any application users. Examples of this kind of sensitive data can be cryptographic keys, passwords, security tokens or any information that an application relies on for critical decisions. [§6.6-1]

#### Examples

- Information leakage results from insufficient memory clean-up (CWE-226),
- Inappropriate protection of cryptographic keys<sup>3</sup> (CWE-311, CWE-326, CWE-321, CWE-325, CWE-656),
- Lack of integrity protection for stored user data (CWE-693),

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<sup>3</sup> OWASP, *Top 10 2007-Insecure Cryptographic Storage*, last modified April 18, 2010, [http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top\\_10\\_2007-Insecure\\_Cryptographic\\_Storage](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-Insecure_Cryptographic_Storage) [accessed 8/11/2014].

- Hard-coded password (CWE-259),
- Heap inspection (CWE-244),
- Information leakage (CWE-200),
- Password management: hardcoded password (CWE-259),
- Password plaintext storage (CWE-256), and
- Privacy violation (CWE-359).

#### **6.3.1.16 Session Management Vulnerability (CWE-718)**

##### **Description**

Session management is the way with which a client and server connect, maintain, and close a connection. Primarily an issue with Web interfaces, this class covers vulnerabilities resulting from poor session management.

##### **Examples**

- Applications should not use variables that include any user personal information (user name, password, home address, etc.),
- Highly protected applications should not implement mechanisms that make automated requests to prevent session timeouts,
- Highly protected applications should not implement "remember me" functionality,
- Highly protected applications should not use URL rewriting to maintain state when cookies are turned off on the client,
- Applications should not use session identifiers for encrypted HTTPS transport that have once been used over HTTP,
- Insufficient Session-ID Length (CWE-6),
- Session Fixation (CWE-384),
- Cross site request forgery (CWE-352),
- Cookie attributes not set securely (e.g., domain, secure and HTTP only) (CWE-614), and
- Overly long session timeout (CWE-613).

#### **6.3.1.17 Concurrency, Synchronization and Timing Vulnerability (CWE-361)**

##### **Description**

Concurrency, synchronization and timing deals with the order of events in a complex computing environment. This vulnerability class deals with timing issues that affect security, most often dealing with multiple processes or threads which share some common resource (file, memory, etc.).

## Examples

- Capture-replay (CWE-294),
- Covert timing channel (CWE-385),
- Failure to drop privileges when reasonable (CWE-271, CWE-653),
- Failure to follow guideline/specification (CWE-573),
- File access race condition: TOCTOU (CWE-367),
- Member field race condition (CWE-488),
- Mutable object returned (CWE-375),
- Overflow of static internal buffer (CWE-500),
- Race conditions (CWE-362),
- Reflection attack in an auth protocol (CWE-301),
- State synchronization error (CWE-373), and
- Unsafe function call from a signal handler (CWE-479).

### 6.3.1.18 Insufficient Safeguards for Mobile Code (CWE-490)

#### Description

Mobile code consists of programming instructions transferred from server to client that execute on the client machine without the user explicitly initiating that execution. Allowing mobile code generally increases attack surface. This subsection includes issues that permit the execution of unsafe mobile code.

#### Examples

- VBScript, JavaScript and Java sandbox container flaws,
- Insufficient scripting controls, and
- Insufficient code authentication.

### 6.3.1.19 Buffer Overflow (CWE-119, CWE-120)

#### Description

Software used to implement an industrial control system (ICS) could be vulnerable to buffer overflows; adversaries could exploit these to perform various attacks [§6.6-3].

A buffer overflow condition exists when a program attempts to put more data in a buffer than it can hold, or when a program attempts to put data in a memory area outside of the boundaries of a buffer. The simplest type of error, and the most common cause of buffer overflows, is the "classic" case in which the program copies the buffer without checking its length at all. Other variants exist, but the existence of a classic overflow strongly suggests that the programmer is not considering even the most basic of security protections [§6.6-4].

## **Examples [§6.6-4]**

- CVE-2012-0227 - Buffer overflow in the VSFlex7.VSFlexGrid ActiveX control in ComponentOne FlexGrid 7.1, as used in Open Automation Software OPC Systems.NET, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via a long archive file name argument to the Archive method;
- CVE-2012-3035 = Buffer overflow in Emerson DeltaV 9.3.1 and 10.3 through 11.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a long string to an unspecified port;
- CVE-2012-5163 - Buffer overflow in an unspecified Third Party component in the Batch module for Schneider Electric CitectSCADA before 7.20 and Mitsubishi MX4 SCADA before 7.20 allows local users to execute arbitrary code via a long string in a login sequence.

### **6.3.1.20 Mishandling of Undefined, Poorly Defined, or “Illegal” Conditions (CWE-388, CWE-20)**

#### **Description**

Some ICS implementations are vulnerable to packets that are malformed or contain illegal or otherwise unexpected field values [§6.6-3].

### **6.3.1.21 Use of Insecure Protocols (CWE-720)**

#### **Description**

Protocols are expected patterns of behavior that allow communication among computing resources. This section deals with the use of protocols for which security was not sufficiently considered during the development process.

#### **Examples**

- Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3.0, Modbus, Profibus, and other protocols are common across several industries and protocol information is freely available. These protocols often have few or no security capabilities built in [§6.6-3],
- Use of clear text protocols such as FTP and Telnet, and
- Use of proprietary protocols lacking security features.

### **6.3.1.22 Weaknesses that Affect Files and Directories CWE-632)**

#### **Description**

Weaknesses in this category affect file or directory resources [§6.6-4].

#### **Examples**

- UNIX path link problems (CWE-60),
- Windows path link problems (CWE-63),
- Windows virtual file problems (CWE-68),

- Mac virtual file problems (CWE-70),
- Failure to resolve case sensitivity (CWE-178),
- Path traversal (CWE-22),
- Failure to change working directory in chroot jail (CWE-243),
- Often misused: path manipulation (CWE-785),
- Password in configuration file (CWE-260),
- Improper ownership management (CWE-282),
- Improper resolution of path equivalence (CWE-41),
- Information leak through server log files (CWE-533),
- Files or directories accessible to external parties (CWE-552),
- Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') (CWE-59),
- Improper handling of windows device names (CWE-67), and
- Improper sanitization of directives in statically saved code ('static code injection') (CWE-96).

## 6.3.2 API Usage & Implementation

### 6.3.2.1 API Abuse (CWE-227)

#### Description

OWASP describes the API abuse vulnerability as follows:

An API is a contract between a caller and a callee. The most common forms of API abuse are caused by the caller failing to honor its end of this contract.

For example, if a program fails to call `chdir()` after calling `chroot()`, it violates the contract that specifies how to change the active root directory in a secure fashion. Another good example of library abuse is expecting the callee to return trustworthy DNS information to the caller. In this case, the caller abuses the callee API by making certain assumptions about its behavior (that the return value can be used for authentication purposes). One can also violate the caller-callee contract from the other side. For example, if a coder subclasses `SecureRandom` and returns a non-random value, the contract is violated. [§6.6-1]

#### Examples

- Dangerous function (CWE-242, CWE-676),
- Directory restriction error (CWE-243),
- Failure to follow guideline/specification (CWE-573),
- Heap inspection (CWE-244),
- Ignored function return value (CWE-252),
- Object model violation: just one of `equals()` and `hashCode()` defined (CWE-581),

- Often misused: authentication (CWE-247),
- Often misused: exception handling (CWE-248),
- Often misused: file system (CWE-785),
- Often misused: privilege management (CWE-250), and
- Often misused: string management (CWE-251).

### **6.3.2.2 Use of Dangerous API (CWE-242, CWE-676)**

#### **Description**

A dangerous API is one that is not guaranteed to work safely in all conditions or can be used safely but could introduce a vulnerability if used in an incorrect manner.

#### **Examples**

- Dangerous function such as the C function gets() (CWE-242),
- Directory restriction error (CWE-243),
- Failure to follow guideline/specification (CWE-573),
- Heap inspection (CWE-244),
- Insecure temporary file (CWE-377),
- Object model violation: just one of equals() and hashCode() defined (CWE-581),
- Often misused: exception handling (CWE-248),
- Often misused: file system (CWE-785),
- Often misused: privilege management (CWE-250),
- Often misused: string management (CWE-251),
- Unsafe function call from a signal handler (CWE-479), and
- Use of obsolete methods (CWE-477).

## **6.4 PLATFORM VULNERABILITIES**

Platforms are defined as the software and hardware units, or systems of software and hardware, that are used to deliver software-based services.

The platform comprises the software, the operating system used to support that software, and the physical hardware. Vulnerabilities arise in this part of the smart grid network due to the complexities of architecting, configuring, and managing the platform itself. Platform areas identified as being vulnerable to risk include the security architecture and design, inadequate malware protection against malicious software attacks, software vulnerabilities due to late or nonexistent software patches from software vendors, an overabundance of file transfer services running, and insufficient alerts from log management servers and systems.



## **6.4.1 Design**

### **6.4.1.1 Use of Inadequate Security Architectures and Designs**

#### **Description**

Development schedule pressures and lack of security training can lead to the use of inadequate security architectures and designs. This includes reliance on in-house security solutions, security through obscurity, and other insecure design practices.

#### **Examples**

- Security design by untrained engineers,
- Reliance on nonstandard techniques and unproven algorithms, and
- Security through obscurity.

### **6.4.1.2 Lack of External or Peer Review for Security Design**

#### **Description**

Lack of understanding regarding the complexity of secure systems leads designers to believe that proven techniques can be easily combined into a larger system while preserving the security of the individual techniques. These kinds of errors are often discovered only through thorough external review.

#### **Examples:**

- Introduction of side-channel attacks,
- Poorly combined algorithms,
- Lack of understanding regarding identifying weakest links, and
- Insufficient analysis of cascaded risk, whereby compromise of one system leads to compromise of a downstream system.

## **6.4.2 Implementation Best Practices and Vulnerabilities**

### **6.4.2.1 Whitelisting**

#### **Best Practice Description**

The countermeasure, an application whitelist, is a list of applications and application components (libraries, configuration files, etc.) that are known to be benign. The technologies used to apply application whitelists—to control which applications are permitted to execute on a host—are called whitelisting programs, application control programs, or application whitelisting technologies. Application whitelisting technologies are intended to stop the execution of malware, unlicensed software, and other unauthorized software. Unlike security technologies such as antivirus software, which block known bad activity and permit all other, application whitelisting technologies are designed to permit known good activity and block all other.

## **Examples**

- Whitelisting to prevent unintentional use of software (unauthorized software, incorrect software version), and
- Signing of executables (i.e., firmware and device drivers are often signed).

### **6.4.2.2 File Integrity Monitoring**

#### **Best Practice Description**

The countermeasure, establishing a “known and trusted” state based on a policy or standard and using a methodology or tool that finds, alerts, assesses, and acts on changes to the known state as soon as a change occurs. This ensures ongoing system integrity and automates detecting, auditing, and reconciliation of changes.

#### **Examples**

- File system integrity checking to ensure files are not changed, and
- Configuration change setting to ensure operating system settings are not changed.

### **6.4.2.3 Inadequate Malware Protection**

#### **Description**

Malicious software can result in performance degradation, loss of system availability, and the capture, modification, or deletion of data. Malware protection software, such as antivirus software, is needed to prevent systems from being infected by malicious software [§6.6-3].

#### **Examples**

- Malware protection software not installed,
- Malware protection software or definitions not current, and
- Malware protection software implemented without exhaustive testing.

### **6.4.2.4 Installed Security Capabilities Not Enabled by Default**

#### **Description**

Security capabilities must be turned on in order to be useful. There are many examples of operating systems where protections such as firewalls are configured but not enabled out-of-the-box. If protections are not enabled, the system may be unexpectedly vulnerable to attacks. In addition, if the administrator does not realize that protections are disabled, the system may continue in an unprotected state for some time until the omission is noticed.

### **6.4.2.5 Absent or Deficient Equipment Implementation Guidelines**

#### **Description**

Unclear implementation guidelines can lead to unexpected behavior.

A system needs to be configured correctly in order to provide the desired security properties. This applies to both hardware and software configuration. Different inputs and outputs, both logical and physical, will have different security properties, and an interface that is intended for internal use may be more vulnerable than an interface designed for external use. Guidelines for installers, operators, and managers should be clear about the security properties expected of the system and how the system is to be implemented and configured in order to obtain those properties.

### **6.4.3 Operational**

#### **6.4.3.1 Lack of Prompt Security Patches from Software Vendors**

##### **Description**

Software often contains bugs and vulnerabilities. When a vulnerability is disclosed, there is often a race between adversaries and system administrators to either exploit or close the vulnerability. The security of the system using the software depends on vendors' ability to provide patches in a timely manner, and on administrators' ability to implement those patches. As zero-day exploits become more widespread, administrators may be faced with the choice of taking a system offline or leaving it vulnerable.

#### **6.4.3.2 Unneeded Services Running**

##### **Description**

Many operating systems are shipped and installed with a number of services running by default. For example, in the case of UNIX, an installation may automatically offer telnet, ftp, and http servers. Every service that runs is a security risk, because unintended use of the service may provide access to system assets, and the implementation may contain exploitable bugs. Services should run only if needed, and an unneeded service has no benefit and should be treated as a vulnerability.

#### **6.4.3.3 Insufficient Log Management**

##### **Description**

Events from all devices should be logged to a central log management server. Alerts should be configured according to the criticality of the event or a correlation of certain events. For instance, when the tamper-detection mechanism on a device is triggered, an alert should be raised to the appropriate personnel. When a remote power disconnect command is issued to an organization-defined number of meters within a certain time, alerts should also be sent.

##### **Examples**

- Inadequate network security architecture [§6.6-3, Table 3-8];
- Inadequate firewall and router logs [§6.6-3, Table 3-11];
- No security monitoring on the network [§6.6-3, Table 3-11]; and
- Critical monitoring and control paths are not identified [§6.6-3, Table 3-12].

## **Potential Impact**

- Failure to detect critical events;
- Removal of forensic evidence; and
- Log wipes.

### **6.4.4 Poorly configured security equipment [§6.6-3, Table 3-8]**

#### **6.4.4.1 Inadequate Anomaly Tracking**

##### **Description**

Alerts and logging are two useful techniques for detecting and mitigating the risk of anomalous events, but can present security risks or become vulnerabilities if not instituted thoughtfully. The appropriate reaction to an event will vary according to the criticality of the event or a correlation of certain events. The event may also need to be logged, and a central logging facility may be necessary for correlating events. Appropriate event reactions could include automatic paging of relevant personnel in the event of persistent tamper messages or may require positive acknowledgement to indicate supervisory approval has been attained before executing a potentially disruptive command (e.g., simultaneously disconnecting many loads from the electrical grid or granting control access rights to hundreds of users).

## **6.5 NETWORK**

Networks are defined by connections between multiple locations or organizational units and are composed of many differing devices using similar protocols and procedures to facilitate a secure exchange of information. Vulnerabilities and risks occur between and within smart grid networks when policy management and procedures do not conform to required standards and compliance policies as they relate to the data exchanged.

### **6.5.1 Network**

#### **6.5.1.1 Inadequate Integrity Checking**

##### **Description**

The integrity of message protocol and message data should be verified before routing or processing. Devices receiving data not conforming to the protocol or message standard should not act on such traffic (e.g., forwarding to another device or changing its own internal state) as though the data were correctly received.

Such verification should be done before any application attempts to use the data for internal processes or routing to another device. Additionally, special security devices acting as application-level firewalls should be used to perform logical bounds checking, such as preventing the shutdown of all power across an entire neighborhood area network (NAN).

##### **Examples**

- Lack of integrity checking for communications [§6.6-3, Table 3-12],
- Failure to detect and block malicious traffic in valid communication channels,

- Inadequate network security architecture [§6.6-3, Table 3-8],
- Poorly configured security equipment [§6.6-3, Table 3-8], and
- No security monitoring on the network [§6.6-3, Table 3-11].

#### **Potential Impact**

- Compromise of smart device, head node, or utility management servers,
- Buffer overflows, and
- Man-in-the-middle (MitM).

#### **6.5.1.2 Inadequate Network Segregation**

##### **Description**

Network architectures often do not clearly define security zones and control traffic between security zones, providing a flat network, wherein traffic from any portion of the network is allowed to communicate with any other portion of the network. Smart grid examples of inadequate network segregation might include failure to install a firewall to control traffic between a head node and the utility company or failure to prevent traffic from one NAN to another NAN.

##### **Examples**

- Failure to define security zones,
- Failure to control traffic between security zones,
- Inadequate firewall ruleset,
- Firewalls nonexistent or improperly configured [§6.6-3, Table 3-10],
- Improperly configured VLAN,
- Inadequate access controls applied [§6.6-3, Table 3-8],
- Inadequate network security architecture [§6.6-3, Table 3-8],
- Poorly configured security equipment [§6.6-3, Table 3-8],
- Control networks used for non-control traffic [§6.6-3, Table 3-10],
- Control network services not within the control network [§6.6-3, Table 3-10], and
- Critical monitoring and control paths are not identified [§6.6-3, Table 3-12].

##### **Potential Impact**

- Direct compromise of any portion of the network from any other portion of the network,
- Compromise of the Utility network from a NAN network,
- VLAN hopping,
- Network mapping,

- Service/Device exploit,
- Covert channels,
- Back doors,
- Worms and other malicious software, and
- Unauthorized multi-homing.

### **6.5.1.3 Inappropriate Protocol Selection**

#### **Description**

It is important to note that the use of encryption is not always the appropriate choice. A full understanding of the information management capabilities that are lost through the use of encryption should be completed before encrypting unnecessarily.

Use of unencrypted network protocols or weakly encrypted network protocols exposes authentication keys and data payload. This may allow adversaries to obtain credentials to access other devices in the network and decrypt encrypted traffic using those same keys. The use of clear text protocols may also permit adversaries to perform session hijacking and MitM attacks allowing the attacker to manipulate the data being passed between devices.

#### **Examples**

- Standard, well-documented communication protocols are used in plain text in a manner which creates a vulnerability [§6.6-3, Table 3-12], and
- Inadequate data protection is permitted between clients and access points [§6.6-3, Table 3-13].

#### **Potential Impact**

- Compromise of all authentication and payload data being passed,
- Session Hijacking,
- Authentication Sniffing,
- MitM Attacks, and
- Session Injection.

### **6.5.1.4 Weaknesses in Authentication Process or Authentication Keys**

#### **Description**

Authentication mechanism does not sufficiently authenticate devices or exposes authentication keys to attack.

#### **Examples**

- Inappropriate Lifespan for Authentication Credentials/Keys;
- Inadequate Key Diversity;

- Authentication of users, data, or devices is substandard or nonexistent [§6.6-3, Table 3-12];
- Insecure key storage;
- Insecure key exchange;
- Insufficient account lockout;
- Inadequate authentication between clients and access points [§6.6-3, Table 3-13]; and
- Inadequate data protection between clients and access points [§6.6-3, Table 3-13].

#### **Potential Impact**

- DoS / DDoS,
- MitM,
- Session Hijacking,
- Authentication Sniffing, and
- Session Injection.

#### **6.5.1.5 Insufficient Redundancy**

##### **Description**

Architecture does not provide for sufficient redundancy, thus exposing the system to intentional or unintentional denial of service.

##### **Examples**

- Lack of redundancy for critical networks [§6.6-3, Table 3-9].

##### **Potential Impact**

- DoS / DDoS.

#### **6.5.1.6 Physical Access to the Device**

##### **Description**

Access to physical hardware may lead to a number of hardware attacks that can lead to the compromise of all devices and networks. Physical access to smart grid devices should be limited according to the criticality or sensitivity of the device. In other circumstances, tamper resistance, tamper detection, and intrusion detection and alerting are among the many techniques that can complement physically securing devices.

##### **Examples**

- Unsecured physical ports,
- Inadequate physical protection of network equipment [§6.6-3, Table 3-9],
- Loss of environmental control [§6.6-3, Table 3-9], and

- Noncritical personnel have access to equipment and network connections [§6.6-3, Table 3-9].

### Potential Impact

- Malicious configurations,
- MitM,
- EEPROM dumping,
- Micro controller dumping,
- Bus snooping, and
- Key extraction.

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# **CHAPTER 7**

## **BOTTOM-UP SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SMART GRID**

### **7.1 SCOPE**

This section identifies specific protocols, interfaces, applications, and best practices that could and should be developed to solve specific smart grid cybersecurity problems. The section identifies some specific problems and issues that need to be addressed, but does not perform a comprehensive gap analysis that covers all possible cybersecurity issues.

Section 7.2 identifies evident and specific security problems in the smart grid that should have open and interoperable solutions, which are not solved by direct application of existing standards, de facto standards, or best practices. This illustrative list includes only cybersecurity problems that have some specific relevance to or uniqueness in the smart grid. Thus, general cybersecurity problems such as poor software engineering practices, key management, etc. are not included unless these problems have a unique challenge when considered in the context of the smart grid.

In conjunction with developing the list of specific problems, Section 7.3 identifies a list of more abstract security issues, when considered in specific contexts, can reveal specific problems.

Finally, in Section 7.4, a third list of cybersecurity design considerations for smart grid systems discusses important cybersecurity issues that arise in the design, deployment, and use of smart grid systems and that should be considered by system designers, implementers, purchasers, integrators, and users of smart grid technologies. In discussing the relative merits of different technologies or solutions to problems, these design considerations do not recommend specific solutions or requirements. The intention is to highlight important issues that can serve as a means of identifying and formulating requirements and high-level designs for key protocols and interfaces that are missing and need to be developed.

### **7.2 EVIDENT AND SPECIFIC CYBERSECURITY PROBLEMS**

This section documents specific cybersecurity problems in the smart grid by describing field cases that explain the operational, system, and device issues. The problems listed are intentionally not ordered or categorized in any particular way.

#### **7.2.1 Authenticating and Authorizing Utility Users**

This section identifies three examples of authenticating and authorizing users that is unique for the smart grid. The three examples include authenticating and authorizing utility users to substation intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), to outdoor field equipment, and to meters. In each of these examples, role-based, rather than unique user-based access control is commonly used and passwords are shared among organizational users with the same role. Also common across all of the examples is the volume of devices, leading to the same password often being used across all devices and seldom changed. Control of authentication and authorization can be centrally managed for substation IEDs, outdoor field equipment, and to meters across the utility, and is updated promptly to ensure that only intended users can authenticate to intended devices and perform authorized functions.

In the case of substation IEDs, passwords are often stored locally on the device, with different passwords allowing different authorization levels. These role passwords are shared among all users of the device performing the role, possibly including Third Party users. A device may be accessed locally and from a front panel connection, a wired network connection, or possibly via a wireless connection. The device may also be accessed remotely from a different physical location.

Substations generally have connectivity to the control center that may be used to distribute authentication information and collect audit logs, but this connectivity may be as slow as 1200 baud. Performing an authentication protocol such as Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) over this connection is probably not desirable. Additionally, reliance on central authentication servers does not address certain security scenarios. For instance, authentication should continue to apply for personnel accessing devices locally in the substation when control center communications are not available. For applications where central authentication servers are in place, standby policies and procedures should also be in place and implemented in the event communications are not available.

With the infrastructure upgrades because of smart grid, some newer pole-top and other outdoor field equipment support 802.11 or Bluetooth for near-local user access for maintenance. In other cases, pole-top and other outdoor field equipment may not have connectivity to the control center and access will usually be local via wired connections, or near-local via short-range radio.

Strong authentication and authorization measures are preferable, and in cases where there is documented exception to this due to legacy and computing constrained devices, compensating requirements should be in place to mitigate risk to an acceptable level. For example, in many utility organizations, very strong operational control and workflow prioritization is in place, such that all access to field equipment is scheduled, logged, and supervised. In addition, switchgear and other protective equipment generally have tamper detection mechanisms on doors as well as connection logging and reporting such that any unexpected or unauthorized access can be reported immediately.

For utility users (primarily maintenance personnel) accessing a meter, access may be local through the optical port of a meter or remote through the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Meters generally have some sort of connectivity to an AMI head end, but this connectivity may be as slow as 1200 baud or lower (e.g., some power line carrier devices have data rates measured in millibaud) and cannot be assumed to be present in a maintenance scenario.

### **7.2.2 Authenticating Devices**

Smart grid implementation will result in the interconnection of many new kinds of devices and associated challenges related to device authentication. Such scenarios include authentication between the smart meters and AMI head end, between the home area network (HAN) gateway and HAN, and the smart meters and AMI networks. In each scenario, authentication is critical to ensure that control commands are not compromised.

Authenticating communication between smart meters and an AMI head end can help ensure that an adversary cannot falsely claim to be the AMI head end and issue control commands to the meter, update firmware. Authenticating the meter to the AMI head end can help ensure that usage information is retrieved from the correct meter.

As utilities merge and service territories change, a utility will eventually end up with a collection of smart meters from different vendors. Meter to/from AMI head end authentication should be interoperable to ensure that authentication and authorization information need not be updated separately on different vendor's AMI systems.

Demand response (DR) HAN devices should be securely authenticated to the HAN gateway and vice versa. It is important for a HAN device to authenticate any demand-response commands from the DR head end in order to prevent coordinated falsification of control commands across many HAN devices and/or at rapid rates could lead to grid stability problems. It is important that the DR head end authenticate the HAN device to ensure that commands are delivered to the correct device and that responses from that device are not forged.

Interoperability of authentication is essential in order to ensure competition that will lead to low-cost consumer devices. This authentication process should be simple and user-friendly, since it will be utilized and installed by consumers who buy/rent HAN devices. HAN devices obtained by the consumer from the utility may be preprovisioned with authentication information, but HAN devices obtained from retail stores may require provisioning through an Internet connection or may receive their provisioning through the HAN gateway.

Authentication and access control is important to meters and AMI access networks (e.g., neighborhood area networks (NANs) and HANs). Network access authentication tied with access control in the AMI access networks can ensure that only authenticated and authorized entities can gain access to the NANs or HANs. In mesh networks, this functionality should be enforced at each node. The network access authentication should provide mutual authentication between a meter and an access control enforcement point. A trust relationship between the meter and the enforcement point may be dynamically established using a trusted Third Party such as an authentication server.

Providing network access authentication for mesh networks can be more challenging than for non-mesh networks due to the difference in trust models. One trust model for mesh networks is based on a dynamically created hop-by-hop chain of trust between adjacent mesh nodes on the path between a leaf mesh node and the gateway to the AMI network where access control is performed on each intermediate mesh node and the gateway. Another trust model for mesh networks is end-to-end trust between a leaf mesh node and the gateway where intermediate mesh nodes are considered untrusted to the leaf node and a secured tunnel may be created between each leaf node and the gateway. These two trust models can coexist in the same mesh network. However, when two or more interconnected mesh networks are operated in different trust models, end-to-end security across these mesh networks is the only way to provide data security for applications running across the mesh networks.

### **7.2.3 Securing Serial SCADA Communications**

Many legacy substations and distribution communication systems employ serial links for various purposes, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) communications with control centers and distribution field equipment. Furthermore, many of the serial protocols currently in use do not offer mechanisms to protect the integrity or confidentiality of messages, i.e., messages are transmitted in cleartext form. Solutions that wrap serial link messages into protocols like Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) over Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) include overhead imposed by such protocols, both in message payload size

and computational requirements and impact latency and bandwidth of communications on such connections.

#### **7.2.4 Secure End-to-End Meter to Head End Communication**

Secure end-to-end communications protocols such as transport layer security (TLS) and IPsec ensure that confidentiality and integrity of communications is preserved regardless of intermediate hops. End-to-end security between meters and the AMI head end is desirable, and even between HAN devices and DR control services. In both cases, for secure communication between devices, mutual authentication is also desirable.

#### **7.2.5 Access Logs for IEDs**

Not all IEDs create access logs, and due to limited bandwidth to substations, even where access logs are kept, they are often available only locally in the substation. These logs will need to become centralized and standardized so that other security tools, such as security incident and event management (SIEM) tools, can analyze the data. A solution that can operate within the context of bandwidth limitations found in many substations as well as the massively distributed nature of the power grid infrastructure is needed.

#### **7.2.6 Remote Attestation of Meters**

Remote attestation provides a means to determine whether a remote field unit has an expected and approved configuration. For meters, this means the meter is running the correct version of untampered firmware with appropriate settings and has always been running untampered firmware. Remote attestation is particularly important for meters given the easy physical accessibility of meters.

#### **7.2.7 Outsourced WAN Links**

Many utilities are leveraging existing communications infrastructure from telecommunications companies to provide connectivity between generation plants and control centers, between substations and control centers (particularly SCADA), and increasingly between pole-top AMI collectors and AMI head end systems, and pole-top distribution automation equipment and distribution management systems.

Due to the highly distributed nature of AMI, it is more likely that an AMI wide area network (WAN) link will be over a relatively low bandwidth medium such as cellular band wireless (e.g., Evolution Data Optimized (EvDO), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)), or radio networks like FlexNet. The link layer security supported by these networks varies greatly. Later versions of WiMAX can utilize Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) for authentication, but NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-127, *Guide to Security for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) Technologies*, provides a number of recommendations and cautions about WiMAX authentication. With cellular protocols, the AirCards used by the collector modems connect to a wireless cloud, typically shared by all local wireless users, with no point-to-point encryption and no restrictions on whom in the wireless cloud can connect to the collector modem's interface. From the wireless, connectivity to the head end system is usually over the Internet, sometimes using a virtual private network (VPN) connection.

Regardless of the strength of any link layer security implemented by the communications service provider, without end-to-end VPN security, the traffic remains accessible to insiders at the

service provider. This can permit legitimate access such as lawful intercept but also can allow unscrupulous insiders at the service provider access to the traffic.

Additionally, like the mesh wireless portion, cellular networks are subject to intentional and unintentional interference and congestion.

### **7.2.8 Detecting Compromised Field Devices**

There should be a means to detect a penetration of a meter or group of meters in a peer-to-peer mesh environment, isolate and contain any subsequent attempts to penetrate other devices. If an adversary has the capability to reverse engineer a device, built-in protections can eventually be compromised as well. It is an open and challenging problem to perform intrusion detection in a peer-to-peer mesh environment.

### **7.2.9 Securing and Validating Field Device Settings**

Numerous field devices contain settings, for example relay settings that control the conditions such as those under which the relay will trip a breaker. In microprocessor devices, these settings can be changed remotely. One potential form of attack is to tamper with relay settings and then attack in some other way. The tampered relay settings would then exacerbate the consequences of the second attack.

For example, NERC has published a *Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Identifying Critical Cyber Assets* that recognizes the need for protecting the system by which device settings are determined and loaded to field devices.<sup>4</sup> This can include the configuration management process by which the settings are determined. It is also recommended for continuous monitoring of the settings to ensure that they remain the same as intended in the configuration management process.

### **7.2.10 Absolute and Accurate Time Information**

Absolute time is used by many types of power system devices for different functions. In some cases, time may be only informational, but increasingly more and more advanced applications will critically depend on an accurate absolute time reference. According to the NERC Control Systems Security Working Group (CSSWG) document, *Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Time Stamping of Operational Data Logs*,<sup>5</sup> “these applications include, but are not limited to, Power Plant Automation Systems, Substation Automation Systems, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), sequence of event recorders, digital fault recorders, intelligent protective relay devices, Energy Management Systems (EMS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, Plant Control Systems, routers, firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), remote access systems, physical security access control systems, telephone and voice recording systems, video surveillance systems, and log

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<sup>4</sup> North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), *Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Identifying Critical Cyber Assets*, version 1.0, June 17, 2010, 47 pp.

[http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Critical%20Cyber%20Asset\\_approved%20by%20CIPCI%20and%20SC%20for%20Posting%20with%20CIP-002-1,%20CIP-002-2,%20CIP-002-3.pdf](http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Critical%20Cyber%20Asset_approved%20by%20CIPCI%20and%20SC%20for%20Posting%20with%20CIP-002-1,%20CIP-002-2,%20CIP-002-3.pdf) [accessed 8/11/2014].

<sup>5</sup> NERC, *Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector: Time Stamping of Operational Data Logs*, version 0.995 [2009]. [http://www.nerc.com/docs/cip/sgwg/Timestamping\\_Guideline\\_009-11-11\\_Clean.pdf](http://www.nerc.com/docs/cip/sgwg/Timestamping_Guideline_009-11-11_Clean.pdf) [accessed 8/11/2014].

collection and analysis systems” [§7.5-14]. Some detailed examples of the importance of absolute and accurate time follow.

#### **7.2.10.1 Security Protocols**

Time has impact on multiple security protocols, especially in regard to the integrity of authentication schemes and other operations, if it is invalid or tampered with. For example, some protocols can rely on time stamp information to ensure against replay attacks or in other cases against time-based revoked access. Appropriate cybersecurity measures should be in place to ensure that time cannot be tampered with in any system or if it is, to ensure that the breach can be detected, responded to, and contained.

#### **7.2.10.2 Synchrophasors**

Synchrophasor measurement units are increasingly being deployed throughout the grid. A phasor is a vector consisting of magnitude and angle. The angle is a relative quantity and can be interpreted only with respect to a time reference. A synchrophasor is a phasor that is calculated from data samples using a standard time signal as the reference for the sampling process. Synchrophasor measurement units use synchrophasors to measure the current state of the power system more accurately than it can be determined through state estimation. If the time references for enough synchrophasor measurements are incorrect, the measured system state will be incorrect, and corrective actions based on this inaccurate information could lead to grid destabilization.

Synchrophasor measurements are beginning to be used to implement wide area protection schemes. With inaccurate time references, these protection schemes may take inappropriate corrective actions that may further destabilize the system.

#### **7.2.10.3 Certificates: Time and Date Issues**

Certificates are typically used to bind an identity to a public key or keys, facilitating such operations as digital signatures and data encryption. They are widely used on the Internet, but there are some potential problems associated with their use.

Absolute time matters for interpretation of validity periods in certificates. If the system time of a device interpreting a certificate is incorrect, an expired certificate could be treated as valid or a valid certificate could be rejected as expired. This could result in incorrect authentication or rejection of users, incorrect establishment or rejection of VPN tunnels, etc. The Kerberos network authentication protocol (on which Windows domain authentication is based) also depends critically on synchronized clocks.

#### **7.2.10.4 Event Logs and Forensics**

Time stamps in event logs must be based on accurate time sources so that logs from different systems and locations can be correlated to reconstruct historical sequences of events. This applies both to logs of power data and to logs of cybersecurity events. For example, correlating logs of power data from different locations can lead to enhanced understanding and analysis of disturbances and anomalies. Correlating cybersecurity events from different systems is essential to forensic analysis to determine if and how a security breach occurred and to support prosecution.

### **7.2.11 Security for Radio-Controlled Distribution Devices**

Remotely controlled switching devices that are deployed on pole-tops throughout distribution areas have the potential to allow for faster isolation of faults and restoration of service to unaffected areas. Some of these products transmit open and close commands to switches over radio with limited protection of the integrity of these control commands. In some cases, no cryptographic protection is used, while in others the protection is weak in that the same symmetric key is shared among all devices.

### **7.2.12 Weak Protocol Stack Implementations**

Many IP stack implementations in control systems devices are not as advanced as the protocol stacks in modern general-purpose operating systems. Improperly formed or unexpected packets can cause some of these control systems devices to lock up or fault in unexpected ways.

### **7.2.13 Insecure Protocols**

Communication protocols currently used in control systems are not typically implemented with adequate security measures. .

### **7.2.14 Unmanaged Call Home Functions**

Many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software applications and devices attempt to connect to public IP addresses in order to update software or firmware, synchronize time, provide help/support/diagnostic information, enforce licenses, or utilize Internet resources such as mapping tools, search systems, etc. In many cases, use of such call home functions is not obvious and is poorly documented, if any documentation exists. Configuration options to modify or disable call home functions are often hard to find, if available. Examples of such call home functions include:

- Operating system updaters;
- Application updaters, including Web browsers, rendering tools for file formats such as PDF, Flash, QuickTime, Real, etc., printing software and drivers, digital camera software, etc.;
- Network devices that obtain time from one or more Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers;
- Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) devices that register with a public call manager;
- Printers that check for updates and/or check a Web database to ensure valid ink cartridges;
- Applications that link to Web sites for documentation; and
- Applications that display information using mapping tools or Google Earth.

Some call home functions run only when an associated application is used; some are installed as operating system services running on a scheduled basis; and some run continuously on the device or system. Some call home updaters request confirmation from the user before installing updates, while others quietly install updates without interaction. Some call home functions use insecure channels.



Unexpected call home functions that are either unknown to or not anticipated by the smart grid system designer can have serious security consequences. These include:

- Network information leakage;
- Unexpected changes in system configuration through software, firmware, or settings updates;
- Risk of network compromise via compromise of the call home channel or external endpoint;
- Unexpected dependence on external systems, including not only the systems that the call home function calls, but also public DNS and public time sources;
- False positives on IDS systems when outbound connection attempts from call home functions are blocked by a firewall;
- System resource consumption; and
- Additional resource consumption when call home functions continuously attempt to retry connections that are blocked by a firewall.

For the specific case of software or firmware updaters, best practices for patch management recommend deploying patch servers that provide patches to endpoints rather than having those endpoints reach out to the Internet. This provides better control of the patching process. However, most applications use custom updating mechanisms, which can make it difficult to deploy a comprehensive patch system for all operating systems, applications, and devices that may be used by the smart grid system. Further, not all applications and devices provide a way to change their configuration to direct them to a patch server.

### **7.3 NONSPECIFIC CYBERSECURITY ISSUES**

This subsection lists cybersecurity issues that are too abstract to describe in terms of specific security problems but when considered in different contexts (control center, substation, meter, HAN device, etc.) are likely to lead to specific problems.

#### **7.3.1 Patch Management**

Specific devices such as IEDs, PLCs, smart meters, etc., will be deployed in a variety of environments and critical systems, and their accessibility may necessitate undertaking complex activities to enable software upgrades or patches due to the distributed and isolated nature of the equipment. Also, many unforeseen consequences can arise from changing firmware in a device that is part of a larger engineered system. Control systems require considerable testing and qualification to maintain reliability factors. The patch, test, and deploy lifecycle for the electricity sector can take a year or more to qualify a patch or upgrade; there are unique challenges in how security upgrades to firmware need to be managed.

#### **7.3.2 System Trust Model**

There should be a clear idea of what elements of the system are trusted—and to what level and why. There will always be something in the system that has to be trusted; the key is to identify the technologies, people, and processes that form the basis of that trust. For example, one could trust a private network infrastructure more than an open public network, because the former

poses less risk. However, there are dependencies based on the design and management of that network that would inform the trust being vested in it.

### **7.3.3 User Trust Model**

Many operational areas within the smart grid are managed and maintained by small groups of trusted individuals operating as close-knit teams. These individuals are characterized by multi-decade experience and history in their companies. Examples include distribution operations departments, field operations, and distribution engineering/planning. In terms of personnel security, it may be worthwhile considering “two-person integrity,” or “TPI,” a security measure to prevent single-person access to key management mechanisms. This practice comes from national security environments but may have some applicability to the smart grid where TPI security measures might be thought of as somewhat similar to the safety precaution of having at least two people working in hazardous environments. Another area of concern related to personnel issues has to do with not having a backup to someone having a critical function; in other words, a person (actor) as a single point of failure (SPOF).

### **7.3.4 Security Levels**

A security model should be built with different security levels that depend on the design of the network/system architecture, security infrastructure, and how trusted the overall system and its elements are. This model can help put the choice of technologies and architectures within a security context and guide the choice of security solutions.

### **7.3.5 Distributed vs. Centralized Model of Management**

There are unique issues associated with how to manage a system as distributed as the smart grid, yet maintain efficiency and reliability factors that imply centralization. Many grid systems are highly distributed, geographically isolated, and require local autonomy—as commonly found in modern substations. Yet these systems need to have a measure of centralized security management in terms of event logging/analysis, authentication, etc. There should be a series of standards in this area that can strike the right balance and provide for the “hybrid” approach necessary for the smart grid.

### **7.3.6 Intrusion Detection for Power Equipment**

One issue specific to power systems is handling specialized protocols like Modbus, DNP3, IEC 61850, etc., and standardized IDS and security event detection and management models should be built for these protocols and systems. More specifically, these models should represent a deep contextual understanding of device operation and state to be able to detect when anomalous commands might create an unforeseen and undesirable impact.

### **7.3.7 Network and System Monitoring and Management for Power Equipment**

Power equipment does not necessarily use common and open monitoring protocols and management systems. Rather, those systems often represent a fusion of proprietary or legacy-based protocols. There is a need for information models and protocols that can be used over a large variety of transports and devices, bridging power equipment into traditional IT monitoring systems for their cyber aspects. The system monitoring and management interfaces will have to work within a context of massive scale, distribution, and often, bandwidth-limited connections.

### **7.3.8 Security Information and Event Management**

Building on more advanced IDS forms for smart grid, security monitoring data/information from a wide array of power and network devices/systems should become centralized and analyzed for detecting events on a correlated basis. There should be clear methods of incident response to events that are coordinated between control system and IT groups, as both of these groups should be involved in security event definition. There are additional security and privacy aspects that should be considered as security event information is shared across and within organizations.

### **7.3.9 Trust Management**

Appropriate trust of a device should be based on the physical and logical ability to protect that device, and on protections available in the network. There are many smart grid devices that are physically accessible to adversaries by the nature of their locations, such as meters and pole-top devices, which also have limited anti-tamper protections due to cost. Systems that communicate with these devices should use multiple methods to validate messages received, should be designed to account for the possibility that exposed devices may be compromised in ways that escape detection, and should never fully trust those devices.

For example, even when communicating with meters authenticated by public key methods and with strong tamper resistance, unexpected or unusual message types, message lengths, message content, or communication frequency or behavior could indicate that the meter's tamper resistance has been defeated and its private keys have been compromised. Such a successful attack on a meter should not result in possible compromise of the AMI head end.

Similarly, because most pole-top devices have very little physical protection, the level of trust for those devices should be limited accordingly. An adversary could replace the firmware, or, in many systems, simply place a malicious device between the pole-top device and the network connection to the Utility network. If the head end system for the pole-top devices places too much trust in them, a successful attack on a pole-top device can be used as an intermediary to attack the head end.

Trust management lays out several levels of trust based on physical and logical access control and the criticality of the system. In this type of trust management, each system in the smart grid is categorized not only for its own needs, but according to the required trust and/or limitations on trust mandated by our ability to control physical and logical access to it and the desire to do so (criticality of the system). This will lead to a more robust system where compromise of a less trusted component will not easily lead to compromise of more trusted components.

### **7.3.10 Tamper Evidence**

In lieu of or in addition to tamper resistance, tamper evidence is desirable for many devices. Both tamper resistance and tamper evidence should be resistant to false positives in the form of both natural actions and adversarial actions. For example, tamper evidence for meters cannot require physical inspection of the meter, since this would conflict with zero-touch after installation, but physical indicators may be appropriate for devices in substations.

### **7.3.11 Challenges with Securing Serial Communications**

Cryptographic protocols such as TLS can impose too much overhead on bandwidth-constrained serial communications channels. Bandwidth-conserving and latency-sensitive methods are

required in order to secure many of the legacy devices that will continue to form the basis of many systems used in the grid.

### **7.3.12 Legacy Equipment with Limited Resources**

The life cycle of equipment in the electricity sector typically extends beyond 20 years. Technology advances at a far more rapid rate, and security technologies typically match the trend. Legacy equipment is resource-limited, making it difficult and in some cases impractical to add security to the legacy device itself without consuming all available resources or significantly impacting performance to the point that the primary function and reliability of the device are hindered. In many cases, the legacy device simply does not have the resources available to upgrade security on the device through firmware changes.

### **7.3.13 Costs of Patch and Applying Firmware Updates**

The costs associated with applying patches and firmware updates to devices in the electricity sector are significant. The balance of cost versus benefit of the security measure in the risk mitigation and decision process can prove prohibitive for the deployment if the cost outweighs the benefits of the deployed patch. Decision makers may choose to accept the risk if the cost is too high compared to the impact.

The length of time to qualify a patch or firmware update, and the lack of centralized and remote patch/firmware management solutions, contributes to higher costs associated with patch management and firmware updates in the electricity sector. Upgrades to devices in the electricity sector can take a year or more to qualify. Extensive regression testing is extremely important to ensure that an upgrade to a device will not negatively impact reliability, but that testing also adds cost. Once a patch or firmware update is qualified for deployment, asset owners typically need to perform the upgrade at the physical location of the device due to a lack of tools for centralized and remote patch/firmware management.

### **7.3.14 Forensics and Related Investigations**

With smart grid technology, additional threats that may require a greater capability for generating and capturing forensic data. For example, such as smart meters should be capable of detecting and reporting physical tampering to identify energy theft or billing fraud. Additionally HAN equipment will need to interact with the meter to support DR, necessitating the tools and data to diagnose problems resulting from either intentional manipulation or other causes. While it is rare that forensics the sole basis for a successful prosecution or civil suit, it is critical that reliable means be defined to gather evidentiary material where applicable and that the tools be provided to maintain chain of custody, reduce the risk of spoliation, and ensure that the origin of the evidence can be properly authenticated. Tools should be capable of retrieving data from meters, collectors, and head end systems, as well as other embedded systems in substations, commercial and industrial customer equipment, and sensors along the lines in a read-only manner either at the source or over the network in accordance with legal and regulatory constraints.

### **7.3.15 Roles and Role-Based Access Control**

A role is a collection of permissions that may be granted to a user. An individual user may be given several roles or may be permitted different roles in different circumstances and may thereby exercise different sets of permissions in different circumstances.

Roles clearly should relate to the structure of the entity and its policies regarding appropriate access. Both the structure and access policies properly flow down from regulatory requirements and organizational governance.

Issues in implementing role-based access control (RBAC) include the following:

1. The extent to which roles should be predefined in standards versus providing the flexibility for individual entities to define their own. Such roles might include—
  - Auditors: users with the ability to only read/verify the state of the devices (this may include remote attestation);
  - System dispatchers: users who perform system operational functions in control centers;
  - Protection engineers: users who determine and install/update settings of protective relays and retrieve log information for analysis of disturbances;
  - Substation maintainers: users who maintain substation equipment and have access requirements to related control equipment;
  - Administrators: users who can add, remove, or modify the rights of other users; and
  - Security officers: users who are able to change the security parameters of the device (e.g., authorize firmware updates).
2. Management and usability of roles.
3. Policies should be expressed in a manner that is implementable and relates to an entity's implemented roles.
4. Support for nonhierarchical roles. The best example is originator and checker (e.g., of device settings). Any of a group of people can originate and check, but the same person cannot do both for the same item.
5. Approaches to expressing roles in a usable manner.
6. Support for emergency access that may need to bypass normal role assignment.
7. Identification of devices that should to support RBAC.

### **7.3.16 Limited Sharing of Vulnerability and/or Incident Information**

There are significant challenges with respect to sharing information about vulnerabilities or incidents in any critical infrastructure industry. There should be a framework for securely sharing such information and quickly coming to field-level mitigations until infrastructure can be upgraded. This system should also include accountability and confidentiality when sharing sensitive vulnerability information.

### **7.3.17 Traffic Analysis**

Traffic analysis is the examination of patterns and other communications characteristics to glean information. Such examination is possible, even if the communication is encrypted. Examples of relevant characteristics include—

- The identity of the parties to the communication (possibly determined from address or header information sent “in the clear” even for otherwise encrypted messages);
- Message length, frequency, and other patterns in the communications; and
- Characteristics of the signals that may facilitate identification of specific devices, such as modems. An example of such a characteristic might be the detailed timing or shape of the waveforms that represent bits.

Traffic analysis could enable an eavesdropper to gain information prohibited by such regulations. In addition, even if operational information were encrypted, traffic analysis could provide an attacker with enough information on the operational situation to enable more sophisticated timing of physical or cyber attacks.

### **7.3.18 Poor Software Engineering Practices**

Poor software engineering practices, such as those identified in Chapter 6 “Vulnerability Classes,” can lead to software that misoperates and may represent a security problem. Such problems are well known in software, but it should be recognized that embedded firmware may also be susceptible to such vulnerabilities [§7.5-12], and that many of the same good software engineering practices that help prevent these vulnerabilities in software may also be used for that purpose with firmware.

### **7.3.19 Attribution of Faults to the Security System**

When communications or services fail in networks, there is a tendency to assume this failure is caused by the security system. This can lead to disabling the security system temporarily during problem resolution—or even permanently if re-enabling security is forgotten. Security systems for the smart grid should allow and support troubleshooting.

## **7.4 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS**

This subsection discusses cybersecurity considerations that arise in the design, deployment, and use of smart grid systems and should be taken into account by system designers, implementers, purchasers, integrators, and users of smart grid technologies. In discussing the relative merits of different technologies or solutions to problems, these design considerations stop short of recommending specific solutions or even requirements.

### **7.4.1 Break Glass Authentication**

Authentication failure should not interfere with the need for personnel to perform critical tasks during an emergency situation. An alternate form of “break glass” authentication may be necessary to ensure that access can be gained to critical devices and systems by personnel when ordinary authentication fails for any reason. A “break glass” authentication mechanism should have the following properties—

- Locally autonomous operation—to prevent failure of the “break glass” authentication mechanism due to failure of communications lines or secondary systems;
- Logging—to ensure that historical records of use of the “break glass” mechanism, including time, date, location, name, employee number, etc., are kept;
- Alarming—to report use of the “break glass” mechanism in real-time or near real-time to an appropriate management authority, e.g., to operators at a control center or security desk;
- Limited authorization—to enable only necessary emergency actions and block use of the “break glass” mechanism for non-emergency tasks; disabling logging particularly should not be allowed; and
- Appropriate policies and procedures—to ensure the “break glass” authentication is used only when absolutely necessary and does not become the normal work procedure.

Possible methods for performing “break glass” authentication include but are not limited to—

- Backup authentication via an alternate password that is not normally known or available but can be retrieved by phone call to the control center, by opening a sealed envelope carried in a service truck, etc.;
- Digital certificates stored in two-factor authentication tokens; and
- One-time passwords.

#### **7.4.2 Biometrics**

Biometrics (such as fingerprint and iris), usually used in conjunction with a token, can provide strong security authentication and access. Biometrics-based authentication is often used in high-security environments where access to the assets is required. Biometrics provides an extra level of authentication when entering a physical area or for logical access to a resource.

#### **7.4.3 Password Complexity Rules**

Password complexity rules are intended to ensure that passwords cannot be guessed or cracked by either online or offline password-cracking techniques. Offline password cracking is a particular risk for field equipment in unmanned substations or on pole-tops where the equipment is vulnerable to physical attack that could result in extraction of password hash databases and for unencrypted communications to field equipment where password hashes could be intercepted.

Incompatible password complexity requirements can make reuse of a password across two different systems impossible. This can improve security since compromise of the password from one system will not result in compromise of password of the other system. Incompatible password complexity requirements might be desirable to force users to choose different passwords for systems with different security levels, e.g., corporate desktop vs. control system. However, forcing users to use too many different passwords can cause higher rates of forgotten passwords and lead users to write passwords down, thereby reducing security. Due to the large number of systems that utility engineers may need access to, reuse of passwords across multiple systems may be necessary. Incompatible password complexity requirements can also cause interoperability problems and make centralized management of passwords for different systems impossible. NIST SP 800-63-2, *Electronic Authentication Guideline* [§7.5-15], contains some

guidance on measuring password strength and recommendations for minimum password strengths.

Some considerations for password complexity rules—

1. Requirements are based on a commonly recognized standard
2. Determination that the requirements are strong enough to measurably increase the effort required to crack passwords that meet the rules.
3. If there are hard constraints in the requirements (e.g., minimum and maximum lengths, min and max upper and lowercase, etc.) or soft constraints that simply measure password strength.
4. If any hard constraints include "upper bounds" that can make selecting a password that meets two or more different complexity requirement sets impossible. For example, “must start with a number” and “must start with a letter” are irreconcilable requirements, whereas “must contain a number” and “must contain a letter” do not conflict.
5. If there are alternatives to password complexity rules (such as running password-cracking programs on passwords as they are chosen) or two-factor authentication that can significantly increase security over that provided by password complexity rules while minimizing user burden.

#### **7.4.4 Network Access Authentication and Access Control**

Several link-layer and network-layer protocols provide network access authentication using Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [§7.5-1]. EAP supports a number of authentication algorithms, also referred to as EAP methods.

Currently EAP-TLS [§7.5-2] and EAP-GPSK (Generalized Pre-Shared Key) [§7.5-3] are the IETF Standard Track EAP methods generating key material and supporting mutual authentication. EAP can also be used to provide a key hierarchy to allow confidentiality and integrity protection to be applied to link-layer frames.

EAP IEEE 802.1X [§7.5-4] provides port access control and transports EAP over Ethernet and Wi-Fi. In WiMAX, PKMv2 (Privacy Key Management version 2) in IEEE 802.16e [§7.5-5] transports EAP. PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access) [§7.5-6] transports EAP over UDP/IP (User Datagram Protocol/Internet Protocol). TNC (Trusted Network Connect) [§7.5-7] is an open architecture to enable network operators to enforce policies regarding endpoint integrity using the above mentioned link-layer technologies. There are also ongoing efforts in ZigBee® Alliance [§7.5-8] to define a network access authentication mechanism for ZigBee Smart Energy Profile 2.0.

In a large-scale deployment, EAP is typically used in pass-through mode where an EAP server is separated from EAP authenticators, and an AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) protocol such as RADIUS [§7.5-9] is used by a pass-through EAP authenticator for forwarding EAP messages back and forth between an EAP peer to the EAP server. The pass-through authenticator mode introduces a three-party key management, and a number of security considerations so called EAP key management framework [§7.5-10] have been made. If an AMI network makes use of EAP for enabling confidentiality and integrity protection at link-layer, it is expected to follow the EAP key management framework.



### **7.4.5 Use of Shared/Dedicated and Public/Private Cyber Resources**

The decision whether to use the public Internet or any shared resource, public or private, will have significant impact on the architecture, design, cost, security, and other aspects of any part of the smart grid. This section provides a list of attributes with which architects and designers can conduct a cost/trade analysis of these different types of resources.

The objective of any such analysis is to understand the types of information that will be processed by the cyber resources under consideration, and to evaluate the information needs relative to security and other operational factors. These needs should be evaluated against the costs of using different types of resources. For example, use of the public Internet may be less costly than developing, deploying, and maintaining a new infrastructure, but it may carry with it performance or security considerations to meet the requirements of the smart grid information that would have to be weighed against the cost savings.

Each organization should conduct its own analyses—there is not one formula that is right for all cases.

#### **7.4.5.1 Definitions**

There are two important definitions to keep in mind when performing the analysis—

1. Cyber Equipment—anything that processes or communicates smart grid information or commands.
2. Internet—An element of smart grid data is said to have used the Internet if at any point while traveling from the system that generates the data-containing message to its ultimate destination it passes through a resource with an address within an RIR (Regional Internet Registry) address space.

#### **7.4.5.2 Checklist/Attribute Groupings**

The following five lists contain attributes relevant to one dimension of the cost/trade analysis—

1. Attributes related to smart grid Information—this list could be viewed as the requirements of the information that is to be processed by the smart grid cyber resource;
  - a. Sensitivity and Security Requirements;
    - Integrity,
    - Confidentiality,
    - Timeliness considerations—how long is the information sensitive?
    - Availability, and
    - Strategic vs. tactical information—aggregation considerations/impacts;
  - b. Ownership—who owns the data;
  - c. Who has a vested interest in the data (e.g., customer use data);
  - d. Performance/Capacity/Service-level requirements; and
    - Latency,

- Frequency of transmission,
    - Volume of data,
    - Redundancy/Reliability, and
    - Quality of Service; and
  - e. Legal/Privacy considerations—in this context, privacy is not related to protection of the data as it moves through the smart grid. It is related to concerns stakeholders in the information would have in its being shared. For example, commercial entities might not wish to have divulged how much energy they use.
2. Attributes of a Smart Grid Cyber Resource—cyber resources have capabilities/attributes that must be evaluated against the requirements of the smart grid information;
- a. Ownership
    - Dedicated, and
    - Shared;
  - b. Controlled/managed by
    - Internal management,
    - Outsourced management to another organization, and
    - Outsourced management where the resource can be shared with others;
  - c. Geographic considerations—jurisdictional consideration;
  - d. Physical Protections that can be used
    - Media,
      - 1. Wired, and
      - 2. Wireless.
        - a. Not directed, and
        - b. Directed
    - Equipment, and
    - Site;
  - e. Performance/Scale Characteristics
    - Capacity per unit time (for example, a measure of bandwidth),
    - Maximum utilization percentage,
    - Ability to scale—related to this is the likelihood of a resource being scaled—including the factors (economic and technical) driving or inhibiting upgrade,
    - Latency, and
    - Migration—ability to take advantage of new technologies;
  - f. Reliability;

- g. Ability to have redundant elements; and
  - h. Known security vulnerabilities.
    - Insider attacks,
    - DOS,
    - DDOS, and
    - Dependency on other components.
3. Attributes related to Security and Security Properties—given a type of information and the type of cyber resource under consideration, a variety of security characteristics could be evaluated—including different security technologies and appropriate policies given the information processed by, and attributes of, the cyber resource.
- a. Physical security and protection;
  - b. Cyber protection
    - Application level controls,
    - Network level controls, and
    - System;
  - c. Security/Access policies
    - Inter organizational, and
    - Intra organizational;
  - d. Cross-administrative domain boundary policies; and
  - e. Specific technologies.
4. Attributes related to Operations and Management—one of the most complex elements of a network is the ongoing operations and management necessary after it has been deployed. This set of attributes identifies key issues to consider when thinking about different types of smart grid cyber resources (e.g., public/private and shared/dedicated).
- a. Operations
    - People,
      - 1. Domain Skills (e.g., knowledge of control systems), and
      - 2. IT Operations Skills (e.g., systems and network knowledge).
    - Processes
      - 1. Coordination
        - a. Within a department,
        - b. Across departments, and
        - c. Across organizations/enterprises.
      - 2. Access Controls

- a. Third Party, and
        - Frequency,
        - Control, and
        - Trusted/Untrusted party (e.g., vetting process).
      - b. Employees; and
    - 3. Auditing.
  - b. System-level and Automated Auditing;
  - c. Monitoring
    - Unit(s) monitored—granularity,
    - Frequency,
    - Alarming and events,
    - Data volume,
    - Visibility to data,
    - Sensitivity, and
    - Archival and aggregation; and
  - d. Management.
    - Frequency of change,
    - Granularity of change,
    - Synchronization changes,
    - Access control,
    - Rollback and other issues, and
    - Data management of the configuration information.
5. Attributes related to costs—the cost attributes should be investigated against the different types of cyber resources under consideration. For example, while a dedicated resource has a number of positive performance attributes, there can be greater cost associated with this resource. Part of the analysis should be to determine if the benefits justify the cost. The cost dimension will cut across many other dimensions.
- a. Costs related to the data
    - Cost per unit of data,
    - Cost per unit of data over a specified time period, and
    - Oversubscription or SLA costs;
  - b. Costs related to resources (cyber resources)
    - Resource acquisition cost (properly apportioned),
    - Resource installation cost,

- Resource configuration,
- Resource operation and management cost, and
- Monitoring cost;
- c. Costs related to operational personnel
  - Cost of acquisition,
  - Cost of ongoing staffing, and
  - Cost of Training;
- d. Costs related to management software
  - Infrastructure costs,
  - Software acquisition costs,
  - Software deployment and maintenance costs, and
  - Operational cost of the software—staff, etc.; and
- e. Sharing of common costs.

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# CHAPTER 8

## RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT THEMES FOR CYBERSECURITY IN THE SMART GRID

### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity is one of the key technical areas where the state of the art falls short of meeting the envisioned functional, reliability, and scalability requirements of the smart grid. This chapter is the deliverable originally produced by the R&D subgroup of SGIP-CSWG based on the inputs from various group members with updates made for the first revision of this document. In general, research involves discovery of the basic science that supports a product's viability (or lays the foundation for achieving a target that is currently not achievable), development refers to turning something into a useful product or solution, and engineering refines a product or solution to a cost and scale that makes it economically viable. Another differentiation is basic research, which delves into scientific principles (usually done in universities), and applied research, which uses basic research to better human lives. Research can be theoretical or experimental. Finally, there is long-term (5–10 years) and short-term (less than 5 years) research. This chapter stops short of specifying which of the above categories each research problem falls into and does not discuss whether something is research, development, engineering, short-term, or long-term, although we might do so in future revisions. In general, this chapter distills research and development themes that are meant to present paradigm changing directions in cybersecurity that will enable higher levels of reliability and security for the smart grid as it continues to become more technologically advanced.

The topics are based partly on the experience of members of the SGIP-CSWG R&D group and research problems that are widely publicized. The raw topics submitted by individual group members were collected in a flat list and iterated over to disambiguate and re-factor them to a consistent set. The available sections were then edited, consolidated, and reorganized as the following five high-level theme areas:

- Device level
- Cryptography and key management
- Systems and distributed systems level
- Networking issues
- Other security issues in the smart grid context

These five groups collectively represent an initial cut at the thematic issues requiring immediate research and development to make the smart grid vision a viable reality. This document is written as an independent collection of research themes, and as such, the sections do not necessarily flow from introduction to summary.

## **8.2 DEVICE-LEVEL TOPICS—COST-EFFECTIVE TAMPER-RESISTANT DEVICE ARCHITECTURES**

### **8.2.1 Improve Cost-Effective High Tamper-Resistant and Survivable Device Architectures**

With intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) playing more critical roles in the smart grid, there is an increasing need to ensure that those IEDs are not easily attacked by firmware updates, commandeered by a spoofed remote device, or swapped out by a rogue device. At the same time, because of the unique nature and scale of these devices, protection measures should be cost-effective as to deployment and use, and the protection measures must be mass-producible. Some initial forms of these technologies are in the field, but there is a growing belief that further improvement is needed, as security researchers have already demonstrated penetrations of these devices—even with some reasonable protections in place. Further, it is important to assume devices will be penetrated, and there must be a method for containment and implementing secure recovery measures using remote means.

Research is needed in devising scalable, cost-effective device architectures that can form a robust hardware and software basis for overall systems-level survivability and resiliency. Such architectures must be highly tamper-resistant and evident, and provide for secure remote recovery. Research into improved security for firmware/software upgrades is also needed.

Potential starting points for these R&D efforts are

- NIST crypto tamper-evident requirements;
- Mitigating and limiting the value of attacks at end-points (containment regions in the smart grid architecture); and
- Expiring lightweight keys.

### **8.2.2 Intrusion Detection with Embedded Processors**

Research is needed to find ways to deal with the special features and specific limitations of embedded processors used in the power grid. A large number of fairly powerful processors, but with tighter resources than general-purpose computers and strict timeliness requirements, embedded in various types of devices, are expected to form a distributed internetwork of embedded systems. This work should also investigate the possible applications of advanced intrusion detection systems and the types of intrusion detection that may be possible for embedded processors, such as real-time intrusion detection.

## **8.3 CRYPTOGRAPHY AND KEY MANAGEMENT**

### **8.3.1 Topics in Cryptographic Key Management**

Smart grid deployments such as AMI will entail remote control of a large number of small processors acting as remote sensors, such as meters and smart devices. Home Area Networks (HANs) provide local sensing and actuation of smart appliances. HANs and devices may communicate and negotiate in a peer-to-peer manner. Security for such systems entails both key management on a scale involving possibly tens of millions of credentials and keys, and local cryptographic processing on the sensors such as encryption and digital signatures. This calls for



research on large-scale, economic key management in conjunction with cryptography that can be carried out effectively on processors with strict limits on space and computation. Existing key management systems and methods could be explored as a basis of further innovation; examples can include public key infrastructure (PKI), identity-based encryption (IBE), and hierarchical, decentralized, and delegated schemes and their hybridization.

There are also problems of ownership (e.g., utility vs. customer-owned) and trust, and how both can be optimally managed in environments where there is little physical protection and access may happen across different organizational and functional domains (e.g., a hub of multiple vendors/service providers, in-home gateway, aggregator, etc.) with their own credentials and security levels. This requires research into new forms of trust management, partitioning, tamper-proofing/detection, and federated ID management that can scale and meet reliability standards needed for the smart grid.

The various devices/systems that will be found in the areas of distributed automation, AMI, distributed generation, substations, etc., will have many resource-constraining factors that have to do with limited memory, storage, power (battery or long sleep cycles), bandwidth, and intermittent connections. All of these factors require research into more efficient, ad hoc, and flexible key management that requires less centralization and persistent connectivity and yet can retain the needed security and trust levels of the entire infrastructure as compared to conventional means.

Emergency (bypass) operations are a critical problem that must optimally be addressed. There are cases where security measures degrade the reliability of the system by, for example, “locking out” personnel/systems during a critical event. Similarly, restoring power may require systems to “cold boot” their trust/security with little to no access to external authentication/authorization services. This requires research into key management and cryptography schemes that can support bypass means and yet remain secure in their daily operations.

Encrypted communications should not hinder existing power system and information and communication systems monitoring for reliability and security requirements (possibly from multiple parties of different organizations). Depending on the system context, this problem may require research into uniquely secure and diverse escrow schemes and supporting key management and cryptography that meet the various smart grid requirements discussed in this report.

### **8.3.2 Advanced Topics in Cryptography**

Several security and privacy requirements for the smart grid may benefit from advanced cryptographic algorithms.

#### **8.3.2.1 Privacy-enhancing cryptographic algorithms**

Privacy-enhancing cryptographic algorithms can mitigate privacy concerns related to the collection of consumer data by computing functions on ciphertexts. This can be beneficial for Third Party providers who want to access encrypted databases and would like to compute statistics over the data. Similarly, while utilities need to collect individual measurements for billing, they do not require real-time individual data collection to operate their network. Therefore, they can use aggregated data representing the consumption at a data aggregator. Homomorphic encryption schemes can provide privacy-preserving meter aggregation by

performing additive computations on encrypted data. Using aggregated data limits the ability of the utility or any Third Party from learning individual consumer usage profiles. Research is needed on extending the efficiency and generality of current homomorphic encryption schemes to provide universal computation.

### **8.3.2.2 Cryptographic in-network aggregation schemes**

Cryptographic in-network aggregation schemes have the potential of improving the efficiency of many-to-one communications in the smart grid, like those generated from multiple sensors to a single or a small number of designated collection points. To achieve efficient in-network aggregation, intermediate nodes in the routing protocol need to modify data packets in transit; for this reason, standard signature and encryption schemes are not applicable, and it is a challenge to provide resilience to tampering by malicious nodes. Therefore, homomorphic encryption and signature schemes tailored for efficient in-network aggregation are needed.

### **8.3.2.3 Identity-Based Encryption**

Key distribution and key revocation are some of the most fundamental problems in key distribution for systems. Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a new cryptographic primitive that eliminates the need for distributing public keys (or maintaining a certificate directory) because identities are automatically bound to their public keys. This allows, for example, a Third Party for energy services to communicate securely to their customers without requiring them to generate their keys. IBE also eliminates the need for key revocation because IBE can implement time-dependent public keys by attaching a validity period to each public key. In addition, for enterprise systems, a key escrow is an advantage for recovering from errors. IBE provides this service because the private-key generator (PKG) can obtain the secret key of participants. This property suggests that IBE schemes are suitable for applications where the PKG is unconditionally trusted. Extending this level of trust for larger federated systems is not possible; therefore, very large deployments require hybrid schemes with traditional public key cryptography and certificates for the IBE parameters of each enterprise or domain. Alternatively, we can extend pure IBE approaches with further research on certificate-based encryption.

### **8.3.2.4 Access control without a mediated, trusted Third Party**

The limited or intermittent connectivity of several smart grid devices requires further research into access control mechanisms without an online Third Party. Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is an emerging crypto-system that can be thought of as a generalization of IBE. In ABE schemes, a trusted entity distributes attribute or predicate keys to users. Data owners encrypt their data using the public parameters and attributes provided by the trusted entity or an attribute policy of their choosing. In ABE, users are able to decrypt ciphertexts only if the attributes associated with the ciphertext (or the keys of the users) satisfy the policy associated with the ciphertext (or the predicate associated with their keys); therefore, access control can be achieved without an online trusted server.

### **8.3.2.5 Interoperability with limited or no online connectivity**

The limited or intermittent connectivity of smart grid devices may require local (e.g., HAN) mechanisms for key and content management. Proxy re-encryption and proxy re-signature schemes can alleviate this problem. In these schemes, a semi-trusted proxy (e.g., a HAN interoperability device) can convert a signature or a ciphertext computed under one key (e.g., the

public key of device A) to another (e.g., the public key of device B), without the proxy learning any information about the plaintext message or the secret keys of the delegating party.

## **8.4 SYSTEMS-LEVEL TOPICS - SECURITY AND SURVIVABILITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE SMART GRID**

The smart grid is a long-term and expensive resource that must be built future-proof. It needs to be designed and built to adapt to changing needs in terms of scale and functionality, and at the same time, to tolerate and survive malicious attacks of the future. Research is needed to develop an advanced protection architecture that is dynamic (can evolve) and focuses on resiliency (tolerating failures, perhaps of a significant subset of constituents). A number of research challenges that are particularly important in the smart grid context are described in the following subsections.

### **8.4.1 Scalability**

The introduction of smart appliances and home area networks (HANs) increases the number of devices that a utility must manage by orders of magnitude. A utility with 1 million customers currently monitoring 1 million meters will conservatively see the number of devices two orders of magnitude higher (perhaps 100 million devices). The ability to control and schedule these through a central SCADA system will be severely limited. As such reliance will need to be on scheduling through HANs and distributed peer-to-peer energy management, or, an “energy internet.” System vulnerabilities will be increased through the addition of potential attack points. The increased number of devices will impact system reliability and system reliability models.

### **8.4.2 Architecting for bounded recovery and reaction**

Effective recovery requires containing the impact of a failure (accidental or malicious); enough resources and data (e.g., state information) positioned to regenerate the lost capability; and real-time decision-making and signaling to actuate the reconfiguration and recovery steps. Even then, guaranteeing the recovery within a bounded time is a hard problem and can be achieved only under certain conditions. To complicate things further, different applications in the smart grid will have different elasticity and tolerance, and recovery mechanisms may themselves affect the timeliness of the steady state, not-under-attack operation.

With the presence of renewable energy sources that can under normal operation turn on or off unpredictably (cloud cover or lack of wind) and mobile energy sinks (such as the hybrid vehicle) whose movement cannot be centrally controlled, the smart grid becomes much more dynamic in its operational behavior. Reliability will increasingly depend on the ability to react to these events within a bounded time while limiting the impact of changes within a bounded spatial region.

Further R&D in the area of reliability may consider the design of a wide-area distributed system (i.e., the smart grid) such that its key components and designated events have a bounded recovery and reaction time.

### **8.4.3 Architecting Real-time Security**

In the context of smart grid, the power industry will increasingly rely on real-time systems for advanced controls. These systems must meet requirements for applications that have a specific

window of time to correctly execute. Some “hard real-time” applications must execute within a few milliseconds. Wide area protection and control systems will require secure communications that must meet tight time constraints. Cyber-physical systems often entail temporal constraints on computations because control must track the dynamic changes in a physical process.

Typically such systems have been treated as self-contained and free of cybersecurity threats.

However, combined with the threat environment today, such systems should a range of security measures that take into account the real-time requirements, including the overhead resulting from these security mechanisms. In some cases, security mechanisms have the potential to violate the real-time requirements by introducing uncontrollable or unbounded delays.

Research in this area should provide strategies for minimizing and making predictable the timing impacts of security protections such as encryption, authentication, and rekeying and exploiting these strategies for grid control with security.

#### **8.4.4 Calibrating assurance and timeliness trade-offs**

There are various sources of delay in the path between two interacting entities in the smart grid (e.g., from the sensor that captures the measurement sample such as the phasor measurement unit (PMU) to the application that consumes it, or from the applications at the control center that invoke operations, upload firmware, or change parameter values to the affected remote smart device). Some delay sources represent security mechanisms that already exist in the system. To defend against potential attacks, additional security mechanisms are needed—which in turn, may add more delay. On the other hand, security is not absolute, and quantifying cybersecurity is already a hard problem. Given the circular dependency between security and delay, the various delay sources in the wide area system, and the timeliness requirements of the smart grid applications, there is a need and challenge to organize and understand the delay-assurance tradespace for potential solutions that are appropriate for grid applications. As the smart grid scales, the ability of humans to react to systems operating in the millisecond time scale becomes limited. As such, there will need to be more reliance on embedded monitors and distributed embedded monitors to provide diagnosis and recovery actions. Without an understanding of delay-assurance tradeoffs, at times of crisis, operators may be ill prepared, and will have to depend on individual intuition and expertise. On the other hand, if the trade-offs are well understood, it will be possible to develop and validate contingency plans that can be quickly invoked or offered to human operators.

#### **8.4.5 Legacy System Integration**

Integrating with legacy systems is a hard and inescapable reality in any realistic implementation of the smart grid. This poses a number of challenges to the security architecture of the smart grid:

- Compatibility problems when new security solutions are installed in new devices resulting in mismatched expectations that may cause the devices to fail or malfunction; and
- Backwards compatibility, which may often be a requirement and may prevent deployment of advanced features.

Potential avenues for future investigation include:

- Compositionality (enhanced overlays, bump-in-the-wire<sup>6</sup>, adapters) that contain and mask legacy systems; and
- Ensuring that the weakest link does not negate new architectures through formal analysis and validation of the architectural design, possibly using red team<sup>7</sup> methodology.

#### **8.4.6 Resiliency Management and Decision Support**

Research into resiliency management and decision support will look at threat response escalation as a method to maintain system resiliency. While other smart grid efforts are targeted at improving the security of devices, this research focuses on the people, processes, and technology options available to detect and respond to threats that have breached those defenses in the context of the smart grid's advanced protection architecture. Some of the responses must be autonomic—timely response is a critical requirement for grid reliability. However, for a quick response to treat the symptom locally and effectively, the scope and extent of the impact of the failure needs to be quickly determined and mitigated. New research is needed to measure and identify the scope of a cyber attack and the dynamic cyber threat response options available in a way that can serve as a decision support tool for the human operators.

#### **8.4.7 Efficient Composition of Mechanisms**

It can sometimes be the case that even though individual components work well in their domains, compositions of them can fail to deliver the desired combination of attributes, or fail to deliver them efficiently. Research that systematizes the composition of communications and/or cryptographic mechanisms and which assists practitioners in avoiding performance, security, or efficiency pitfalls would greatly aid the creation and enhancement of the smart grid.

#### **8.4.8 Risk Assessment and Management**

A risk-based approach is a potential way to develop viable solutions to security threats and measure the effectiveness of those solutions. Applying risk-based approaches to cybersecurity in the smart grid context raises a number of research challenges. The following subsections describe four important ones.

##### **8.4.8.1 Advanced Attack Analysis**

While it is clear that cyber attacks or combined cyber-physical attacks pose a significant threat to the power grid, advanced tools and methodologies are needed to provide a deep analysis of cyber and cyber-physical attack vectors and consequences on the power grid.

##### **8.4.8.2 Local Privacy**

Detailed management of devices in a HAN has the potential to divulge private information both through cyber channels and also through physical channels. Recent work in Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) has shown very high fidelity event reconstruction through

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<sup>6</sup> An implementation model that uses a hardware solution to implement IPSec.

<sup>7</sup> A group of people authorized and organized to emulate a potential adversary's attack or exploitation capabilities against an enterprise's security posture. The Red Team's objective is to improve enterprise Information Assurance by demonstrating the impacts of successful attacks and by demonstrating what works for the defenders (i.e., the Blue Team) in an operational environment.

techniques such as hidden Markov models. Significant threats to individual privacy can be envisioned (in addition to the enterprise concerns in 8.6.1.1).<sup>8</sup> However, privacy cannot be ensured through cryptographic methods alone.

#### **8.4.8.3 Measuring Risk**

The state of the art in the risk measurement area is limited to surveys and informal analysis of critical assets and the impact of their compromise or loss of availability. Advanced tools and techniques that provide quantitative notions of risks—that is, threats, vulnerabilities, and attack consequences for current and emerging power grid systems—will allow for better protection of power systems.

#### **8.4.8.4 Risk-based Cyber/Physical Security Investment**

It is challenging to assess the extent to which risk has been mitigated and how much investment in cybersecurity is appropriate for a given entity in the electricity sector. Research into advanced tools and technologies based on quantitative risk notions that take into account not only cyber risks and physical risks, but combined cyber-physical risks in which cyber/physical vulnerabilities become interdependent. These include physical attacks informed by cyber in which uncovering cyber decisions leads to knowledge of physical system vulnerabilities such as congestion. These can also include cyber attacks enhancing physical attacks or a cyber system used to cause physical harm.

### **8.5 NETWORKING TOPICS**

#### **8.5.1 Safe Use of Commercial Off-the-shelf/Publicly Available Systems and Networks**

Economic and other drivers push the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, public networks like the Internet, or available Enterprise systems. Research is needed to investigate if such resources can be used in the smart grid reliably and safely, and how they would be implemented.

##### **8.5.1.1 Internet Usage in Smart Grid**

A specific case is the use of the existing Internet in smart grid–related communications, including possibly as an emergency out-of-band access infrastructure. The Internet is readily available, evolving, and inherently fault tolerant. But it is also shared, containing numerous instances of malicious malware and malicious activities. Research into methods to deal with denial of service, as well as to identify other critical reliability issues for specific types of smart grid applications. In particular, this is a quality of service issue; it is important that bandwidth is guaranteed to a distributed embedded application such as a smart grid. Considerations include the effects of delays on the physical control, for example, when physical delay or computation delay cannot be easily bounded, particularly in the face of changing network topologies and state.

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<sup>8</sup> For more on the privacy concerns related to NIALM, see Volume 2, § 5.3.1.

### **8.5.1.2 TCP/IP Security and Reliability Issues**

Security/reliability issues surrounding the adoption of TCP/IP for smart grid networks is a related research topic separate from the subject of Internet use. Research into the adoption of Internet protocols for smart grid networks could include understanding the current state of security designs proposed for advanced networks. Features such as quality of service (QoS), mobility, multi-homing, broadcasting/multicasting, and other enhancements necessary for smart grid applications must be adequately secured and well managed if TCP/IP is to be adopted.

### **8.5.2 Advanced Networking**

Advanced networking technologies independent of the Internet protocols are being explored in multiple venues under the auspices of the National Science Foundation (NSF), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and others. Advanced networking development promises simpler approaches to networking infrastructures that solve by design some of the issues now affecting the Internet protocols. The work, although not complete, should be understood in the context of providing secure networks with fewer complexities that can be more easily managed and offer more predictable behavior.

A wide variety of communication media and protocols are currently available and being used today—leased lines, microwave links, wireless, power line communication, etc. Any advanced networking technology that aims to provide a uniform abstraction for smart grid communication must also need support these various physical, data link, and transport layers for SCADA, substation automation, and peer-to-peer communication.

### **8.5.3 IPv6**

Research is needed to ensure that the IPv6-based network will be stable, reliable, and secure.

In particular, these issues need more research—

- The current and future protocols scale to millions of devices,
- Sufficiency of current modeling, simulation, and emulation technologies for future networks using IPv6,
- The validation of accuracy of projected performance,
- How devices will interoperate in multi-vendor environments,
- Identification of suitable routing protocols – either leveraging existing protocols or identifying new areas,
- Other security concerns, such as how the network be will be partitioned
- How NAT (Network Addresses Translation) should be used, and
- The need for a fundamentally new network architecture.

## **8.6 OTHER SECURITY ISSUES IN THE SMART GRID CONTEXT**

The smart grid is viewed as a cyber-physical system, hence, the cyber cross section of the smart grid will look like a large federated, distributed environment where information systems from various organizations with very different characteristics and purpose will need to interoperate.

Among the various interacting entities are utilities, power generators, regulating authorities, researchers, and institutions; and with the advent of home-based renewable-energy and electric vehicles, residential customers may possibly be included. Effectively securing the interfaces between environments will become an increasing challenge as users seek to extend smart grid capabilities. Scalable and secure inter-organizational interaction is a key security and management issue. Privacy policies involving data at rest, in transit, and in use will have to be enforced within and across these environments. Research is needed in the areas discussed in the following subsections.

## **8.6.1 Privacy and Access Control in Federated Systems**

### **8.6.1.1 Managed Separation of Business Entities**

Research in the area of managed separation will focus on the network and systems architecture, enabling effective communication among various business entities without inadvertent sharing/leaking of their trade secrets, business strategies, or operational data and activities. It is anticipated that fine-grained energy data and various other types of information will be collected (or will be available as a byproduct of interoperability) from businesses and residences to realize some of the advantages of smart grid technology. Research into managing the separation between business entities needs to address multiple areas:

- Techniques to specify and enforce the appropriate sharing policies among entities with various cooperative, competing, and regulatory relationships are not well understood today. Work in this area would mitigate these risks and promote confidence among the participants. Architectural solutions will be important for this objective, but there are also possibilities for improvements, for example, by using privacy-enhancing technologies based on cryptography or work on anonymity protections.
- As more information is collected, energy service providers will need to manage large amounts of privacy-sensitive data in an efficient and responsible manner. Research on privacy policy and new storage management techniques will help to diminish risk and enhance the business value of the data collected while respecting customer concerns and regulatory requirements. Such work would contribute to improved tracking of the purpose for which data was collected and enable greater consumer discretionary control.
- Verifiable enforcement of privacy policies regardless of the current state and location of data will provide implicit or explicit trust in the smart grid. Research is needed to develop better mechanisms for such enforcement.

### **8.6.1.2 Authentication and Access Control in a Highly Dynamic Federated Environment**

Collaborating autonomous systems in a federated environment must need to invoke operations on each other, other than accessing collected data (e.g., an ISO asking for more power from a plant). Access control (authentication and authorization), especially when the confederates enter into dynamic relationships such as daily buying/selling, long-term contracts, etc., is an issue that needs added research.

## **8.6.2 Auditing and Accountability**

The concept of operation of the envisioned smart grid will require collecting audit data from various computer systems used in the smart grid. The existence of multiple autonomous



federated entities makes auditing and accountability a complex problem and include identifying responsibility for auditing, how audit trails will be linked, and mechanisms that can be used to mine the data. Such data will be needed to assess status, including evidence of intrusions and insider threats. Research is needed on a range of purposes for which audit data will be needed and on finding the best ways to assure accountability for operator action in the system, including research on forensic techniques to support tracing and prosecuting adversaries and providing evidence to regulatory agencies without interrupting operations.

### **8.6.3 Infrastructure Interdependency Issues**

Maintaining the resiliency and continuous availability of the power grid itself as a critical national infrastructure is an important mandate. There are also other such critical national infrastructure elements, such as telecommunications, oil and natural gas pipelines, water distribution systems, etc., with as strong a mandate for resiliency and continuous availability. However, the unique nature of the electrical grid is that it supplies key elements toward the operation of these other critical infrastructure elements. Additionally, there are reverse dependencies emerging on smart grid being dependent on the continuous well-being of the telecommunications and digital computing infrastructure, as well as on the continuing flow of the raw materials to generate the power. These interdependencies are sometimes highly visible and obvious, but many remain hidden below the surface of the detailed review for each. There is little current understanding of the cascading effect outages and service interruptions might have, especially those of a malicious and judiciously placed nature with intent to cause maximum disruption and mass chaos.

Research into interdependency issues would investigate and identify these dependencies and work on key concepts and plans toward mitigating the associated risks from the perspective of the smart grid. Such research should lead to techniques that show not only how communication failures could impact grid efficiency and reliability, how power failures could affect digital communications, and how a simultaneous combination of failures in each of the systems might impact the system as a whole, but should also apply a rigorous approach to identifying and highlighting these key interdependencies across all of these critical common infrastructure elements. The research would lead to developing and applying new system-of-systems concepts and design approaches toward mitigating the risks posed by these interdependencies on a nationwide scale.

### **8.6.4 Cross-Domain (Power/Electrical to Cyber/Digital) Security Event Detection, Analysis, and Response**

The implication of failures or malicious activity in the cyber domain on the electrical domain, or vice versa, in the context of a large-scale and highly dynamic distributed cyber-physical system like the smart grid, is not well understood. Without further research, this is going to remain a dark area that carries a big risk for the operational reliability and resiliency of the power grid.

As mentioned throughout various sections of this report, there is a need to better integrate the cyber and power system view. This is especially important in regard to detecting security events such as intrusions, unauthorized accesses, misconfigurations, etc., as well as anticipating cyber and power system impacts and forming a correct and systematic response on this basis. This is driven by the goal of using the modern IT and communications technologies in the smart grid to

enhance the reliability of the power system while not offering a risk of degrading it. This will require research into new types of risk and security models as well as methods and technologies.

There is need to further research and develop models, methods, and technologies in the following areas:

- Unified risk models that have a correlated view of cyber and power system reliability impacts;
- Response and containment models/strategies that use the above unified risk models;
- Security and reliability event detection models that use power, IT, and communication system factors in a cross-correlated manner and can operate on an autonomous, highly scaled, and distributed basis (e.g., security event detection in mesh networks with resource-constrained devices, distributed and autonomous systems with periodic connectivity, or legacy component systems with closed protocols). New security models need to be developed to overcome the limitations of purely cryptographic solutions. These models must embrace power, IT, and communications in a unified fashion;
- Unified intrusion detection/prevention systems that use the models/methods above and have a deep contextual understanding of the smart grid and its various power system and operations interdependencies;
- Very large-scale wide area security event detection and response systems for the smart grid that can interoperate and securely share event data across organizational boundaries and allow for intelligent, systematic, and coordinated responses on a real-time or near real-time basis;
- Development of distributed IED autonomous security agents with multi-master Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) reporting for wide area situational awareness;
- Development of distributed IED autonomous security agents with continuous event and state monitoring and archiving in the event of islanding, security state restoration and forensics when isolated from master SIEM systems;
- Advanced smart grid integrated security and reliability analytics that provide for event and impact prediction, and continual infrastructure resiliency improvement; and
- Advanced security visual analytics for multidimensional, temporal, and geo-spatial views of real-time security data capable of digesting structured and unstructured data analysis for system and security operation control center operators.

To develop and refine the modeling and systems necessary for much of the proposed research, there is also need for developing new simulation capabilities for the distribution grid that incorporate communications with devices/models for distribution control, distributed generation, storage, EV/PEV/PHEV, etc., to provide a representative environment for evaluating the impact of various events. To provide a realistic assessment of impact, the simulation capabilities should be similar in fidelity to the transmission grid simulation capabilities that currently exist.

However, both the distribution and transmission grid system simulations need to be further developed to integrate cyber elements and evaluate their possible cross-impacts on each other.

### 8.6.5 Covert network channels in the Smart Grid: Creation, Characterization, Detection and Elimination

The idea of covert channels was introduced by Lampson in 1973 as an attack concept that allows for secret transfer of information over unauthorized channels.<sup>9</sup> These channels demonstrate the notion that strong security models and encryption/authentication techniques are not sufficient for protection of information and systems. Earlier research on covert channels focused on multilevel, secure systems but more recently a greater emphasis has been placed on "covert network channels" that involve network channels and can exist in discretionary access control systems and Internet-like distributed networks. Given that many smart grid networks are being designed with Internet principles and technologies in mind, the study of covert network channels for the smart grid becomes an interesting research problem. Like the more general covert channels, covert network channels are typically classified into storage and timing channels. Storage channels involve the direct/indirect writing of object values by the sender and the direct/indirect reading of the object values by the receiver. Timing channels involve the sender signaling information by modulating the use of resources (e.g., CPU usage) over time such that the receiver can observe it and decode the information.

The concern over covert network channels stems from the threat of adversaries using such channels for communication of sensitive information and coordination of attacks. Adversaries will first compromise computer systems in the target organization and then establish covert network channels. Typically, such channels are bandwidth-constrained as they aim to remain undetected. Sensitive information that may be sent over such channels include Critical Energy Infrastructure Information<sup>10</sup> (CEII), involving the leakage of operational information to power marketing entities, and cryptographic keying material that protects information and systems. In addition, information exchange for coordination of attacks such as management and coordination of botnets, and spreading worms and viruses are also important concerns.

For example, covert network channels have been created using IP communication systems by a variety of means including the use of unused header bits, modulating packet lengths, and modifying packets rates/timings. Similarly, such channels have been shown to be possible with routing protocols, wireless LAN technologies, and HTTP and DNS protocols. For the smart grid, an interesting research challenge is to identify new types of covert network channels that may be created. For example, given that the extensive cyber-physical infrastructure of smart grid, perhaps the physical infrastructure can be leveraged to design covert network channels. Additional challenges include identification of other covert network channels that can be established on smart grid networks, for example, using relevant weaknesses in protocols. For all created channels, it is important to characterize the channels. This includes estimating channel capacity and noise ratios.

Covert channels can be detected at the design/specification level and also while they are being exploited. A variety of formal methods-based techniques have been developed in the past. Research challenges include identification of covert network channels for smart grid systems both at the design level and when they may be exploited. Once identified, the next challenge lies

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<sup>9</sup> B.W. Lampson, "A Note on the Confinement Problem," *Communications of the ACM* 16(10), October 1973, pp. 613-615. <http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/blampson/11-Confinement/Acrobat.pdf> [accessed 8/11/2014].

<sup>10</sup> For a list of relevant FERC Orders regarding CEII, see <http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/ceii-rule.asp>.

in eliminating them, limiting their capacity, and being able to observe them for potential exploitation. Means for doing so include the use of host and network security measures, and traffic normalization at hosts and network endpoints, such as firewalls or proxies. Again, research challenges include developing means for eliminating covert network channels, and in a case where that is not feasible, the objective is to limit their capacity and be able to monitor their use. Potential avenues of research include analyzing and modifying garbage collection processes in smart grid systems, and developing signature and anomaly-based detection techniques. Covert channels are not limited to network observations.

## **8.6.6 Denial of Service Resiliency**

### **8.6.6.1 Overview**

Smart grid communications are progressing toward utilizing IP-based transport protocols for energy utility information and operational services. As IP-based nodes propagate, more opportunities for exploitation by adversaries are evolving. If a network component can be probed and profiled as part of the smart grid or other critical infrastructures, it is most likely to be targeted for some form of intrusion by adversaries. This is especially relevant with the growing use of wireless IP communications.

### **8.6.6.2 DoS/DDoS Attacks**

Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) attacks have become an effective tool to take advantage of vulnerabilities. The attack objective is to take actions that deprive authorized individuals access to a system, its resources, information stored thereon, or the network to which it is connected.

A simple DoS attack attempts to consume resources in a specific application, operating system, or specific protocols or services, or a particular vendor's implementation of any of these targets to deny access by legitimate users. It may also be used in conjunction with other actions (attacks) to gain unauthorized access to a system, resources, information, or network.

The DDoS attack seeks to deplete resource capacity, such as bandwidth or processing power, in order to deny access to authorized users and can be levied against the infrastructure layer or the application layer. This technique utilizes a network of attack agents to amass a large, simultaneous assault of messages on the target. As with the DoS attack, DDoS may be combined with other techniques for malicious purposes.

IP-based networks are vulnerable to other attacks due to deficiencies of underlying protocols and applications. A man-in-the-middle, session-based hijack, or other technique may accompany the DoS/DDoS attack to inflict further damage on the target. Wireless networks in the AMI/HAN environment can be difficult to secure and are of particular concern as the object of an attack or an entry point to the upstream network and systems.

### **8.6.6.3 Research and Development Requirements**

The SGIP CSWG R&D subgroup desires to highlight and seek further research and development support in order to improve DoS/DDoS resiliency. The following areas of work were identified as areas of interest for further pursuit by smart grid stakeholders:

1. **Network architectures for survivability:** Smart grid networks and the public Internet will have several interface points, which might be the target of DoS/DDoS attacks originating from the public Internet. A survivable smart grid network will minimize the disruption to smart grid communications, even when publicly addressable interfaces are subject to DDoS attacks;
2. **Policy-based routing and capabilities:** Policy-based routing is a fundamental redesign of routing with the goal of allowing communications if, and only if, all participants (source, receiver, and intermediaries) approve. A particular policy of interest for defending against DDoS attacks is the use of capabilities. In this scenario, senders must obtain explicit authorization (a capability) from the receiver before they are allowed to send significant amounts of traffic (enforced by the routing infrastructure). Smart grid networks provide a good opportunity to design from the ground up a new routing infrastructure supporting capabilities;
3. **Stateless dynamic packet filtering:** Filtering and rate limiting are basic defenses against DDoS attacks. Further research in stateless packet filtering techniques may significantly reduce packet-processing overhead.

An example of this is “Identity-Based Privacy-Protected Access Control Filter” (IPACF) which is advertised as having the “capability to resist massive denial of service attacks.” IPACF shows promise for using “stateless, anonymous and dynamic” packet filtering techniques without IP/MAC address, authentication header (AH) and cookie authentication dependencies, especially for resource-constrained devices (RCDs).

When compared to stateful filtering methods, IPACF may significantly reduce packet processing overhead and latencies even though it is dynamically applied to each packet. IPACF describes the ability to utilize discarded packets for real-time intrusion detection (ID) and forensics without false positives.

Initial modeling reveals that embedded stateless packet filtering techniques may significantly mitigate DoS/DDoS and intrusion and could be evolved to defend man-in-the-middle attacks, while offering considerable device implementation options and economies of scale; and

4. **Lightweight authentication and authorization:** There is a distinct need for an embedded-level, lightweight, secure, and efficient authentication and authorization (AA) protocol to mitigate intrusion and DDoS attacks targeting resource-intense AA mechanisms.

### 8.6.7 Cloud Security

With the advent of cloud computing in the smart grid, special attention should be given to the use of cloud computing resources and the implications of leveraging those resources. There are several organizations that are focusing on security and appropriate use of cloud computing resources, including the Cloud Security Alliance. They have produced a document that addresses security areas for cloud computing that provides valuable guidelines to security in this environment. Additionally, NIST has published multiple publications in the area of cloud computing, which are available at: <http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/publications.cfm>.

As with any shared resource that will host potentially sensitive information, security mechanisms must be deployed that provide the appropriate protection and auditing capabilities throughout the cloud. Cloud computing must be evaluated with consideration of the unique constraints and consequences of control systems in the context of the smart grid. Impact of cloud provider engagement must also be considered in terms of liabilities for data existing in the cloud, in what is likely to be a multi-tenancy environment.

Data security issues should be addressed such as data ownership, data protection both in and out of the cloud for storage and transit, access control to the data and the cloud, and authorization considerations for trust and permissions. Trust models should be put in place to provide these guarantees in a manner that is verifiable and compliant with emerging regulations like NERC CIPs, FERC 889, user data privacy concerns, and other emerging compliance regulations. These types of regulations may have corollaries in industries like the health sector that could be considered, but differ enough that there are unique concerns.

WAN security and optimization issues must also be addressed depending on the data access patterns and flow of information in the cloud. This could include new work in encryption, key management, data storage, and availability model views. For instance, securely moving synchrophasor data from end nodes into the cloud on a global basis could be overly resource intensive. This might make real-time use infeasible with current cloud computing technology without further research in this area. Current distributed file system approaches may not be appropriately optimized to operate in a secure WAN environment, favoring network-expensive replication in a LAN environment as a trade-off for speed.

#### **8.6.8 Security Design and Verification Tools**

The smart grid is a collection of many complex, interconnected systems and networks that represent a fusion of IT, telecommunications, and power system domains. Each of these domains represents distinct forms of technology and operations that have unique interdependencies on each other and can indeed lead to elements of the cyber system (i.e., IT and communications) impacting the reliability of elements of the power system and vice-versa. Security design and verification should be a cross-domain effort and include expertise from the IT, telecom, and power systems domains.

Research and development should be conducted in security design and verification tools that can—

- a. Formally model smart grid cyber and power systems, their interactions, and their underlying components using a formal language. Candidates for examination and further adaptation can include: SysML, Formal ontologies and knowledge representation based on semantic Web technologies such as Web Ontology Language (OWL), or other novel forms. The language should allow one to communicate certain assertions about the expected function of a device/system and its security controls and risks, as well as the relationship between components, systems, and system communication. Most importantly, the model must provide a basis to represent multiple concurrent and independently interacting complex processes with distributed system states;
- b. Provide automatic, intelligent methods of verification that discover reliability and security issues in component and system states for the smart grid, in a formal design

model (as represented using the methods in (a.) using any number of machine learning or knowledge/logic inference techniques; and

- c. Simulate any number of scenarios based on the intelligent model built using (a.) and (b.), and provide predictive analytics that can optimize a security design that minimizes risks and costs, as well as maximizing security and reliability in the power and cyber domain.

### **8.6.9 Distributed versus Centralized Security**

Several models for designing intelligent and autonomous actions have been advanced for the smart grid, particularly in automated distribution management. Some approaches offer embedded security controls, while some externalize security and some offer combinations of both approaches. In the larger context of advanced distribution automation, there is a similar debate regarding how much “intelligence” should be deployed within IEDs, distributed generation endpoints, etc., versus reliance on centralized systems.

Also, Wide Area Situational Awareness (WASA) systems and actors are distributed by nature, yet most security mechanisms in place today are centralized. It is important to identify the appropriate security mechanism to place in a distributed environment that will not compromise an existing security framework, yet allow Third Party WASA systems and actor’s visibility into security intelligence and appropriate functional capability to act and respond to distributed security events.

Advanced security research should be conducted to determine an underlying security model to support these various approaches to distributed versus centralized security intelligence and functionality in the grid. Some factors to consider include the following:

- Communication with centralized security mechanisms may be interrupted. Research should be conducted into hybrid approaches and the appropriate layering of security controls between centralized and distributed systems.
- Externalized security mechanisms, such as in some control system protocol implementations may be desirable because they can be scaled and upgraded independently in response to evolving threats and technology changes, possibly without retrofitting or upgrading devices deployed in the field. On the other hand, some mechanisms should be deployed locally, such as bootstrap trusted code verification modules for firmware, logging, etc. Research should be conducted in best practices to determine the appropriate model for deployment.
- Rapid changes of cryptographic keys and authentication credentials may be needed to contain security incidents or provide ongoing assurance, and centralized security systems may be needed.
- Functionality of some components (e.g., breakers, IEDs, relays, etc.) and communications functions should not fail due to failure of a security mechanism.
- Integration of security mechanisms between security domains is needed (for example, between logical and physical security mechanisms of remote sensors).
- Edge devices such as distributed generation controllers and substation gateways need to be capable of autonomous action (e.g., self-healing), but these actions should be governed by business rules and under certain circumstances data from the devices should not be

trusted by decision support systems and systems that have more than local control of the grid.

- A trust model is needed to govern autonomous actions, especially by systems outside the physical control of the utility.

While it is not clear which security functions should be centralized or decentralized for a particular implementation, research into coherent reference models and taxonomies for layering these controls following best practice should be conducted. The model should contain a standard approach by which smart grid actors can make better security architecture decisions based on risks to their environment and efficiencies of security operations.

#### **8.6.10 System Segmentation and Virtualization**

The objective of this research is to develop methods to protect network end-points through Intense System Segmentation. The research should seek to create a platform that implements the characteristics of time-tested and recognized security principles, including isolation, a minimal trusted computing base, high usability and user transparency, a limited privilege capability that provides for user, process, and application class of service definitions, and a default-deny rules engine enforcing such privileges.

The requirement for continuous availability of utility grid operations necessitates a high degree of reliability within and across domains. Many domain end-points, such as legacy substation equipment, rely on outdated operating systems with little or no encryption capabilities, posing numerous challenges to the overall security of the smart grid. By enclosing an Intense System Segmentation framework around the existing computer architecture of these localized end-points, the legacy infrastructure should gain a layer of redundancy and security. Intense System Segmentation within a single Virtual Machine (VM) should provide granular isolation to reduce the attack surface to a single file and/or single application, and reduce the ability of threats to virally propagate. End-point protection must also be customizable to address the specific needs of subsectors within individual energy sector domains.

Traditional virtualization techniques that use sandboxing have known, exploitable vulnerabilities. This is largely the result of the communication that traditional VMs require in order to perform sharing functions between applications and administrative requirements. Sandboxing also relies on binary decisions for processes and communication that might compromise security. Intense System Segmentation should allow communication between isolated environments to occur while eliminating any execution of code outside of an isolated environment. An Intense System Segmentation platform may use some of the tools of virtualization, such as a sealed hypervisor to provide protection of end-point resources, and sealed VMs to perform computing in intense isolation. Hypervisors are designed to streamline communication between a wide range of applications and processes, and utilize APIs and other communication entry points. A sealed hypervisor should block these communication entry points, for both the hypervisor and an attestable kernel.

Maintaining the resiliency and continuous availability of the power grid should be one of the primary goals in creating a system segmentation platform. As this platform assumes that end-points will be penetrated, secure recovery, containment, and resiliency should be a focus of continued research. The inherent redundancy of hypervisor-driven segmentation can be utilized to enclose legacy systems and should allow customizable interoperability between the DHS-



defined critical infrastructure sectors. An open platform that uses a secure computing architecture and leverages the tools of virtualization will enhance the resiliency of existing Energy Sector critical infrastructure. The use of virtualization has also been recognized as building block to implement resiliency through agility. This can be used to increase uncertainty and cost to adversaries.

#### **8.6.11 Vulnerability Research**

Both design and implementation vulnerabilities represent varying and potentially great risks to the power grid. While future code revisions and hardware versions may introduce new vulnerabilities, many may exist in the current systems that require significant time to identify and address. For many years, SCADA systems have been quarantined from security scans for fear of causing outages. A few significant projects have undertaken security research on some of these new smart grid systems, networks, and devices, and positive results have resulted but more research is necessary. Security research grants are important to ensuring greater scrutiny of the existing systems to find vulnerabilities that may currently exist in smart grid equipment.

#### **8.6.12 Vulnerability Research Tools**

Smart grid networks represent a great deal of proprietary, obtuse systems and protocols. Before security can be reasonably well tested, tools must be created to maximize the value of security research. Several freely available tools have already been in active development but lack resources. Other tools are important but nonexistent.

#### **8.6.13 Data Provenance**

Methods to address data provenance while maintaining the operational integrity and state of many systems are needed for unique operational constraints of the smart grid. Some of the issues include:

- Measuring the quality of the data from a security perspective. This may include both subjective and objective viewpoints, and may have to deal with uncertainty about the data.
- How operational decisions are made based on data that may have questionable attributes of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, and timeliness.
- How organizations coordinate their beliefs with other organizations, including what happens if the other organizations are suffering from a significant security breach and how one organization should react with data of uncertain trustworthiness.

#### **8.6.14 Security and Usability**

One of the issues with the implementation of security is the usability of security, or the ease of use and impact on convenience. Some organizations weaken their security for various reasons (e.g., operational cost, profit, effort, and lack of understanding). To encourage users to deploy strong security, certain issues must be overcome. These include:

- Security must be self-configuring. That is, the systems should be able to configure themselves to maximize security without requiring expert knowledge of security.

- Security options should be simple and understandable by users who lack a background in security. Concepts like certificates and keys are not well understood by end users. These details should be hidden.
- The relationship between a security policy, the protection the policy provides, and the security configuration should be clear. If a system is “misconfigured” in a way that reduces the protection, the risk should be clear to the user.
- Security should be reconfigured. In other words, if a policy is changed (for instance, stronger security is enabled), the systems should adapt to meet the new requirements. It should not be necessary to physically visit devices to reconfigure them. However, if policy changes, some devices might be unable to change, and end up being isolated from the new configuration.
- Part of usability is maintainability. There needs to be ways to upgrade security without replacing equipment. Firmware upgrades are often proprietary, vendor-specific, and have uncertain security.

Usability of security technologies needs to improve to address these issues.

#### **8.6.15 Cybersecurity Issues for Electric Vehicles**

Plug-in electric, plug-in hybrid electric and electric vehicles (generalized in this report as PEVs) have a similar entry point to the electric grid as the smart meters and are associated with similar security and privacy issues. When PEVs connect to the grid to charge their batteries, it is necessary to communicate across a digital network to interface with a payment and settlement system. Assuming that proper standards are adopted, these charging solutions will have the same issues as payment and settlement systems for other products. Appropriate physical security measures and tamper-evident mechanisms must be developed to prevent or detect the insertion of cloning devices to capture customer information and electric use debit and credit information. One may expect that adversaries will develop means to clone legitimate PEV interfaces for criminal activity. Like other areas that depend on a supply chain, PEVs have similar issues. Thus, it is necessary to make sure that car repair shops will not be able to install illegal devices at time of car maintenance.

Utilities and private/public charging stations may also be subject to law enforcement search warrants and subpoenas in regards to PEV usage. A PEV may be stolen and used in the act of a crime. Law enforcement may issue an “alert” to control areas to determine if the suspected PEV is “connected” to the grid and would want to know where and when. Research may also be requested by law enforcement to enable a utility to be able to “disable” a PEV in order to preserve evidence and apprehend the criminals. Authentication and non-repudiation are critical in this process; otherwise a thief can use the same processes to steal a car (or disable cars as in the example, above).

#### **8.6.16 Detecting Anomalous Behavior Using Modeling**

Various sensors in the power/electrical domain already collect a wide array of data from the grid. In the smart grid, there will also be a number of sensors in the cyber domain that will provide data about the computing elements as well as about the electrical elements. In addition to naturally occurring noise, some of the sensor data may report effects of malicious cyber activity and misinformation fed by an adversary.

Reliable operation depends on timely and accurate detection of outliers and anomalous events. Power grid operations will need sophisticated outlier detection techniques that enable the collection of high integrity data in the presence of errors in data collection.

Research in this area will explore developing normative models of steady state operation of the grid and probabilistic models of faulty operation of sensors. Smart grid operators can be misguided by intruders who alter readings systematically, possibly with full knowledge of outlier detection strategies being used. Ways of detecting and coping with errors and faults in the power grid need to be reviewed and studied in a model that includes such systematic malicious manipulation. Research should reveal the limits of existing techniques and provide better understanding of assumptions and new strategies to complement or replace existing ones.

Some example areas where modeling research could lead to development of new sensors include:

- Connection/disconnection information reported by meters may identify an unauthorized disconnect, which in the context of appropriate domain knowledge can be used to determine root cause. This research would develop methods to determine when the number of unauthorized disconnects should be addressed by additional remediation actions to protect the overall AMI communications infrastructure, as well as other distribution operations (DR events, etc.).
- Information about meters running backwards could generally be used for theft detection (for those customers not subscribed to net metering). This research would identify thresholds where too many unauthorized occurrences would initiate contingency operations to protect the distribution grid.

Related prior work includes fraud detection algorithms and models that are being used in the credit card transactions.

# CHAPTER 9

## OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS REVIEW

### 9.1 OBJECTIVE

The objective of the standards review is to ensure that identified standards applicable to the smart grid adequately address the cybersecurity requirements included in this document. If the standards do not have adequate coverage, relative to their intended scope, this review will identify where changes may need to be made or where other standards may need to be applied to provide sufficient coverage in that area. This standards review is part of the process to include a standard into the SGIP Catalog of Standards.<sup>11</sup>

The SGCC works with the SGIP and the standards bodies to identify the standards for review and to gain appropriate access to the standards. This is an ongoing effort as there are many standards that apply and must be assessed. To undertake the process, the CSWG/SGCC established a standards subgroup to perform the assessments and developed a review process and an assessment template for performing the assessments.

### 9.2 REVIEW PROCESS

#### 9.2.1 Overview

NISTIR 7628 contains a catalog of cybersecurity requirements that can be used to identify what cybersecurity requirements are applicable to specific smart grid interactions and cybersecurity requirement families that should be considered in the review document (*see* Volume 1, Chapter 3).

#### 9.2.2 CSWG/SGCC Review Process

Before the SGCC compares the standards document against the high-level requirements in NISTIR 7628, the SGCC reviews the scope of the standard and documents additional assumptions as to whether cybersecurity should be part of the standards document. The cybersecurity content can take the form of detailed cybersecurity technologies, specific cybersecurity requirements to meet specific cybersecurity goals, general cybersecurity best practices, or high-level policy statements. This cybersecurity content can also cover reliability/availability requirements, confidentiality requirements, data integrity requirements, and privacy issues.

Some of these requirements are general, such as having policies and procedures for specific types of interactions, for example “SG.CM-1: Configuration Management Policy and Procedures.”<sup>12</sup> Some are more specific, such as “SG.SC-12: Use of Validated Cryptography.”<sup>13</sup>

#### 9.2.3 Step 1: Reviewing the Document Scope

When the SGCC receives a request from the SGIP to review a document, the SGCC reviews the scope and purpose of the requested review document, and notes any assumptions as to the

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<sup>11</sup> For additional information on the SGIP Catalog of Standards, refer to: <http://sgip.org/Catalog-of-Standards>.

<sup>12</sup> *See* Volume 1, §3.11.

<sup>13</sup> *See* Volume 1, §3.24.

domain and type of document. If the document should or does contain cybersecurity requirements, then the document is assessed for cybersecurity completeness and correctness. The SGCC Standards Subgroup usually requests an expert on the document to participate and answer questions.

### **9.2.4 Step 2: NISTIR 7628 High-Level Cybersecurity Requirements**

After assessing the overall scope of the document, the SGCC starts a detailed review of the cybersecurity contents of the document, assessing them against the High-Level Security Requirements from the NISTIR 7628. During this assessment, some requirements and interactions may not have direct correlations with the NISTIR 7628 high-level cybersecurity requirements. This will lead to a potential recommendation of:

- NISTIR 7628 high-level cybersecurity requirements may need to be updated to include them, or the requirement may be so specific that the requirement is not needed in NISTIR 7628.
- If there is a relevant NISTIR 7628 cybersecurity family or requirement that is not referenced within the scope of the review document, then a gap is documented by the SGCC and a potential recommendation is documented for the review document.

### **9.2.5 Step 3: Recommendations on Standard**

During the assessment, cybersecurity concerns or issues are noted and often discussed with the owners of the document. Recommendations for improvement on cybersecurity issues are provided so that the document owners may choose to update the document or undertake additional documents to address these recommendations.

If the standard meets all relevant requirements, the SGCC recommends inclusion in the SGIP Catalog of Standards. If some requirements are not met, the SGCC may recommend conditional approval pending the correction or mitigation of the cybersecurity concern.

## **9.3 SGCC STANDARDS ASSESSMENT CONCEPTS**

The following provides the background and concepts used in assessing standards:

### **9.3.1 Correlation of Cybersecurity with Information Exchange Standards**

Correlating cybersecurity with specific information exchange standards, including functional requirements standards, object modeling standards, and communication standards, is very complex. There is rarely a one-to-one correlation, with more often a one-to-many or many-to-one correspondence.


First, communication standards for the smart grid are designed to meet many different requirements at many different “layers” in the reference model. Two commonly used reference models are the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI) 7-layer reference model<sup>14</sup> and the GridWise Architecture Council (GWAC) Stack<sup>15</sup> (see Figure 9-1), where the OSI 7-layer model maps to the Technical levels of the GWAC Stack. Some standards address the lower layers of the reference models, such as

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<sup>14</sup>International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission, *Information technology—Open Systems Interconnection—Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model*, ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994.

<sup>15</sup> The GWAC Stack is available at <http://www.gridwiseac.org/> in the *GridWise Interoperability Context-Setting Framework*.

wireless media, fiber optic cables, and power line carrier. Others address the “transport” layers for getting messages from one location to another. Still others cover the “application” layers, the semantic structures of the information as it is transmitted between software applications. In addition, there are communication standards that are strictly abstract models of information – the relationships of pieces of information with each other. Cybersecurity is a cross-cutting issue and should be reflected in requirements at all levels: cybersecurity policies and procedures mainly cover the GWAC Stack Organizational and Informational levels, while cybersecurity technologies generally address those requirements at the Technical level.



**Figure 9-1 ISO/OSI 7-Layer Reference Model and GWAC Stack Reference Model**

Second, regardless of what communications standards are used, cybersecurity must address all layers – end-to-end – from the source of the data to the ultimate destination of the data. In addition, cybersecurity must address those aspects outside of the communications system in the upper GWAC Stack layers that may be functional requirements or may rely on procedures rather than technologies, such as authenticating the users and software applications, and screening personnel. Cybersecurity must also address how to cope during an attack, recover from it afterwards, and create a trail of forensic information to be used in post-attack analysis.

Third, the cybersecurity requirements must reflect the environment where a standard is implemented rather than the standard itself - how and where a standard is used must establish the levels and types of cybersecurity needed. Communications standards do not address the importance of specific data or how it might be used in systems; these standards only address how to exchange the data. Standards related to the upper layers of the GWAC Stack may address issues of data importance.

Therefore, cybersecurity must be viewed as a stack or “profile” of different security technologies and procedures, woven together to meet the security requirements of a particular implementation of policy, procedural, and communication standards designed to provide specific services. Ultimately cybersecurity, as applied to the information exchange standards, should be described as profiles of technologies and procedures which can include both “power system” methods (e.g. redundant equipment, analysis of power system data, and validation of power system states) and information technology (IT) methods (e.g., encryption, role-based access control, and intrusion detection).

There also can be a relationship between certain communication standards and correlated cybersecurity technologies. For instance, if Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP) is being used at the transport layer and if authentication, data integrity, and/or confidentiality are important, then transport layer security (TLS) should be used.

In the following discussions of information exchange standard being reviewed, these caveats should be taken into account.

### **9.3.2 Correlation of Cybersecurity Requirements with Physical Security Requirements**

Correlating cybersecurity requirements with specific physical security requirements is very complex since they generally address very different aspects of a system. Although both cyber and physical security requirements seek to prevent or deter deliberate or inadvertent adversaries from accessing a protected facility, resource, or information, physical security solutions and procedures are vastly different from cybersecurity solutions and procedures, and involve very different expertise. Each may be used to help protect the other, while compromises of one can definitely compromise the other.

Physical and environmental security that encompasses protection of physical assets from damage is addressed by this document only at a high level. Therefore, assessments of standards that cover these non-cyber issues must necessarily also be at a general level.

### **9.3.3 Standardization Cycles of Information Exchange Standards**

Information exchange standards, regardless of the standards organization, are developed over a time period of many months by experts who are trying to meet a specific need. In most cases, these experts are expected to revisit standards every five years in order to determine if updates are needed. In particular, since cybersecurity requirements were often not included in standards in the past, existing communication standards often have no references to security except in generalities, using language such as “appropriate security technologies and procedures should be implemented.”

With the advent of the smart grid, cybersecurity has become increasingly important within the electricity sector. However, since the development cycles of communication standards and cybersecurity standards are usually independent of each other, appropriate normative references between these two types of standards are often missing. Over time, these missing normative references can be added, as appropriate.

Since technologies (including cybersecurity technologies) are rapidly changing to meet increasing new and more powerful threats, some cybersecurity standards can be out-of-date by the time they are released. This means that some requirements in a security standard may be inadequate (due to new technology developments), while references to other security standards

may be obsolete. This rapid improving of technologies and obsolescence of older technologies is impossible to avoid, but may be ameliorated by indicating minimum requirements and urging fuller compliance to new technologies as these are proven.

### 9.3.4 References and Terminology

References to NISTIR 7628 security requirements refer to Volume 1, Chapter 3, High-Level Security Requirements, of this document.

References to “government-approved cryptography” refer to the list of approved cryptography suites identified in Volume 1, Chapter 4, Cryptography and Key Management, of this document. Summary tables of the approved cryptography suites are provided in Volume 1, §4.3.2.1.

Some standards do not mandate their provisions using “shall” statements, but rather use statements such as “should,” “may,” or “could.” Some standards also define their provisions as being “normative” or “informative.” Normative provisions often are expressed with “shall” statements. Various standards organizations use different terms (e.g., standard, guideline) to characterize their standards according to the kinds of statements used. If standards include security provisions, they need to be understood in the context of the “shall,” “should,” “may,” and/or “could” statements, “normative,” or “informative” language with which they are expressed.

The terms “approved,” “acceptable,” and “deprecated” are defined as the following:<sup>16</sup>

- Approved is used to mean that an algorithm is specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation (published as a NIST Special Publication).
- Acceptable is used to mean that the algorithm and key length is safe to use; no security risk is currently known.
- Deprecated means that the use of the algorithm and key length is allowed, but the user must accept some risk. The term is used when discussing the key lengths or algorithms that may be used to apply cryptographic protection to data (e.g., encrypting or generating a digital signature).

As noted, standards have different degrees for expressing requirements, and the security requirements must match these degrees. For these standards assessments, the following terminology is used to express these different degrees<sup>17</sup>:

- Requirements are expressed by “...shall...,” which indicates mandatory requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to the standard and from which no deviation is permitted (shall equals is required to).
- Recommendations are expressed by “...should...,” which indicates that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others; or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required (should equals is recommended that).

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<sup>16</sup> The definitions are obtained from NIST Special Publication 800-131A, *Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths*, available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-131A/sp800-131A.pdf> [accessed 8/11/2014].

<sup>17</sup> The first clause of each terminology definition comes from the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Annex H of Part 2 of ISO/IEC Directives. The second clause (after “which”) comes from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) as a further amplification of the term.



- Permitted or allowed items are expressed by “...may...,” which is used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the standard (may equals is permitted to).
- Ability to carry out an action is expressed by “...can ...,” which is used for statements of possibility and capability, whether material, physical, or causal (can equals is able to).
- The use of the word must is deprecated, and should not be used in these standards to define mandatory requirements. The word must is only used to describe unavoidable situations (e.g., “All traffic in this lane must turn right at the next intersection.”)

## 9.4 SGCC STANDARDS ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE

The following presents the standards assessment template, including the template structure and questions, used by the Standards Subgroup to report findings from their standards review effort.

1. **Description of Document**
2. **Assumptions**
3. **Assessment of Cybersecurity Content**
4. **Does the standard address cybersecurity? If not, should it?**
5. **What aspects of cybersecurity does the standard address and how well (correctly) does it do so?**

**Table 9-1: Correlations between Standard being Assessed and the NISTIR Security Requirements**

Reference in Standard	Applicable NISTIR 7628 High Level Security Requirements	Comments including how NISTIR HLR Requirements Are or Are Not Completely Met

6. **What aspects of cybersecurity does the standard not address? Which of these aspects should it address? Which should be handled by other means?**
7. **What work, if any, is being done currently or is planned to address the gaps identified above? Is there a stated timeframe for completion of these planned modifications?**
8. **Recommendations**

The SGCC recommends {specific recommendations from the SGCC on the standard}

9. **List any references to other standards and whether they are normative or informative**

# CHAPTER 10

## KEY POWER SYSTEM USE CASES FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The focus of this chapter is to identify the key Use Cases that are “architecturally significant” with respect to security requirements for the smart grid. This identification is neither exhaustive nor complete. The Use Cases presented in this chapter will be employed in evaluating smart grid characteristics and associated cybersecurity objectives; the high-level requirements of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA); and stakeholder concerns. The focus here is more on operational functions rather than “back office” or corporate functions, since it is the automation and control aspects of power system management that are relatively unique and certainly stretch the security risk assessment, security controls, and security management limits.

Many interfaces and “environments”—with constraints and sensitive aspects—make up the information infrastructure that monitors and controls the power system infrastructure. This chapter does not directly capture those distinctions, but leaves it up to the implementers of security measures to take those factors into account.

### 10.1 USE CASE SOURCE MATERIAL

The Use Cases listed in this chapter were derived “as-is” from a number of sources and put into a common format for evaluation. The resulting list presented in this chapter does not constitute a catalog of recommended or mandatory Use Cases, nor are the listed Use Cases intended for architecting systems or identifying all the potential scenarios that may exist. The full set of Use Cases presented in this chapter was derived from the following sources:

- **IntelliGrid Use Cases:** Over 700 Use Cases are provided by this source, but only the power system operations Use Cases and Demand Response (DR) or Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) cases are of particular interest for security. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) IntelliGrid project developed the complete list of Use Cases. *See IntelliGrid Web site, Directory of Use Cases*<sup>18</sup>.
- **AMI Business Functions:** Use Cases were originally extracted from Appendix B of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure Security (AMI-SEC) System Security Requirements document (published by the AMI-SEC Task Force) by the Transmission and Distribution Domain Expert Working Group (T&D DEWG), and the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel – Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee (SGIP-SGCC) has now also posted this material on the SGIP TWiki). Before the revision of this document, the CSWG/SGCC AMI Subgroup revised the AMI use cases to better reflect actual AMI deployments.
- **Benefits and Challenges of Distribution Automation:** Use Case Scenarios (White Paper for Distribution on T&D DEWG), extracted from a California Energy Commission (CEC) document, which has 82 Use Cases; now posted on the SGIP TWiki.

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<sup>18</sup> [http://www.intelligrid.info/scripts/dir\\_list\\_sort.asp](http://www.intelligrid.info/scripts/dir_list_sort.asp).

- **EPRI Use Case Repository:** A compilation of IntelliGrid and Southern California Edison (SCE) Use Cases, plus others. See EPRI Web site, Use Case Repository<sup>19</sup>.
- **SCE Use Cases:** Developed by Southern California Edison with the assistance of EnerNex. See SCE.com Web site, Use Case Series Descriptions<sup>20</sup>.

A certain amount of overlap is found in these sources, particularly in the new area of AMI. However, even the combined set (numbering over 1,000 Use Cases) does not address all requirements. For example, for one operation—the connect/disconnect of meters—originally 6 utilities developed more than 20 use case variations to meet their diverse needs, often as a means to address different state regulatory requirements.

The collected Use Cases listed in this chapter were not generally copied verbatim from their sources but were oftentimes edited to focus on the security issues.

## 10.2 KEY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERATIONS

The Use Cases listed in subsection 10.3 can be considered to have key security requirements that may vary in vulnerabilities and impacts, depending upon the actual systems, but that nonetheless can be generally assessed as having security requirements in the three principal areas addressed in subsections 10.2.1 through 10.2.3.

### 10.2.1 CI&ASecurity Requirements

The following points briefly outline security requirements related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

**Confidentiality** is generally the least critical for power system reliability. However, this is important as customer information becomes more easily available in cyber form:

- Privacy of customer information is the most important,
- Electric market information has some confidential portions,
- General corporate information, such as human resources, internal decision-making, etc.

**Integrity** is generally considered the second most critical security requirement for power system operations and includes assurance that—

- Data has not been modified without authorization,
- Source of data is authenticated,
- Timestamp associated with the data is known and authenticated,
- Quality of data is known and authenticated.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.smartgrid.epri.com/Repository/Repository.aspx>

<sup>20</sup> [https://www.sce.com/wps/portal/home/customer-service/my-account/smart-meters/use-case-license-agreement!/ut/p/b1/hdDBroIwEAXQb\\_EHmJEq4LIahCpaeBDAbgYaWIGkBo38vpg8F8aos5vk3EnugIAcRF3cSIVcS10X1W MX1rrveNRnMTJusimyv0XAo5Bj6JIOrDqAH4bir3wG4pU4czJANh64CZ-YaFvkDQSp3QEvtlwRT-wf4DF88LIQ9efcWReEhFkMJITCIBtP7BlxYzEKrSm-4j2RjEvpTJUD2603pDHAWikTvZyMbY68sV8rZtDaW1qqSx1Sc4n3Is2WF4zGjvDvu-np8!/dl4/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/](https://www.sce.com/wps/portal/home/customer-service/my-account/smart-meters/use-case-license-agreement!/ut/p/b1/hdDBroIwEAXQb_EHmJEq4LIahCpaeBDAbgYaWIGkBo38vpg8F8aos5vk3EnugIAcRF3cSIVcS10X1W MX1rrveNRnMTJusimyv0XAo5Bj6JIOrDqAH4bir3wG4pU4czJANh64CZ-YaFvkDQSp3QEvtlwRT-wf4DF88LIQ9efcWReEhFkMJITCIBtP7BlxYzEKrSm-4j2RjEvpTJUD2603pDHAWikTvZyMbY68sV8rZtDaW1qqSx1Sc4n3Is2WF4zGjvDvu-np8!/dl4/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/).

*Availability* is generally considered the most critical security requirement, although the time latency associated with availability can vary:

- 4 milliseconds for protective relaying,
- Subseconds for transmission wide area situational awareness monitoring,
- Seconds for substation and feeder supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) data,
- Minutes for monitoring noncritical equipment and some market pricing information,
- Hours for meter reading and longer term market pricing information,
- Days/weeks/months for collecting long-term data such as power quality information.

### **10.2.2 Critical Issues for the Security Requirements of Power Systems**

The automation and control systems for power system operations have many differences from most business or corporate systems. Some particularly critical issues related to security requirements include—

- Operation of the power system must continue 24×7 with high availability (e.g., 99.99 % for SCADA and higher for protective relaying) regardless of any compromise in security or the implementation of security measures which hinder normal or emergency power system operations.
- Power system operations must be able to continue during any security attack or compromise (as much as possible).
- Power system operations must recover quickly after a security attack or compromised information system.
- The complex and many-fold interfaces and interactions across this largest machine of the world—the power system—makes security particularly difficult since it is not easy to separate the automation and control systems into distinct “security domains,” and yet end-to-end security is critical.
- There is not a one-size-fits-all set of security practices for any particular system or for any particular power system environment.
- Testing of security measures cannot be allowed to impact power system operations.
- Balance is needed between security measures and power system operational requirements. Absolute security is never perfectly achievable, so the costs and impacts on functionality of implementing security measures must be weighed against the possible impacts from security breaches.
- Balance is also needed between risk and the cost of implementing the security measures.

### **10.2.3 Security Programs and Management**

Development of security programs is critical to all Use Cases, including—

- Risk assessment to develop security requirements based on business rational (e.g., impacts from security breaches of ICIA) and system vulnerabilities.

- The likelihood of particular threat agents, which are usually included in risk assessments, should only play a minor role in the overall risk assessment, since the power system is so large and interconnected that appreciating the risk of these threat agents would be very difficult.
- However, in detailed risk assessments of specific assets and systems, some appreciation of threat agent probabilities is necessary to ensure that an appropriate balance between security and operability is maintained.
- Security technologies that are needed to meet the security requirements:
  - Plan the system designs and technologies to embed the security from the start
  - Implement the security protocols
  - Add physical security measures
  - Implement the security monitoring and alarming tools
  - Establish role-based access control (RBAC) to authorize and authenticate users, both human and cyber, for all activities, including password/access management, certificate and key management, and revocation management
  - Provide the security applications for managing the security measures
- Security policies, training, and enforcement to focus on the human side of security, including:
  - Normal operations
  - Emergency operations when faced with a possible or actual security attack
  - Recovery procedures after an attack
  - Documentation of all anomalies for later analysis and re-risk assessment.
- Conformance testing for both humans and systems to verify they are using the security measures and tools appropriately and not bypassing them:
  - Care must be taken not to impact operations during such testing
  - If certain security measures actually impact power system operations, the balance between that impact and the impact of a security compromise should be evaluated
- Periodic reassessment of security risks

### **10.3 USE CASE SCENARIOS**

The following subsections present the key Use Cases deemed architecturally significant with respect to security requirements for the smart grid, with the listing grouped according to 10 main categories: AMI, Demand Response, Customer Interfaces, Electricity Market, Distribution Automation, Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV), Distributed Resources, Transmission Resources, Regional Transmission Operator / Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) Operations, and Asset Management.

### 10.3.1 AMI Security Use Cases

In this chapter basic use cases are described which can be used as building blocks for more complex use cases that users of this guideline and AMI security profile may be interested in. Dozens of use cases can be constructed from these basic functions. A few short examples are provided below that demonstrate a more detailed process of combining the basic building blocks in the AMI security profile.

There are other functions not specified below which can be composed from these defined functions. The absence of a function on the list of use cases should not be taken as indication those functions are less important, but as an indication those functions are combinations of basic functions with the possible addition of out-of-scope and/or business process behaviors. Some examples:

- **Revenue Protection:** Revenue protection with respect to AMI consists of a number of business processes combined with AMI functions. For example, theft of service can be identified by comparing meter reads (Meter Sends Information function) of power line branch meter with the sum of meter reads of each of the subscribers on that branch (a specific non-AMI business process). A discrepancy on the total can indicate theft of service.
- **Meter Removal:** Detection of meter removal can occur in a number of different ways including “Meter Sends Information” where the exception case indicates no contact with the meter or “Meter Sends Alarm” where the self-protection capability of the meter notes a tamper event. There is also the case that includes meter not communicating (disassociated from network), where a meter that has been associated or registered on the network is no longer performing necessary activities to maintain registration.
- **Meter Bypass:** Generically, detection of meter bypass is a back office business process dependent on information received from the field. One way of detecting meter bypass is historical analysis of consumption data and comparison of that data to other similar subscribers in the region.
- **Outage Detection and Restoration:** This is not directly an AMI function, but information for the process can be acquired from the AMI meter field through the “Meter Sends Information” function and the “Meter Sends Alarm” function. Depending on the needs of restoration, “Utility Sends Operational Command” may also occur. The specific set of functions for detection and restoration will most likely be different with each outage event and may differ based on the Utility and its practices.
- **Pre-paid Metering:** Depending on the specific mechanism for pre-paid metering (e.g., payment at the meter, payment to the utility, emergency power enable button) this can end up being the combination of any or all AMI functions. At the simplest, the setting of a consumption limit on a meter based on some business process decision by the utility would be a “Utility Sends Operational Command”. Information about consumption rates as well as warnings about credit exhaustion will flow back to the utility via “Meter Sends Information” and “Meter Sends Alarm”.

The 6 basic functions listed below were chosen because they mostly represent the same level of control plane and they involve only AMI elements. As utilities continue to develop their set of use cases, which involve (but are not necessarily limited to) AMI elements, they can use this set of functions to describe the AMI portion of the use case.

<b>Category:</b> AMI		Overall Use Case #1	
<b>Scenario:</b> Meter sends information			
<u><b>Category Description</b></u> AMI systems consist of the hardware, software, and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and Third Party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and Third Party systems that are interfaced to the AMI systems.			
<u><b>Scenario Description</b></u> A meter sends automated energy usage information to the Utility (e.g., meter read (usage data)). The automated send of energy usage information is initiated by the meter and is sent to the Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) Head End System (HES). The Head End system message flows to the meter Reading and Control (MRC). The MRC evaluates the message. The MRC archives the automated energy usage information and forwards the information onto the meter Data Management Systems (MDMS). <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Meter configuration information</li><li>• Periodic meter Reading</li><li>• On-Demand meter Reading</li><li>• Net metering for distributed energy resources (DER) and plug in electric vehicle (PEV)</li></ul>			
<u><b>Smart Grid Characteristics</b></u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li><li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li><li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li></ul>	<u><b>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</b></u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Confidentiality (privacy) of customer metering data over the AMI system, metering database, and billing database to avoid serious breaches of privacy and potential legal repercussions</li><li>• Integrity of meter data is important, but the impact of incorrect data is not large</li><li>• Availability of meter data is not critical in real-time</li></ul>	<u><b>Potential Stakeholder Issues</b></u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer data access</li><li>• Customer data privacy and security</li><li>• Reliable data for billing</li><li>• Third party or party acting as an agent of the utility access to energy usage information for market and/or consumer services</li><li>• Third party or party acting on behalf of the utility reliable data</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> AMI		Overall Use Case #2
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility sends operational command to meter		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>AMI systems consist of the hardware, software, and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and Third Party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and Third Party systems that are interfaced to the AMI systems.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>A Utility requires an operational command be sent to the meter, such as a disconnect or reconnect of an electric smart meter. The command flows to the meter Reading and Control (MRC) that looks up the meter associated with the customer and then instructs the Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) Head End system (HES) to communicate the command to the meter. The HES evaluates current conditions and, if suitable (e.g., reconnects are not executed if the system is in a rolling black out state), sends the command to the meter. When the meter receives the command and parameters, the meter evaluates the command as to whether it is permitted. If the command is permitted, the meter executes the command and sends the result to the HES. If the command is not permitted, the meter sends the result to the HES. The HES evaluates the result (whether the action was successful or not and why) and relays that to the MRC. The MRC records the command result and notifies the appropriate actors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Configuration request</li> <li>• Calibration request</li> <li>• Connect / Disconnect request</li> <li>• Prepaid metering configuration/setup</li> </ul>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> <li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confidentiality requirements of the meter command is generally not very important</li> <li>• Integrity of control commands to the meter is critical to avoid dangerous/unsafe conditions.</li> <li>• Availability is not important with the exception of emergency situations such as fire or medical emergency for remote connect/disconnect.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer Safety</li> <li>• Third party or party acting as an agent of the utility access to energy usage information for market and/or consumer services</li> </ul>



Category: AMI		Overall Use Case #3	
Scenario: Field tool sends instruction to the meter			
<div>Category Description</div> <p>AMI systems consist of the hardware, software, and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and Third Party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and Third Party systems that are interfaced to the AMI systems.</p>			
<div>Scenario Description</div> <p>A field tool requires onsite maintenance of an electric smart meter. The Field Tool connects directly to an electric smart meter, then the command flows to the smart meter. When the meter receives the command and parameters, the meter evaluates the command as to whether it is permitted. If the command is permitted, the meter executes the command and sends the result back to the field tool. This use case is a closed loop, as stated in the preconditions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Meter calibration update</li><li>Meter configuration update</li></ul>			
<div>Smart Grid Characteristics</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li><li>Enables new products, services and markets</li></ul>	<div>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Confidentiality is not important unless some maintenance activity involves personal information</li><li>Integrity of meter maintenance repairs and updates are essential to prevent malicious intrusions and integrity of billing data to prevent high utility bills</li><li>Availability is important, because field tool requires real time interaction with the meter.</li></ul>	<div>Potential Stakeholder Issues</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Customer data privacy and security</li><li>Third party or party acting as an agent of the utility having access to customer &amp; Utility information</li></ul>	

Category: AMI		Overall Use Case #4	
Scenario: Utility sends non-operational instruction to meter (peer-to-peer)			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> AMI systems consist of the hardware, software, and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and Third Party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and Third Party systems that are interfaced to the AMI systems.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> This use case describes the Utility sending a non-operational instruction sent to meter as a peer-to-peer transaction. A Utility requires actions from a set of meters, which may or may not result in a change to the power state of the grid. These include at least meter reading, and certain configuration changes. The meter Reading and Control (MRC) determines the need to send instruction(s) to a meter. MRC looks up the meter associated with the customer and then instructs the Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) Head End system (HES) to queue up and execute the instruction(s). The AMI Head End can determine the instruction needs to be split into packets, schedules the sending of the packets and continues to send the packets to the meter until all instruction packets have been sent. The meter receives the instruction(s) and determines if the instruction is permitted. After execution, the meter sends the instruction result to the HES. The HES will then send the instruction result to the MRC. If the instruction result is energy usage information, the MRC will then forward the energy usage information onto the meter Data Management System (MDMS). If the MDMS receives energy usage information, then the MDMS forwards the energy usage information onto other actors for other actions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Meter calibration validation</li><li>• Connectivity validation</li><li>• Geolocation of meter</li><li>• Smart meter battery management</li></ul>			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li><li>• Operates resiliently in response to natural and manmade events</li><li>• Increases the timeliness, availability, and granularity of information for billing</li></ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Confidentiality may or may not be an issue depending on whether information is public (date, time) or private (password change, Personal Identifiable Information). Some items must be confidential due to laws and regulations; confidentiality of other items may be left up to local policy, such as firmware or GPS coordinates.</li><li>• Integrity of meter maintenance repairs and updates is essential to prevent malicious intrusions</li><li>• Availability is important, but only in terms of hours or maybe days to provide synchronization and coherence of devices on the network, i.e., all devices acting together for entire population</li></ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer data privacy and security</li><li>• Third party or party acting as an agent of the utility having access to customer &amp; Utility information</li><li>• Third party access to electrical distribution system, e.g., separation of duties &amp; authority (regulatory impact)</li><li>• Vendor product quality</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> AMI		<b>Overall Use Case #5</b>	
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility sends batch instruction to meters (group multicast transaction)			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> AMI systems consist of the hardware, software, and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and Third Party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and Third Party systems that are interfaced to the AMI systems.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> This use case describes a batch instruction send to meters as a multicast transaction in an open loop situation. The open loop situation means that Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) Head End System (HES) does not expect a response for each packet sent to a meter. A Utility requires actions from a set of meters, which may or may not result in a change to the power state of the grid. These include at least meter reading, and certain configuration changes. The meter Reading and Control (MRC) determines the need to send batch instructions to more than one meter. MRC looks up the meter associated with the customer and then instructs the Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) Head End system (HES) to queue up and execute the instructions. The AMI Head End can determine the instruction needs to be split into packets, schedules the sending of the packets and continues to send the packets to the meters until all instruction packets have been sent. The meter(s) receive the instruction(s) and determines if the instruction is permitted. After execution, the meter(s) send the instruction result to the HES. The HES will then send the instruction result to the MRC. If the instruction result is energy usage information, the MRC will then forward the energy usage information onto the meter Data Management System (MDMS). If the MDMS receives energy usage information, then the MDMS forwards the energy usage information onto other actors for other actions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Firmware update</li><li>Key management update</li></ul>			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li><li>Enables new products, services and markets</li><li>Reduces cost of operations</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Confidentiality is not important unless some maintenance activity involves personal information</li><li>Integrity of meter maintenance repairs and updates are essential to prevent malicious intrusions</li><li>Availability is important, but only in terms of hours or maybe days</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Confirmation (if required) of update status.</li><li>Customer data privacy and security</li><li>Third party or party acting as an agent of the utility access to energy usage information for market and/or consumer services</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> AMI		Overall Use Case #6	
<b>Scenario:</b> Meter sends alarm or unsolicited and unscheduled request to the utility			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> AMI systems consist of the hardware, software, and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and Third Party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and Third Party systems that are interfaced to the AMI systems.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> A meter sends an alarm or unsolicited and unscheduled request to the Utility (e.g., Physical tamper detection, Network join request, or HAN device / direct load control device enrollment request (proxy for customer). The message is initiated by the meter and sends the messages to the Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) Head End System (HES). The HES message flows to the meter Reading and Control (MRC). The MRC evaluates the message. The MRC records the command result and notifies the appropriate actors.			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li><li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Confidentiality is not important unless alarm contains private information or exposes an attempt to obtain security information stored in the meter</li><li>• Integrity - Protect against energy theft</li><li>• Protect integrity of meter configuration</li><li>• Protect integrity of reporting</li><li>• To protect the integrity of the network (authorized devices)</li><li>• Availability is important to capture last gasp detecting, join detection, and reporting</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Network Service Providers</li><li>• Customer may receive outage notification through Third Party</li><li>• Billing service provider</li><li>• Transmission &amp; Distribution service provider</li></ul>	

### 10.3.2 Demand Response Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Demand Response (DR)		Overall Use Case #7
<b>Scenario:</b> Real-Time Pricing (RTP) for Customer Load and DER/PEV		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time based or may be tariff based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed or some combination. RTP inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Use of RTP for electricity is common for very large customers, affording them an ability to determine when to use power and minimize the costs of energy for their business. The extension of RTP to smaller industrial and commercial customers and even residential customers is possible with smart metering and in-home displays. Aggregators or customer energy management systems must be used for these smaller consumers due to the complexity and 24×7 nature of managing power consumption. Pricing signals may be sent via an AMI system, the Internet, or other data channels.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity, including nonrepudiation, of pricing information is critical, since there could be large financial and possibly legal implications</li> <li>• Availability, including nonrepudiation, for pricing signals is critical because of the large financial and possibly legal implications</li> <li>• Confidentiality is important mostly for the responses that any customer might make to the pricing signals</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Demand Response		Overall Use Case #8
<b>Scenario:</b> Time of Use (TOU) Pricing		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time based or may be tariff based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed TOU pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>TOU creates blocks of time and seasonal differences that allow smaller customers with less time to manage power consumption to gain some of the benefits of real-time pricing. This is the favored regulatory method in most of the world for dealing with global warming.</p> <p>Although RTP is more flexible than TOU, it is likely that TOU will still provide many customers will all of the benefits that they can profitably use or manage.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not critical since TOU pricing is fixed for long periods and is not generally transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Demand Response		Overall Use Case #9
<b>Scenario:</b> Net Metering for DER and PEV		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time based or may be tariff based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>When customers have the ability to generate or store power as well as consume power, net metering is installed to measure not only the flow of power in each direction, but also when the net power flows occurred. Often TOU tariffs are employed.</p> <p>Today larger commercial and industrial (C&amp;I) customers and an increasing number of residential and smaller C&amp;I customers have net metering installed for their photovoltaic systems, wind turbines, combined heat and power (CHP), and other DER devices. As PEVs become available, net metering will increasingly be implemented in homes and small businesses, even parking lots.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not very critical since net metering pricing is fixed for long periods and is not generally transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Demand Response		Overall Use Case #10	
<b>Scenario:</b> Feed-In Tariff Pricing for DER and PEV			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time based or may be tariff based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> Feed-in tariff pricing is similar to net metering except that generation from customer DER/PEV has a different tariff rate than the customer load tariff rate during specific time periods.			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li><li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li><li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Integrity is not critical, since feed-in tariff pricing is fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted electronically</li><li>• Availability is not an issue</li><li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer data privacy and security</li><li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li><li>• Customer data access</li></ul>	



<b>Category:</b> Demand Response		Overall Use Case #11	
<b>Scenario:</b> Critical Peak Pricing			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time based or may be tariff based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> Critical Peak Pricing builds on TOU pricing by selecting a small number of days each year where the electric delivery system will be heavily stressed and increasing the peak (and sometime shoulder peak) prices by up to 10 times the normal peak price. This is intended to reduce the stress on the system during these days.			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li><li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li><li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Integrity is not critical, since feed-in tariff pricing is fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted electronically</li><li>• Availability is not an issue</li><li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer data privacy and security</li><li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li><li>• Customer data access</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> Demand Response		Overall Use Case #12
<b>Scenario:</b> Mobile Plug-In Electric Vehicle Functions		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time based or may be tariff based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>In addition to customers with PEVs participating in their home-based Demand Response functions, they will have additional requirements for managing the charging and discharging of their mobile PEVs in other locations:</p> <p>Customer connects PEV at another home</p> <p>Customer connects PEV outside home territory</p> <p>Customer connects PEV at public location</p> <p>Customer charges the PEV</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not critical, since feed-in tariff pricing is fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

### 10.3.3 Customer Interfaces Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Customer Interfaces		Overall Use Case #13
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer's In Home Device is Provisioned to Communicate With the Utility		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in-home displays, computers, and mobile devices). In addition to real-time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>This scenario describes the process to configure a customer's device to receive and send data to utility systems. The device could be an information display, communicating thermostat, load control device, or smart appliance.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To protect passwords</li> <li>• To protect key material</li> <li>• To authenticate with other devices on the AMI system</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Customer Interfaces		Overall Use Case #14
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer Views Pricing or Energy Data on Their In-Home Device		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in-home displays, computers, and mobile devices). In addition to real-time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>This scenario describes the information that should be available to customers on their in-home devices. Multiple communication paths and device functions will be considered.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To validate that information is trustworthy (integrity)</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Customer Interfaces		Overall Use Case #15
<b>Scenario:</b> In-Home Device Troubleshooting		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in-home displays, computers, and mobile devices). In addition to real-time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>This alternate scenario describes the resolution of communication or other types of errors that could occur with in-home devices. Roles of the customer, device vendor, and utility will be discussed.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To avoid disclosing customer information</li> <li>• To avoid disclosing key material and/or passwords</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Customer Interfaces	Overall Use Case #16		
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer Views Pricing or Energy Data via the Internet			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in-home displays, computers, and mobile devices). In addition to real-time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> In addition to a utility operated communications network (i.e., AMI), the Internet can be used to communicate to customers and their devices. Personal computers and mobile devices may be more suitable for displaying some types of energy data than low cost specialized in-home display devices. This scenario describes the information that should be available to the customer using the Internet and some possible uses for the data.			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li><li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li><li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li></ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To protect customer's information (privacy)</li><li>• To provide accurate information</li></ul>		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer device standards</li><li>• Customer data privacy and security</li></ul>

<b>Category:</b> Customer Interfaces		Overall Use Case #17
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility Notifies Customers of Outage		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in-home displays, computers, and mobile devices). In addition to real-time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>When an outage occurs the utility can notify affected customers and provide estimated restoration times and report when power has been restored. Smart grid technologies can improve the utility's accuracy for determination of affected area and restoration progress.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To validate that the notification is legitimate</li> <li>• Customer's information is kept private</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Customer Interfaces		Overall Use Case #18
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer Access to Energy-Related Information		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Customers with home area networks (HANs) and/or building energy management (BEM) systems will be able to interact with the electric utilities as well as Third Party energy services providers to access information on their own energy profiles, usage, pricing, etc.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Customers with HANs and/or BEM systems will be able to interact with the electric utilities as well as Third Party energy services providers. Some of these interactions include:</p> <p>Access to real-time (or near-real-time) energy and demand usage and billing information</p> <p>Requesting energy services such as move-in/move-out requests, prepaying for electricity, changing energy plans (if such tariffs become available), etc.</p> <p>Access to energy pricing information</p> <p>Access to their own DER generation/storage status</p> <p>Access to their own PEV charging/discharging status</p> <p>Establishing thermostat settings for demand response pricing levels</p> <p>Although different types of energy related information access is involved, the security requirements are similar.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity, including non-repudiation, is critical since energy and pricing data will have financial impacts</li> <li>• Availability is important to the individual customer, but will not have wide-spread impacts</li> <li>• Confidentiality is critical because of customer privacy issues</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>



### 10.3.4 Electricity Market Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Electricity Market		Overall Use Case #19
<b>Scenario:</b> Bulk Power Electricity Market		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>The electricity market varies significantly from state to state, region to region, and at local levels. The market is still evolving after some initial setbacks and is expected to expand from bulk power to retail power and eventually to individual customer power as tariffs are developed to provide incentives. Demand response, handled in subsection 10.3.2, is a part of the electricity market.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>The bulk power market varies from region to region, and is conducted primarily through RTOs and ISOs. The market is handled independently from actual operations, although the bids into the market obviously affect which generators are used for what time periods and which functions (base load, regulation, reserve, etc.). Therefore there are no direct operational security impacts, but there are definitely financial security impacts.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity for pricing and generation information is critical</li> <li>• Availability for pricing and generation information is important within minutes to hours</li> <li>• Confidentiality for pricing and generation information is critical</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Electricity Market		Overall Use Case #20
<b>Scenario:</b> Retail Power Electricity Market		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>The electricity market varies significantly from state to state, region to region, and at local levels. The market is still evolving after some initial setbacks and is expected to expand from bulk power to retail power and eventually to individual customer power as tariffs are developed to provide incentives. Demand response, handled in subsection 10.3.2, is a part of the electricity market.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>The retail power electricity market is still minor, but growing, compared to the bulk power market but typically involves aggregators and energy service providers bidding customer-owned generation or load control into both energy and ancillary services. Again it is handled independently from actual power system operations. Therefore there are no direct operational security impacts, but there are definitely financial security impacts. (The aggregator's management of the customer-owned generation and load is addressed in the Demand Response subsection (see 10.3.2).)</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity for pricing and generation information is critical</li> <li>• Availability for pricing and generation information is important within minutes to hours</li> <li>• Confidentiality for pricing and generation information is critical</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Electricity Market		Overall Use Case #21
<b>Scenario:</b> Carbon Trading Market		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>The electricity market varies significantly from state to state, region to region, and at local levels. The market is still evolving after some initial setbacks and is expected to expand from bulk power to retail power and eventually to individual customer power as tariffs are developed to provide incentives. Demand response, handled in subsection 10.3.2, is a part of the electricity market.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>The carbon trading market does not exist yet, but the security requirements will probably be similar to the retail electricity market.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity for pricing and generation information is critical</li> <li>• Availability for pricing and generation information is important within minutes to hours</li> <li>• Confidentiality for pricing and generation information is critical</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

### 10.3.5 Distribution Automation Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation (DA)		Overall Use Case #22
<b>Scenario:</b> DA within Substations		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation that is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain DA functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other DA functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Distribution automation within substations involves monitoring and controlling equipment in distribution substations to enhance power system reliability and efficiency. Different types of equipment are monitored and controlled:</p> <p>Distribution supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system monitors distribution equipment in substations</p> <p>Supervisory control on substation distribution equipment</p> <p>Substation protection equipment performs system protection actions</p> <p>Reclosers in substations</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of distribution control commands is critical for distribution operations, avoiding outages, and providing power to customers reliably and efficiently</li> <li>• Availability for control is critical, while monitoring individual equipment is less critical</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Device standards</li> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #23	
<b>Scenario:</b> DA Using Local Automation			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b>  A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation that is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.  No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.  Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>  Local automation of feeder equipment consists of power equipment that is managed locally by computer-based controllers that are preset with various parameters to issue control actions. These controllers may just monitor power system measurements locally, or may include some short-range communications to other controllers and/or local field crews. However, in these scenarios, no communications exist between the feeder equipment and the control center.  Local automated switch management  Local volt/VAR control  Local Field crew communications to underground network equipment			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provides power quality</li><li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li><li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Integrity of distribution control commands is critical for distribution operations, avoiding outages, and providing power to customers reliably and efficiently</li><li>• Availability for control is critical, while monitoring individual equipment is less critical</li><li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer safety</li><li>• Customer device standards</li><li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #24	
<b>Scenario:</b> DA Monitoring and Controlling Feeder Equipment			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation that is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.  No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.  Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> Operators and distribution applications can monitor the equipment on the feeders and determine whether any actions should be taken to increase reliability, improve efficiency, or respond to emergencies. For instance, they can—  Remotely open or close automated switches Remotely switch capacitor banks in and out Remotely raise or lower voltage regulators Block local automated actions Send updated parameters to feeder equipment Interact with equipment in underground distribution vaults Retrieve power system information from smart meters Automate emergency response Provide dynamic rating of feeders			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provides power quality</li><li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li><li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Integrity of distribution control commands is critical for distribution operations, avoiding outages, and providing power to customers reliably and efficiently</li><li>• Availability for control is critical, while monitoring individual equipment is less critical</li><li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Customer safety</li><li>• Customer device standards</li><li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #25
<b>Scenario:</b> Fault Detection, Isolation, and Restoration		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation that is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>AMI smart meters and distribution automation devices can detect power outages that affect individual customers and larger groups of customers. As customers rely more fundamentally on power (e.g., PEV) and become used to not having to call in outages, outage detection, and restoration will become increasingly critical.</p> <p>The automated fault location, isolation, and restoration (FLIR) function uses the combination of the power system model with the SCADA data from the field on real-time conditions to determine where a fault is probably located by undertaking the following steps:</p> <p>Determines the faults cleared by controllable protective devices:</p> <p>Determines the faulted sections based on SCADA fault indications and protection lockout signals</p> <p>Estimates the probable fault locations based on SCADA fault current measurements and real-time fault analysis</p> <p>Determines the fault-clearing non-monitored protective device</p> <p>Uses closed-loop or advisory methods to isolate the faulted segment</p> <p>Once the fault is isolated, it determines how best to restore service to unfaulted segments through feeder reconfiguration.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of outage information is critical</li> <li>• Availability to detect large-scale outages usually involve multiple sources of information</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #26
<b>Scenario:</b> Load Management		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation that is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Load management provides active and passive control by the utility of customer appliances (e.g., cycling of air conditioner, water heaters, and pool pumps) and certain C&amp;I customer systems (e.g., plenum precooling, heat storage management).</p> <p>Direct load control and load shedding</p> <p>Demand side management</p> <p>Load shift scheduling</p> <p>Curtailement planning</p> <p>Selective load management through HANs</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of load control commands is critical to avoid unwarranted outages</li> <li>• Availability for load control is important – in aggregate (e.g., &gt; 300 MW), it can be critical</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>



<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #27
<b>Scenario:</b> Distribution Analysis using Distribution Power Flow Models		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>The brains behind the monitoring and controlling of field devices are the DA analysis software applications. These applications generally use models of the power system to validate the raw data, assess real-time and future conditions, and issue the appropriate actions. The applications may be distributed and located in the field equipment for local assessments and control, and/or may be centralized in a distribution management system (DMS) for global assessment and control.</p> <p>Local peer-to-peer interactions between equipment</p> <p>Normal distribution operations using the Distribution System Power Flow (DSPF) model</p> <p>Emergency distribution operations using the DSPF model</p> <p>Study-Mode DSPF model</p> <p>DSPF/DER model of distribution operations with significant DER generation/storage</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is critical to operate the distribution power system reliably, efficiently, and safely</li> <li>• Availability is critical to operate the distribution power system reliably, efficiently, and safely</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #28
<b>Scenario:</b> Distributed Energy Resources Management		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected DER, and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>In the future, more and more of generation and storage resources will be connected to the distribution network and will significantly increase the complexity and sensitivity of distribution operations. Therefore, the management of DER generation will become increasingly important in the overall management of the distribution system, including load forecasts, real-time monitoring, feeder reconfiguration, virtual and logical microgrids, and distribution planning.</p> <p>Direct monitoring and control of DER</p> <p>Shut-down or islanding verification for DER</p> <p>PEV management as load, storage, and generation resource</p> <p>Electric storage fill/draw management</p> <p>Renewable energy DER with variable generation</p> <p>Small fossil resource management, such as backup generators to be used for peak shifting</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is critical for any management/ control of generation and storage</li> <li>• Availability requirements may vary depending on the size (individual or aggregate) of the DER plant</li> <li>• Confidentiality may involve some privacy issues with customer-owned DER</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Distribution Automation		Overall Use Case #29
<b>Scenario:</b> Distributed Energy Resource Management		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>A broad definition of “distribution automation” includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources, and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/VAR control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Distribution planning typically uses engineering systems with access only to processed power system data that is available from the control center. It is therefore relatively self-contained.</p> <p>Operational planning</p> <p>Assessing planned outages</p> <p>Storm condition planning</p> <p>Short-term distribution planning</p> <p>Short term load forecast</p> <p>Short term DER generation and storage impact studies</p> <p>Long term distribution planning</p> <p>Long term load forecasts by area</p> <p>Optimal placements of switches, capacitors, regulators, and DER</p> <p>Distribution system upgrades and extensions</p> <p>Distribution financial planners</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity not critical due to multiple sources of data</li> <li>• Availability is not important</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> </ul>

### 10.3.6 PHEV Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV)		Overall Use Case #30	
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer Connects PHEV to Energy Portal			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> Plug-in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging, and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> This scenario discusses the simple case of a customer plugging in an electric vehicle at their premise to charge its battery. Variations of this scenario will be considered that add complexity: a customer charging their vehicle at another location and providing payment or charging at another location where the premise owner pays.			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li><li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li><li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li><li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li><li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The customer's information is kept private</li><li>• Billing information is accurate</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Vehicle standards</li><li>• Customer safety</li><li>• Customer device standards</li><li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles		Overall Use Case #31
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer Connects PHEV to Energy Portal and Participates in "Smart" (Optimized) Charging		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>Plug-in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging, and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>In addition to simply plugging in an electric vehicle for charging, in this scenario the electric vehicle charging is optimized to take advantage of lower rates or help prevent excessive load peaks on the electrical system.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer information is kept private</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles		Overall Use Case #32
<b>Scenario:</b> PHEV or Customer Receives and Responds to Discrete Demand Response Events		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>Plug-in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging, and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>An advanced scenario for electric vehicles is the use of the vehicle to provide energy stored in its battery back to the electrical system. Customers could participate in demand response programs where they are provided an incentive to allow the utility to request power from the vehicle at times of high system load.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved system stability and availability</li> <li>• To keep customer information private</li> <li>• To insure DR messages are accurate and trustworthy</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles		Overall Use Case #33
<b>Scenario:</b> PHEV or Customer Receives and Responds to Utility Price Signals		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Plug-in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging, and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>In this scenario, the electric vehicle is able to receive and act on electricity pricing data sent from the utility. The use of pricing data for charging is primarily covered in another scenario. The pricing data can also be used in support of a distributed resource program where the customer allows the vehicle to provide power to the electric grid based on market conditions.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved system stability and availability</li> <li>• Pricing signals are accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Customer information is kept private</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

### 10.3.7 Distributed Resources Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Distributed Resources		Overall Use Case #34
<b>Scenario:</b> Customer Provides Distributed Resource		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>Traditionally, distributed resources have served as a primary or emergency backup energy source for customers that place a premium on reliability and power quality. Distributed resources include generation and storage devices that can provide power back to the electric power system. Societal, policy, and technological changes are increasing the adoption rate of distributed resources, and smart grid technologies can enhance the value of these systems.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>This scenario describes the process of connecting a distributed resource to the electric power system and the requirements of net metering.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer information is kept private</li> <li>• Net metering is accurate and timely</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safety</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>



<b>Category:</b> Distributed Resources		Overall Use Case #35	
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility Controls Customer's Distributed Resource			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> Traditionally, distributed resources have served as a primary or emergency backup energy source for customers that place a premium on reliability and power quality. Distributed resources include generation and storage devices that can provide power back to the electric power system. Societal, policy, and technological changes are increasing the adoption rate of distributed resources, and smart grid technologies can enhance the value of these systems.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> Distributed generation and storage can be used as a demand response resource where the utility can request or control devices to provide energy back to the electrical system. Customers enroll in utility programs that allow their distributed resource to be used for load support or to assist in maintaining power quality. The utility programs can be based on direct control signals or pricing information.			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li><li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li><li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li><li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li><li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li></ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Commands are trustworthy and accurate</li><li>• Customer's data is kept private</li><li>• DR messages are received timely</li></ul>		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Safety</li><li>• Customer data privacy and security</li></ul>

### 10.3.8 Transmission Resources Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Transmission Operations		Overall Use Case #36
<b>Scenario:</b> Real-Time Normal Transmission Operations Using Energy Management System (EMS) Applications and SCADA Data		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> <p>Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The EMS assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility's control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers if power system anomalies are detected.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> <p>Transmission normal real-time operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA and EMS. The types of information exchanged include—</p> <p>Monitored equipment states (open/close), alarms (overheat, overload, battery level, capacity), and measurements (current, voltage, frequency, energy)</p> <p>Operator command and control actions, such as supervisory control of switching operations, setup/options of EMS functions, and preparation for storm conditions</p> <p>Closed-loop actions, such as protective relaying tripping circuit breakers upon power system anomalies</p> <p>Automation system controls voltage, VAR, and power flow based on algorithms, real-time data, and network linked capacitive and reactive components</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to protective relaying (e.g., &lt; 4 ms) and operator commands (e.g., 1 s)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Transmission Operations		Overall Use Case #37	
<b>Scenario:</b> EMS Network Analysis Based on Transmission Power Flow Models			
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The EMS assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility's control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers if power system anomalies are detected.			
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> EMS assesses the state of the transmission power system using the transmission power system analysis models and the SCADA data from the transmission substations EMS performs model update, state estimation, bus load forecast EMS performs contingency analysis, recommends preventive and corrective actions EMS performs optimal power flow analysis, recommends optimization actions EMS or planners perform stability study of network Exchange power system model information with RTOs/ISOs and/or other utilities			
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provides power quality</li><li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li><li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li></ul>		<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Integrity is vital to the reliability of the transmission system</li><li>• Availability is critical to react to contingency situations via operator commands (e.g., one second)</li><li>• Confidentiality is not important</li></ul>	
		<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Cybersecurity</li></ul>	

<b>Category:</b> Transmission Operations		Overall Use Case #38
<b>Scenario:</b> Real-Time Emergency Transmission Operations		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The EMS assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility's control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers if power system anomalies are detected.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>During emergencies, the power system takes some automated actions and the operators can also take actions:</p> <p>Power System Protection: Emergency operations handles under-frequency load/generation shedding, under-voltage load shedding, load tap changer (LTC) control/blocking, shunt control, series compensation control, system separation detection, and wide area real-time instability recovery</p> <p>Operators manage emergency alarms</p> <p>SCADA system responds to emergencies by running key applications such as disturbance monitoring analysis (including fault location), dynamic limit calculations for transformers and breakers based on real-time data from equipment monitors, and pre-arming of fast acting emergency automation</p> <p>SCADA/EMS generates signals for emergency support by distribution utilities (according to the T&amp;D contracts):</p> <p>Operators performs system restorations based on system restoration plans prepared (authorized) by operation management</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to protective relaying (e.g., &lt; 4 ms) and operator commands (e.g., 1 s)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Transmission Operations		Overall Use Case #39
<b>Scenario:</b> Wide Area Synchrophasor System		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The EMS assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility's control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers if power system anomalies are detected.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>The wide area synchrophasor system provides synchronized and time-tagged voltage and current phasor measurements to any protection, control, or monitoring function that requires measurements taken from several locations, whose phase angles are measured against a common, system-wide reference. Present day implementation of many protection, control, or monitoring functions is hobbled by not having access to the phase angles between local and remote measurements. With system-wide phase angle information, they can be improved and extended. The essential concept behind this system is the system-wide synchronization of measurement sampling clocks to a common time reference.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to protective relaying (e.g., &lt; 4 ms) and operator commands (e.g., 1 s)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

### 10.3.9 RTO/ISO Operations Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> RTO/ISO Operations		Overall Use Case #40
<b>Scenario:</b> RTO/ISO Management of Central and DER Generators and Storage		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b> TBD		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b> RTOs and ISOs manage the scheduling and dispatch of central and distributed generation and storage. These functions include— Real-time scheduling with the RTO/ISO (for nonmarket generation/storage) Real-time commitment to RTO/ISO Real-time dispatching by RTO/ISO for energy and ancillary services Real-time plant operations in response to RTO/ISO dispatch commands Real-time contingency and emergency operations Black start (system restoration after blackout) Emissions monitoring and control		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to operator commands (e.g., one second)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

### 10.3.10 Asset Management Security Use Cases

<b>Category:</b> Asset Management		Overall Use Case #41
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility Gathers Circuit and/or Transformer Load Profiles		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>At a high level, asset management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost, and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies, and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain, and protect utility assets.</p> <p>For our purposes we will establish the scope for the asset management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff, such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, computer-based maintenance management systems (CMMS), display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications, and data marts (historians).</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Load profile data is important for the utility planning staff and is also used by the asset management team that is monitoring the utilization of the assets and by the SCADA/EMS and system operations team. This scenario involves the use of field devices that measure loading, the communications network that delivers the data, the historian database, and the load profile application and display capability that is either separate or an integrated part of the SCADA/EMS.</p> <p>Load profile data may also be used by automatic switching applications that use load data to ensure new system configurations do not cause overloads.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data is accurate (integrity)</li> <li>• Data is provided timely</li> <li>• Customer data is kept private</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Asset Management		Overall Use Case #42
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility Makes Decisions on Asset Replacement Based on a Range of Inputs Including Comprehensive Offline and Online Condition Data and Analysis Applications		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>At a high level, asset management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost, and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies, and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain, and protect utility assets.</p> <p>For our purposes we will establish the scope for the asset management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, CMMS, display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications and data marts (historians).</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>When decisions on asset replacement become necessary, the system operator, asset management, apparatus engineering, and maintenance engineering staff work closely together with the objective of maximizing the life and utilization of the asset while avoiding an unplanned outage and damage to the equipment.</p> <p>This scenario involves the use of online condition monitoring devices for the range of assets monitored, offline test results, mobile work force technologies, the communications equipment used to collect the online data, data marts (historian databases) to store and trend data as well as condition analysis applications, CMMS applications, display applications, and SCADA/EMS.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data provided is accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Data is provided timely</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>



<b>Category:</b> Asset Management		Overall Use Case #43
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility Performs Localized Load Reduction to Relieve Circuit and/or Transformer Overloads		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>At a high level, asset management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost, and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies, and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain, and protect utility assets.</p> <p>For our purposes we will establish the scope for the asset management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff, such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, CMMS, display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications, and data marts (historians).</p> <p>Advanced functions that are associated with asset management include dynamic rating and end of life estimation.</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Transmission capacity can become constrained due to a number of system-level scenarios and result in an overload situation on lines and substation equipment. Circuit and/or transformer overloads at the distribution level can occur when higher than anticipated customer loads are placed on a circuit or when operator or automatic switching actions are implemented to change the network configuration.</p> <p>Traditional load reduction systems are used to address generation shortfalls and other system-wide issues. Localized load reduction can be a key tool enabling the operator to temporarily curtail the load in a specific area to reduce the impact on specific equipment. This scenario describes the integrated use of the AMI system, the demand response system, other load reduction systems, and the SCADA/EMS to achieve this goal.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Load reduction messages are accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Customer's data is kept private</li> <li>• DR messages are received and processed timely</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

<b>Category:</b> Asset Management		Overall Use Case #44
<b>Scenario:</b> Utility System Operator Determines Level of Severity for an Impending Asset Failure and Takes Corrective Action		
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>At a high level, asset management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost, and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies, and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain, and protect utility assets.</p> <p>For our purposes we will establish the scope for the asset management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff, such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, CMMS, display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications, and data marts (historians).</p>		
<p><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>When pending asset failure can be anticipated, the system operator, asset management, apparatus engineering, and maintenance engineering staff work closely together with the objective of avoiding an unplanned outage while avoiding further damage to the equipment.</p> <p>This scenario involves the use of online condition monitoring devices for the range of assets monitored, offline test results, mobile workforce technologies, the communications equipment used to collect the online data, data marts (historian databases) to store, and trend data, as well as condition analysis applications, CMMS applications, display applications, and SCADA/EMS.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cybersecurity Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asset information provided is accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Asset information is provided timely</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cybersecurity</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

## APPENDIX H

### ANALYSIS MATRIX OF LOGICAL INTERFACE CATEGORIES

A set of smart grid key attributes was defined and allocated to each logical interface category. These key attributes included requirements and constraints that were used in the selection of security requirements for the logical interface category.

This analysis was one of the tools that was used in the determination of the CI&A impact levels for each logical interface category and in the selection of security requirements. The attribute table was used as a guide for selecting unique technical requirements and determining the impact level for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The set of attributes allocated to each logical interface category is not intended to be a comprehensive set, or to exclude interfaces that do not include that attribute. For example, a smart grid information system may include logical interface category 1, but not ATR-11, legacy information protocols. The goal was to define typical attributes for each logical interface category.

Table H-1 provides additional descriptions of each attribute.

**Table H-1 Interface Attributes and Descriptions**

Interface Attributes	Descriptions
ATR-1a: Confidentiality requirements	Strong requirement that information should not be viewed by unauthorized entities
ATR-1b: Privacy concerns	Strong requirement that information should not be viewed by unauthorized entities
ATR-2: Integrity requirements	Strong requirement that information should not be modified by unauthorized entities, and should be validated for accuracy and errors. Higher level integrity may require additional technical controls.
ATR-3: Availability requirements	Strong requirement that information should be available within appropriate time frames. Often this necessitates redundancy of equipment, communication paths, and or information sources.
ATR-4: Low bandwidth of communications channels	Severely limited bandwidth may constrain the types of security technologies that should be used across an interface while still meeting that interface's performance requirements.
ATR-5: Microprocessor constraints on memory and compute capabilities	Severely-limited memory and/or compute capabilities of a microprocessor-based platform may constrain the types of security technologies, such as cryptography, that may be used while still allowing the platform to meet its performance requirements.
ATR-6: Wireless media	Wireless media may necessitate specific types of security technologies to address wireless vulnerabilities across the wireless path.
ATR-7: Immature or proprietary protocols	Immature or proprietary protocols may not be adequately tested either against inadvertent compromises or deliberate attacks. This may leave the interface with more vulnerabilities than if a more mature protocol were used.

Interface Attributes	Descriptions
ATR-8: Inter-organizational interactions	Interactions that cross-organizational domains, including the use of out-sourced services and leased networks, can limit trust and compatibility of security policies and technologies. Therefore, these vulnerabilities should be taken into account.
ATR-9: Real-time operational requirements with low tolerance for latency problems	Real-time interactions may entail short acceptable time latencies, and may limit the security technology choices for mitigating on-going attacks.
ATR-11: Legacy communication	Older communication technologies may limit the types, thoroughness, or effectiveness of different security technologies that may be employed. This sensitivity to security technologies should be taken into account.
ATR-10: Legacy end-devices and systems protocols	Older end-devices and protocols may constrain the types, thoroughness, or effectiveness of different security technologies that may be employed.
ATR-12: Insecure, untrusted locations	Devices or systems in locations, which cannot be made more secure due to their physical environment or ownership, pose additional security challenges. For instance, hardware-based cryptography may be necessary.
ATR-13: Key management for large numbers of devices	Key management for large numbers of devices without direct access to certificate management may limit the methods for deploying, updating, and revoking cryptographic keys.
ATR-14: Patch and update management constraints for devices including scalability and communications	Patch management constraints may limit the frequency and processes used for updating security patches.
ATR-15: Unpredictability, variability, or diversity of interactions	Unpredictable interactions may complicate the decisions on the types and severity of security threats and their potential impacts
ATR-16: Environmental and physical access constraints	Access constraints may limit the types of security technologies that could be deployed. For instance, if appliances are in a customer's house, access could be very limited.
ATR-17 Limited power source for primary power	Devices with limited power, such as battery-run appliances which "go to sleep" between activities, may constrain the types of security technologies to those that do not require continuous power.
ATR-18: Autonomous control	Autonomous control of devices that may not be centrally monitored could lead to undetected security threats.

Table H-2 provides the analysis matrix of the security-related logical interface categories (rows) against the attributes (ATR) that reflect the interface categories (columns).

**Table H-2 Analysis Matrix of Security-Related Logical Interface Categories, Defined by Attributes**

<div>Attributes</div> <div>Logical Interface Categories</div>	ATR-1a: Confidentiality requirements	ATR-1b: Privacy concerns	ATR-2: Integrity requirements	ATR-3: Availability requirements	ATR-4: Low bandwidth of communications channels	ATR-5: Microprocessor constraints on memory and compute capabilities	ATR-6: Wireless media	ATR-7: Immature or proprietary protocols	ATR-8: Inter-organizational interactions	ATR-9: Real-time operational requirements with low tolerance for latency problems	ATR-10: Legacy end-devices and systems	ATR-11: Legacy communication protocols	ATR-12: Insecure, untrusted locations	ATR-13: Key management for large numbers of devices	ATR-14: Patch and update management constraints for devices including scalability and communications	ATR-15: Unpredictability, variability, or diversity of interactions	ATR-16: Environmental and physical access constraints	ATR-17: Limited power source for primary power	ATR-18: Autonomous control
1. Interface between control systems and equipment with high availability, and with compute and/or bandwidth constraints			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X
2. Interface between control systems and equipment without high availability, but with compute and/or bandwidth constraints			X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
3. Interface between control systems and equipment with high availability, without compute nor bandwidth constraints			X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X

Attributes  Logical Interface Categories																			
	ATR-1a: Confidentiality requirements	ATR-1b: Privacy concerns	ATR-2: Integrity requirements	ATR-3: Availability requirements	ATR-4: Low bandwidth of communications channels	ATR-5: Microprocessor constraints on memory and compute capabilities	ATR-6: Wireless media	ATR-7: Immature or proprietary protocols	ATR-8: Inter-organizational interactions	ATR-9: Real-time operational requirements with low tolerance for latency problems	ATR-10: Legacy end-devices and systems	ATR-11: Legacy communication protocols	ATR-12: Insecure, untrusted locations	ATR-13: Key management for large numbers of devices	ATR-14: Patch and update management constraints for devices including scalability and communications	ATR-15: Unpredictability, variability, or diversity of interactions	ATR-16: Environmental and physical access constraints	ATR-17: Limited power source for primary power	ATR-18: Autonomous control
4. Interface between control systems and equipment without high availability, without compute nor bandwidth constraints			X				X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
5. Interface between control systems within the same organization			X	X						X		X			X				X
6. Interface between control systems in different organizations			X	X					X	X		X			X				
7. Interface between back office systems under common management authority	X	X	X												X				
8. Interface between back office systems not under common management authority	X	X	X						X						X				

<div>Attributes</div> <div>Logical Interface Categories</div>	ATR-1a: Confidentiality requirements	ATR-1b: Privacy concerns	ATR-2: Integrity requirements	ATR-3: Availability requirements	ATR-4: Low bandwidth of communications channels	ATR-5: Microprocessor constraints on memory and compute capabilities	ATR-6: Wireless media	ATR-7: Immature or proprietary protocols	ATR-8: Inter-organizational interactions	ATR-9: Real-time operational requirements with low tolerance for latency problems	ATR-10: Legacy end-devices and systems	ATR-11: Legacy communication protocols	ATR-12: Insecure, untrusted locations	ATR-13: Key management for large numbers of devices	ATR-14: Patch and update management constraints for devices including scalability and communications	ATR-15: Unpredictability, variability, or diversity of interactions	ATR-16: Environmental and physical access constraints	ATR-17: Limited power source for primary power	ATR-18: Autonomous control
9. Interface with B2B connections between systems usually involving financial or market transactions	x	x	x	x					x	x						x			
10.Interface between control systems and non-control/ corporate systems	x	x	x	x				x	x						x	x			
11.Interface between sensors and sensor networks for measuring environmental parameters, usually simple sensor devices with possibly analog measurements					x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x				x	x	
12.Interface between sensor networks and control systems			x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x		x			x	x	x
13.Interface between systems that use the AMI network	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x		

<div>Attributes</div> <div>Logical Interface Categories</div>	ATR-1a: Confidentiality requirements	ATR-1b: Privacy concerns	ATR-2: Integrity requirements	ATR-3: Availability requirements	ATR-4: Low bandwidth of communications channels	ATR-5: Microprocessor constraints on memory and compute capabilities	ATR-6: Wireless media	ATR-7: Immature or proprietary protocols	ATR-8: Inter-organizational interactions	ATR-9: Real-time operational requirements with low tolerance for latency problems	ATR-10: Legacy end-devices and systems	ATR-11: Legacy communication protocols	ATR-12: Insecure, untrusted locations	ATR-13: Key management for large numbers of devices	ATR-14: Patch and update management constraints for devices including scalability and communications	ATR-15: Unpredictability, variability, or diversity of interactions	ATR-16: Environmental and physical access constraints	ATR-17: Limited power source for primary power	ATR-18: Autonomous control
14.Interface between systems that use the AMI network for functions that require high availability	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x		
15.Interface between systems that use customer (residential, commercial, and industrial) site networks such as HANs and BANs	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x			x	x		x	x		x
16.Interface between external systems and the customer site	x	x	x			x		x	x				x	x		x			
17.Interface between systems and mobile field crew laptops/equipment			x	x	x		x	x					x	x	x		x		
18.Interface between metering equipment	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x		



Attributes  Logical Interface Categories																			
	ATR-1a: Confidentiality requirements	ATR-1b: Privacy concerns	ATR-2: Integrity requirements	ATR-3: Availability requirements	ATR-4: Low bandwidth of communications channels	ATR-5: Microprocessor constraints on memory and compute capabilities	ATR-6: Wireless media	ATR-7: Immature or proprietary protocols	ATR-8: Inter-organizational interactions	ATR-9: Real-time operational requirements with low tolerance for latency problems	ATR-10: Legacy end-devices and systems	ATR-11: Legacy communication protocols	ATR-12: Insecure, untrusted locations	ATR-13: Key management for large numbers of devices	ATR-14: Patch and update management constraints for devices including scalability and communications	ATR-15: Unpredictability, variability, or diversity of interactions	ATR-16: Environmental and physical access constraints	ATR-17: Limited power source for primary power	ATR-18: Autonomous control
19.Interface between operations decision support systems			X	X					X	X									
20.Interface between engineering/ maintenance systems and control equipment			X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X		X		
21.Interface between control systems and their vendors for standard maintenance and service			X	X					X				X	X	X		X		
22.Interface between security/network/ system management consoles and all networks and systems	X	X	X	X						X	X	X		X	X	X	X		

# APPENDIX I

## MAPPINGS TO THE HIGH-LEVEL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

### I.1 VULNERABILITY CLASSES

The following is a mapping of vulnerability classes [See §6] to the High-Level Security Requirements Families.

**Table I-1 Mapping of Vulnerability Classes to High-Level Security Requirements Families**

			Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																																				
			Access Control (SG.AC)		Awareness and Training (SG.AT)		Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)		Configuration Management (SG.CM)		Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)		Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)		Incident Response (SG.IR)		Information and Document Management (SG.ID)		Media Protection (SG.MP)		Personnel Security (SG.PS)		Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)		Strategic Planning (SG.PL)		Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)		Security Program Management (SG.PM)		Planning (SG.PL)		Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)		Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)		Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)		Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
People, Policy and Procedure	Training	Insufficient Trained Personnel		X			X		X																														
		Inadequate Security Training and Awareness Program		X				X		X																													
	Policy and Procedure	Insufficient Identity Validation, and Background Checks	X						X				X	X							X	X																X	
		Inadequate Security Policy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
		Inadequate Privacy Policy																																					

			Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
			Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
People, Policy and Procedure	Risk Management	Inadequate Patch Management Process	X			X	X	X	X							X			X	X	
		Inadequate Change and Configuration Management				X										X				X	
		Unnecessary System Access	X			X		X		X	X	X				X					
		Inadequate Periodic Security Audits			X											X					
		Inadequate Security Oversight by Management		X	X							X	X		X	X					
		Inadequate Continuity of Operations or Disaster Recovery Plan					X							X	X	X	X				
		Inadequate Risk Assessment Process														X					
		Inadequate Incident Response Process				X			X				X	X		X	X				

		Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
		Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Platform Software/ Firmware Vulnerabilities	Software Development	Code Quality Vulnerability		X							X				X		X	X	X	X
	Authentication Vulnerability		X	X			X								X			X	X	X
	Authorization Vulnerability		X	X			X								X			X	X	X
	Cryptographic Vulnerability		X												X				X	X
	Environmental Vulnerability	X	X				X				X				X		X		X	X
	Error Handling Vulnerability		X												X			X	X	X
	General Logic Error		X												X				X	X
	Business Logic Error		X												X				X	X
	Input and Output Validation		X												X			X	X	X
	Logging and Auditing Vulnerability		X				X								X				X	X
	Password Management Vulnerability	X	X				X								X				X	X

			Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
			Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Platform Software/ Firmware Vulnerabilities	Software Development	Path Vulnerability		X											X				X	X	
		Protocol Errors		X											X				X	X	
		Range and Type Error Vulnerability		X												X				X	X
		Sensitive Data Protection Vulnerability		X						X						X				X	X
		Session Management Vulnerability		X												X				X	X
		Concurrency, Synchronization and Timing Vulnerability		X												X				X	X
		Insufficient Safeguards for Mobile Code		X												X				X	X
		Buffer Overflow		X												X				X	X
		Mishandling of Undefined, Poorly		X												X				X	X

[illegible]

		Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
		Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
	File Integrity Monitoring (Best Practice)							X	X									X	X	X
	Inadequate Malware Protection		X	X		X	X					X				X	X	X	X	
	Installed Security Capabilities Not Enables by Default	X	X	X	X		X					X				X	X	X	X	
	Absent or Deficient Equipment Implementation Guidelines	X	X	X	X		X					X			X	X	X		X	
Operational	Lack of Prompt Security Patches from Software Vendors			X		X	X										X	X	X	
	Unneeded Services Running		X	X	X							X				X	X	X	X	
	Insufficient Log Management	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X				X	X	X	X	

			Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
			Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Network	Poorly configured security equip.	Inadequate Anomaly Tracking	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X	X	
	Inadequate Integrity Checking					X								X	X			X	X	X	X
	Inadequate Network Segregation					X								X			X	X	X	X	X
	Inappropriate Protocol Selection					X								X	X		X	X	X	X	X
	Weakness in Authentication Process or Authentication Keys					X													X	X	
	Insufficient Redundancy	X				X		X				X	X		X	X					X
	Physical Access to the Device	X				X		X				X	X		X	X				X	X



## I.2 BOTTOM-UP TOPICS

The following is a mapping of topics identified in the Bottom-up chapter [See §7] to the High-Level Security Requirements Families.

**Table I-2 Mapping of Bottom-Up Topics to the High-Level Security Requirements Families**

	Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Authenticating and Authorizing Utility Users to Substation IEDs						X													
Authenticating Devices						X													
Securing Serial SCADA Communications																X			
Secure End-to-End Meter to Head End Communication																X			
Access Logs for IEDs			X																
Remote Attestation of Meters																X	X		X
Outsourced WAN Links																X			
Detecting Compromised Field Devices																	X	X	
Securing and Validating Field Device Settings	X					X										X			
Absolute and Accurate Time Information			X			X										X			

	Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Security Protocols																			
Synchrophasors																			
Certificates: Time and Date Issues																			
Event Logs and Forensics																			
Security for Radio-Controlled Distribution Devices						X										X			
Weak Protocol Stack Implementations																X			
Insecure Protocols																			
Unmanaged Call Home Function																			
Patch Management																	X		
System Trust Model																X			
User Trust Model																X			
Security Levels																			
Distributed versus Centralized Model of Management																			
Intrusion Detection for Power Equipment			X			X											X		

	Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Network and System and Management for Power Equipment	X			X		X											X		
Security Information and Event Management					X		X										X		X
Trust Management																			
Tamper Evidence	X										X					X			
Challenges with Securing Serial Communications																			
Legacy Equipment with Limited Resources																X		X	X
Costs of Patch and Applying Firmware Updates	X	X		X		X					X						X		
Forensics and Related Investigations			X		X		X										X		
Roles and Role Based Access Control	X					X													
Limited Sharing of Vulnerability and/or Incident Information														X					
Traffic Analysis						X										X	X		

[illegible]

### I.3 R&D TOPICS

The following table is a mapping of research and development topics [See §8] to the High-Level Security Requirements Families.

**Table I-3 Mapping of R&D Topics to the High-Level Requirements Families**

			Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																							
Syst ems	Novel Mechanisms	Device Level																								
			Improve Cost - Effective Higher Tamper Resistant & Survivable Device Architectures	Intrusion Detection with Embedded Processors	Topics in Cryptographic Key Management	Advanced Topics in Cryptography	Scalability	Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)

		Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
		Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Network King	Architecting for bounded recovery and reaction					X		X					X			X				X
	Architecting Real-time security	X					X								X		X			
	Calibrating assurance and timeliness trade-offs		X										X		X	X				
	Legacy system integration				X												X		X	X
	Resiliency Management and Decision Support		X	X		X		X					X			X				
	Efficient Composition of Mechanisms																X			
	Risk Assessment and Management				X	X		X						X	X	X				
Network King	Safe use of COTS/Publicly Available																X			

		Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
		Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Other Security Issues in the Smart Grid Context	Systems and Networks																			
	Advanced Networking																X			
	IPv6																X		X	X
	Privacy and Access Control in Federated Systems	X		X			X													
	Auditing and Accountability			X																
	Infrastructure Interdependency Issues					X		X				X				X				
	Cross-Domain (Power/Electrical to Cyber/Digital) Security Event Detection, Analysis, and Response					X		X				X				X				

		Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
		Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
Other Security Issues in the Smart Grid Context	Covert Network Channels in the Smart Grid: Creation, Characterization, Detection and Elimination					X		X									X			
	DoS Resiliency	X				X	X	X									X	X		
	Cloud Security	X					X		X	X							X			
	Security Design and Verification Tools				X															X
	Distributed versus Centralized security	X			X	X	X	X								X		X	X	
	System Segmentation and Virtualization	X			X					X							X	X		X
	Vulnerability Research	X	X		X		X			X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X
	Vulnerability Research Tools	X			X		X			X	X	X		X			X	X		X



		Smart Grid Security Requirements Families																		
		Access Control (SG.AC)	Awareness and Training (SG.AT)	Audit and Accountability (SG.AU)	Configuration Management (SG.CM)	Continuity of Operations (SG.CP)	Identification and Authentication (SG.IA)	Incident Response (SG.IR)	Information and Document Management (SG.ID)	Media Protection (SG.MP)	Personnel Security (SG.PS)	Physical and Environmental Security (SG.PE)	Strategic Planning (SG.PL)	Security Assessment and Authorization (SG.CA)	Security Program Management (SG.PM)	Planning (SG.PL)	Smart Grid Information System and Communication Protection (SG.SC)	Smart Grid Information System and Information Integrity (SG.SI)	Smart Grid Information System and Services Acquisition (SG.SA)	Smart Grid Information System Development and Maintenance (SG.MA)
	Data Provenance			X	X		X			X							X	X		X
	Security and Usability		X												X	X				
	Cybersecurity Issues for Electric Vehicles	X		X			X			X							X	X		X
	Detecting Anomalous Behavior Using Modeling			X	X			X									X	X		

## APPENDIX J

### GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

3DES	Triple Data Encryption Standard (168 Bit)
AAA	Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
Active Directory	A technology created by Microsoft that provides a variety of network services and is a central component of the Windows Server platform. The directory service provides the means to manage the identities and relationships that make up network environments.
ADA	Americans with Disabilities Act
AEAD	Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AGA	American Gas Association
AGC	Automatic Generation Control. A standalone subsystem that regulates the power output of electric generators within a prescribed area in response to changes in system frequency, tie-line loading, and the relation of these to each other. This maintains the scheduled system frequency and established interchange with other areas within predetermined limits.
Aggregation	Practice of summarizing certain data and presenting it as a total without any PII identifiers
AICPA	American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The national, professional organization for all Certified Public Accountants.
AMI	Advanced Metering Infrastructure
AMI-SEC	AMI Security [Task Force]
Anonymize	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To organize data in such a way as to preserve the anonymity or hide the personal identity of the individual(s) to whom the data pertains</li> <li>• A process of transformation or elimination of PII for purposes of sharing data</li> </ul>
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
ASAP-SG	Advanced Security Acceleration Project – Smart Grid
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
Asymmetric cipher	Cryptography solution in which separate keys are used for encryption and decryption, where one key is public and the other is private.
ATR	Attribute
B2B	Business to Business
BAN	Building Area Network
BEM	Building Energy Management

Block cipher	A symmetric key cipher operating on fixed-length groups of bits, called blocks, with an unvarying transformation—in contrast to a stream cipher, which operates on individual digits one at a time and whose transformation varies during the encryption. A block cipher, however, can effectively act as a stream cipher when used in certain modes of operation.
Botnet	Robot Network. A large number of compromised computers also called a “zombie army,” that can be used to flood a network with messages as a denial of service attack. A thriving botnet business consists in selling lists of compromised computers to hackers and spammers.
C&I	Commercial and Industrial
CA	Certificate Authority
CALEA	Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
CAN-SPAM	Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CEC	California Energy Commission
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CHP	Combined Heat and Power
CI&A	Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
CIM	Common Information Model. A structured set of definitions that allow different smart grid domain representatives to communicate important concepts and exchange information easily and effectively.
CIMA	Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIPA	Children’s Internet Protection Act
CIS	Cryptographic Interoperability Strategy
CIS	Customer Information System
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
CMMS	Computer-based Maintenance Management Systems
COTS	Commercial Off-the-Shelf
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSCTG	Cyber Security Coordination Task Group
CSO	Chief Security Officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameters
CSR	Certificate Signing Request

CSR	Customer Service Representative
CSSWG	Control Systems Security Working Group
CSWG	Cyber Security Working Group
CRT	Cathode Ray Tube
CTR mode	Counter mode. A block cipher mode of operation also known as Integer Counter Mode (ICM) and Segmented Integer Counter (SIC) mode.
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CWE	Common Weakness Enumeration
DA	Distribution Automation
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCS	Distributed Control System. A computer-based control system where several sections within the plants have their own processors, linked together to provide both information dissemination and manufacturing coordination.
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
De-identify	A form of anonymization that does not attempt to control the data once it has had PII identifiers removed, so it is at risk of re-identification.
DER	Distributed Energy Resources
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DEWG	Domain Expert Working Group
DFR	Digital Fault Recorder
DGM	Distribution Grid Management
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
Diffie-Hellman	A cryptographic key exchange protocol first published by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976. It allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel.
Distinguished names	String representations that uniquely identify users, systems, and organizations.
DMS	Distribution Management System
DN	Distinguished Name
DNP	Distributed Network Protocol
DNS	Domain Name Service
DoD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DoS	Denial of Service
DR	Demand Response
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generators

DRM	Digital Rights Management. A generic term for access control technologies used by standards providers, publishers, copyright holders, manufacturers, etc. to impose limitations on the usage of digital content and devices. The term is used to describe any technology that inhibits the use of digital content in a manner not desired or intended by the content provider.
DRMS	Distribution Resource Management System
DSL	Digital Subscriber Line
DSPF	Distribution System Power Flow
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAX mode	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A mode of operation for cryptographic block ciphers. It is an AEAD algorithm designed to simultaneously provide both authentication and privacy of the message with a two-pass scheme, one pass for achieving privacy and one for authenticity for each block.</li> <li>• A mixed authenticated encryption mode of operation of a block cipher in order to reduce the area overhead required by traditional authentication schemes.</li> </ul>
EAX'	A modification of the EAX mode used in the ANSI C12.22 standard for transport of meter-based data over a network.
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography (encryption)
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. A key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel.
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECPA	Electronic Communications Privacy Act
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
EISA	Energy Independence and Security Act
EKU	Extended Key Usage
EMS	Energy Management System
EMSK	Extended Master Session Key
Entropy	In the case of transmitted messages, a measure of the amount of information that is missing before reception.
Ephemeral Unified Model	An ECDH scheme where each party generates an ephemeral key pair to be used in the computation of the shared secret.
EPIC	Electronic Privacy Information Center
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
EPSA	Electric Power Supply Association
ES	Electric Storage
ESI	Energy Services Interface

ESP	Energy Service Provider
ET	Electric Transportation
EUMD	End Use Measurement Device
EV	Electric Vehicle
EV/PEV/PHEV	Electric Vehicle/Plug-in Electric Vehicle/Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles. Cars or other vehicles that draw electricity from batteries to power an electric motor. PHEVs also contain an internal combustion engine.
EvDO	Evolution Data Optimized
EVSE	Electric Vehicle Service Element
FACTA	Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
FAQ	Frequently Asked Questions
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FERPA	Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FIPS 140-2	Publication 140-2 is a U.S. government computer security standard used to accredit cryptographic modules. NIST issued the FIPS 140 Publication Series to coordinate the requirements and standards for cryptography modules that include both hardware and software components.
FLIR	Fault Location, Isolation, Restoration
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
G&T	Generations and Transmission
GAPP	Generally Accepted Privacy Principles. Privacy principles and criteria developed and updated by the AICPA and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants to assist organizations in the design and implementation of sound privacy practices and policies.
GIC	Group Insurance Commission
GIS	Geographic Information System
GLBA	Gramm-Leach Bliley Act
GPRS	General Packet Radio Service
GPSK	Generalized Pre-Shared Key
Granularity	The extent to which a system contains separate components, e.g., the fineness or coarseness with which data fields are subdivided in data collection, transmission, and storage systems. The more components in a system, the more flexible it is. In more general terms, the degree to which a volume of information is finely detailed.
GRC	Governance, Risk, and Compliance
GWAC	GridWise Architecture Council

Hacker	In common usage, a hacker is a person who breaks into computers and/or computer networks, usually by gaining access to administrative controls. Hackers are often unconcerned about the use of illegal means to achieve their ends. Out-and-out cyber-criminal hackers are often referred to as "crackers."
HAN	Home Area Network. A network of energy management devices, digital consumer electronics, signal-controlled or -enabled appliances, and applications within a home environment that is on the home side of the electric meter.
Hash	Any well-defined procedure or mathematical function that converts a large, possibly variable-sized amount of data into a small datum, usually a single integer that may serve as an index to an array. The values returned by a hash function are called hash values, hash codes, hash sums, checksums, or simply hashes.
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HITECH	Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
Hz	hertz
IBE	Identity-Based Encryption
ICS	Industrial Control Systems
ID	Identification
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IED	Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IFAC	International Federation of Accountants
IKE	Internet Key Exchange. Protocol used to set up a security association in the IPSec protocol suite.
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
IP	Internet Protocol
IPP	Independent Power Producer
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
IS	Information Security

ISA	International Society of Automation
ISAKMP	Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
ISMS	Information Security Management System
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISO	Independent System Operator
ISO/IEC27001	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission Standard 27001. A auditable international standard that specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving a documented Information Security Management System within the context of the organization's overall business risks. It uses a process approach for protection of critical information.
IT	Information Technology
ITGI	IT Governance Institute
ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
IVR	Interactive Voice Response
JNI	Java Native Interface
JTC	Joint Technical Committee
KDC	Key Distribution Center
KEK	Key Encryption Key
Kerberos	A computer network authentication protocol, developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which allows nodes communicating over a nonsecure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner. It is also a suite of free software published by MIT that implements this protocol.
LAN	Local Area Network
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LMS	Load Management System
LTC	Load Tap Changer
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MAC address	Media Access Control address. The unique serial number burned into Ethernet and Token Ring adapters that identifies that network card from all others.
MAC protection	Message Authentication Code protection. In cryptography, a short piece of information used to authenticate a message. The MAC value protects data integrity and authenticity of the tagged message by allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key used to generate the value) to detect any changes to the message content.
MDMS	Meter Data Management System
min	minute
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology



MITM	Man in the Middle
ms	millisecond ( $10^{-3}$ second)
MTBF	Mean Time Before Failure
MW	megawatt ( $10^6$ watts)
NAN	Neighborhood Area Network
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NISTIR	NIST Interagency Report
NMAP	Networked Messaging Application Protocol
NRECA	National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA Suite B	A set of cryptographic algorithms promulgated by the National Security Agency to serve as an interoperable cryptographic base for both unclassified information and most classified information.
NSF	National Science Foundation
NVD	National Vulnerability Database
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OE	Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. A global governmental forum of 30+ market democracies for comparison of policy experiences, good practices, and coordination of domestic and international policies. It is one of the world's largest and most reliable sources of comparable statistical, economic and social data.
OID	Object Identifier
OMS	Outage Management System
One-Pass Diffie-Hellman	A key-agreement scheme in which an ephemeral key pair generated by one party is used together with the other party's static key pair in the computation of the shared secret.
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
PANA	Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access
PAP	Priority Action Plan
PC	Personal Computer
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
PDC	Phasor Data Concentrator
PE	Protocol Encryption

PE mode	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An encryption mode combining CTR mode and ECB mode developed for streaming SCADA messages. It relies on the SCADA protocol's ability to detect incorrect SCADA messages.</li> <li>• Position Embedding mode. A cryptographic mode designed specifically for low latency integrity protection on low-speed serial links.</li> </ul>
Personal Information	Information that reveals details, either explicitly or implicitly, about a specific individual's household dwelling or other type of premises. This is expanded beyond the normal "individual" component because there are serious privacy impacts for all individuals living in one dwelling or premise. This can include items such as energy use patterns or other types of activities. The pattern can become unique to a household or premises just as a fingerprint or DNA is unique to an individual.
PEV	Plug-In Electric Vehicle
PFS	Perfect Forward Secrecy
PHEV	Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle
PIA	Privacy Impact Assessment. A process used to evaluate the possible privacy risks to personal information, in all forms, collected, transmitted, shared, stored, disposed of, and accessed in any other way, along with the mitigation of those risks at the beginning of and throughout the life cycle of the associated process, program or system.
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKMv2	Privacy Key Management version 2
PLC	Programmable Logic Controller
PMU	Phasor Measurement Unit
POTS	Plain Old Telephone Service
PPP	Point-to-Point Protocol
PQ	Power Quality
Public-key cryptography	A cryptographic approach that involves the use of asymmetric key algorithms instead of or in addition to symmetric key algorithms. Unlike symmetric key algorithms, it does not require a secure initial exchange of one or more secret keys to both sender and receiver.
PUC	Public Utilities Commission
QoS	Quality of Service
R&D	Research and Development
RA	Registration Authority
RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RAM	Random Access Memory
RBAC	Role-Based Access Control

Retail Access	Competitive retail or market-based pricing offered by energy services companies or utilities to some or all of their customers under the approval/regulation of state public utilities departments.
RF	Radio Frequency
RFC	Request for Comments
RNG	Random Number Generator
RP	Relying Party
RSA	Widely used in electronic commerce protocols, this algorithm for public-key cryptography is named for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman who were first to publicly described it. This was the first algorithm known to be suitable for signing as well as encryption and represents a great advance in public key cryptography.
RSA algorithm	RSA is public key cryptography algorithm named for its co-inventors: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman.
RTO	Regional Transmission Operator
RTP	Real-Time Pricing
RTU	Remote Terminal Unit
s	second
S/MIME	Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SA	Security Association
SAM	Security Authentication Module
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCE	Southern California Edison
SDLC	Software Development Life Cycle
SDO	Standard Developing Organization
SEL	Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories
SEP	Smart Energy Profile
SGCC	Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee
SGIP	Smart Grid Interoperability Panel
SGIP TWiki	An open collaboration site for the smart grid community to work with NIST in developing a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems and is part of a robust process for continued development and implementation of standards as needs and opportunities arise and as technology advances.
SGIP-CSWG	SGIP – Cyber Security Working Group
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard

SIEM	Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
Single sign-on	A property of access control of multiple, related, but independent software systems. With this property a user/device logs in once and gains access to all related systems without being prompted to log in again at each of them.
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
Social Engineering	The act of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. The term typically applies to trickery or deception being used for purposes of information gathering, fraud, or computer system access.
SP	Special Publication
SPOF	Signal Point of Failure
SSH	Secure Shell. A protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network.
SSID	Service Set Identifier
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
SSL/TLS	Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security
SSN	Social Security Number
SSO	Single Sign-On
SSP	Sector-specific Plans
Symmetric cipher	Cryptography solution in which both parties use the same key for encryption and decryption, hence the encryption key must be shared between the two parties before any messages can be decrypted.
T&D	Transmission and Distribution
T&D DEWG	T&D Domain Expert Working Group
TA	Trust Anchor
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TCPA	Telephone Consumer Protection Act
TCS	Trouble Call System
Telnet	Teletype network. A network protocol used on the Internet or local area networks to provide a bidirectional interactive communications facility. The term telnet may also refer to the software that implements the client part of the protocol.
TEMPEST	A codename referring to investigations and studies of conducted emissions. Compromising emanations are defined as unintentional intelligence-bearing signals, which, if intercepted and analyzed, may disclose the information, transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise processed by any information-processing equipment.
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TNC	Trusted Network Connect

TOCTOU	Time of Check, Time of Use
TPI	Two-Person Integrity
TRSM	Tamper Resistant Security Modules
Trust anchor	In public key infrastructure, an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor. The public key (of the trust anchor) is used to verify digital signatures and the associated data.
TWiki	A flexible, open source collaboration and Web application platform (i.e., a structured Wiki) typically used to run a project development space, a document management system, a knowledge base, or any other groupware tool on an intranet, extranet, or the Internet to foster information flow between members of a distributed work group.
UCAlug	UtiliSec Working Group
UDP/IP	User Datagram Protocol/Internet Protocol
Upsell	Marketing term for the practice of suggesting higher priced products or services to a customer who is considering a purchase.
URL	Universal Resource Locator
USRK	Usage-Specific Root Key
Van Eck phreaking	Named after Dutch computer researcher Wim van Eck, phreaking is the process of eavesdropping on the contents of a CRT and LCD display by detecting its electromagnetic emissions. Because of its connection to eavesdropping, the term is also applied to exploiting telephone networks.
VAR	Volts-Amps-Reactive
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WAMS	Wide Area Measurement System
WAN	Wide Area Network
WASA	Wide Area Situational Awareness
WG	Working Group
Wi-Fi	Term often used as a synonym for IEEE 802.11 technology. Wi-Fi is a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance that may be used with certified products that belong to a class of WLAN devices based on the IEEE 802.11 standards.
WiMAX	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access. A telecommunications protocol that provides fixed and fully mobile Internet access.</li> <li>Wireless digital communications system, also known as IEEE 802.16, which is intended for wireless "metropolitan area networks."</li> </ul>
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network
WMS	Work Management System
XML	Extensible Markup Language

## APPENDIX K

### SGIP-CSWG AND SGIP 2.0-SGCC MEMBERSHIP

This list is a combination of all participants in the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel–Cyber Security Working Group (SGIP–CSWG, including all of the subgroups) and the SGIP 2.0 Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee. Some of the organizations listed have changed over time, but these reflect the organizational affiliation of the members during their time of membership.

Name	Organization
Aber, Lee	OPOWER
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Ahmad, Wadji	General Electric
Ahmadi, Mike	GraniteKey
Ahsan, Naeem	DNV KEMA Energy and Sustainability
Aikman, Megan	FERC
Akyol, Bora	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Alcaraz, Cristina	NIST
Alexander, Michael	Underwriters Laboratories Inc.
Alexander, Rob	Ember Corporation
Alexander, Roger	Eka Systems, Inc.
Allitt, Ed	IPKeys
Al-Mukdad, Wendy	California PUC
Alrich, Tom	ENCARI
Ambady, Balu	Sensus
Anderson, Casey	Tendril, Inc.
Anderson, Dwight	Schweitzer Engineering Labs
Anderson, Ken	Information and Privacy Commissioner's Office of Ontario
Andreou, Demos	Cooper Industries
Andrews, Joseph	Western Electricity Coordinating Council
Antonacopoulos, Glenn	Northrop Grumman Corp.
Arensman, Will	SouthWest Research Institute
Arneja, Vince	Arxan Technologies, Inc.
Artz, Sharla	Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories
Arunachalam, Arun	Southern California Edison
Ascough, Jessica	Harris Corporation
Ashton, Skip	Ember Corporation
Bacik, Sandy	Enernex

Baiba Grazdina	Duke Energy
Baker, Fred	Cisco Systems, Inc.
Balsam, John	Georgia Tech Research Institute
Banerjee, Aditi	Texas Instruments
Barber, Mitch	Industrial Defender, Inc.
Barclay, Steve	ATIS
Barnes, Frank	University of Colorado at Boulder
Barnett, Bruce	GE Global Research
Barr, Michael	L-3 Communications Nova Engineering
Bartol, Nadya	Utilities Telecom Council
Barton, Michael	SunPower Corporation
Bass, Len	Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University
Basu, Sourjo	General Electric Energy
Bates, Shirley	Siemens
Batz, David	Edison Electric Institute
Beale, Steven	Future of Privacy Forum
Behrens, Stephen	KEMA, Inc.
Beinert, Rolf	OpenADR
Belanger, Phil	Oak Tree Consulting
Belgi, Subodh	MIEL e-Security Private Limited
Bell, Ray	Grid Net
Bell, Will	Grid Net
Bemmel, Vincent	Trilliant
Bender, Klaus	Utilities Telecom Council
Benn, Jason	Hawaiian Electric Company
Benoit, Jacques	Cooper Power Systems
Berkowitz, Don	S&C Electric Company
Beroset, Ed	Elster Group
Berrett, Dan E.	DHS Standards Awareness Team (SAT)
Berrey, Adam	General Catalyst Partners
Bertholet, Pierre-Yves	Ashlawn Energy, LLC
Besko, Geoff	Seccuris, Inc.
Beyene, Tsegereda	Cisco Systems, Inc.
Bezecny, Steve	CenterPoint Energy
Bhaskar, Mithun M.	National Institute of Technology, Warangal
Biggs, Doug	Infogard

Biggs, Les	Infogard
Bilow, Steve	The Bilow Group
Bitter, David	SMUD
Blomgren, Paul	SafeNet Inc.
Blossom, Michael	SmartSynch
Bobba, Rakesh	University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Bochman, Andy	IBM
Bockenek, Richard	Verizon
Boivie, Rick	IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
Boulez, Kris	Aszure
Brackney, Dick	Microsoft
Bradley, Steven	Virginia State Corporation Commission
Braendle, Markus	ABB
Branco, Carlos	Northeast Utilities
Brennan, Jim	New Hampshire PUC
Brent, Richard	FriiPwrLtd
Brenton, Jim	Ercot
Brewer, Tanya	NIST
Brigati, David	NitroSecurity
Brinskele, Ed	Vir2us Inc.
Brooks, Thurston	3e Technologies International, Inc.
Brown, Bobby	Consumers Energy / EnerNex Corporation
Brown, Peter	Progress Energy
Brozek, Mike	Westar Energy, Inc.
Brunnetto, Michael	
Bryan, Clifford	Examiner.com
Brydl, Jerry	Steffes Corporation
Bucciero, Joe	Buccerio Consulting
Buffo, Lydia	Dominion
Bump, William	Booz, Allen, Hamilton
Burnham, Laurie	Dartmouth College
Butler, Greg	
Butterworth, Jim	Guidance Software
Byrum, Drake	Cigital, Inc.
Camilleri, John	Green Energy Corp
Camm, Larry	Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
Campagna, Matt	Certicom Corp.



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Chan, Rida	Deloitte & Touche, LLP
Chaney, Mike	Securicon
Charbonneau, Sylvain	Hydro-Quebec
Chasko, Stephen	Landis+Gyr
Chason, Glen	EPRI
Chaudhry, Hina	Argonne National Labs
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Chibba, Michelle	Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
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Chow, Edward	U of Colorado at Colorado Springs
Chow, Richard	PARC
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Christopher, Jason	FERC
Chudgar, Raj	Sungard
Chung, Raymond	National Technical Systems, Inc.
Churchill, Alex	Duke Energy
Cioni, Mark V.	MV Cioni Associates, Inc.
Clark, Jamie	OASIS
Claypoole, Ted	Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC
Clements, Abraham	Sandia National Laboratories
Clements, Sam	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Cleveland, Frances	Xanthus Consulting International
Cohen, Michael	Mitre
Cohen, Yossi	
Collier, Albert	Alterium, LLC
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Coomer, Mark	ITT Defense and Information Solutions
Coop, Mike	ThinkSmartGrid
Cornish, Kevin	Enspira
Cortes, Sarah	Inman Technology IT

Cosio, George	Florida Power and Light
Cox, William	Cox Software Architects
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Crane, Melissa	Tennessee Valley Authority
Crljenica, Igor	State of Michigan
Cuen, Lita	LC RISQ & Associates
Cui, Stephen	Microchip Technology
Czaplewski, John	Northrup Grumman Corp.
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Dalva, Dave	Stroz Friedberg
Danahy, Jack	Bochman & Danahy Research
Danezis, George	Microsoft
Dangler, Jack	
Das, Subir	Applied Communication Sciences
Davis, Scott	Sensus
Davison, Brian	Public Utility Commission of Texas
De Petrillo, Nick	Industrial Defender
Delenela, Ann	Ercot
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DePeppe, Doug	i2IS Cyberspace Solutions
di Sabato, Mark	
Dieffenbach, Dillon	Ernst & Young
Dienhart, Mary	Xcel Energy
Dierking, Tim	Aclara Power-Line Systems, Inc.
Dillon, Terry	APS
Dinges, Sharon	Trane
Dion, Thomas	Dept of Homeland Security
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Dunton, Benjamin	NYS Department of Public Service
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Ewing, Chris	Schweitzer Engineering Labs
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Famolari, David	Telcordia Technologies
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Fraser, Barbara	Cisco
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Gilchrist, Grant	EnerNex
Gill, Jeff	RuggedCom Inc.
Gillmore, Matt	CMS Energy
Givens, Beth	Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Glassey, Todd	Certichron Inc.
Glavin, Kevin	Cigital
Glenn, Bill	Westar Energy, Inc.
Goff, Ed	Progress Energy
Gokul, Jay	Technology Crest Corp.
Golla, Ramprasad	Grid Net
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Greenfield, Neil	American Electric Power, Inc.
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Griffin, Slade	Enernex
Grochow, Jerrold	MIT
Gulick, Jessica	SAIC
Gunter, Carl	U. of Illinois
Gupta, Rajesh	UC San Diego
Gupta, Sarbari	Electrosoft
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Hanley, James	General Electric
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Hartmann, Chad	Xcel Energy
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Hastings, Nelson	NIST
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Heger, Mary	Ameren Services
Heiden, Rick	Pitney Bowes
Heidner, Dennis	
Helm, Donny	Oncor
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Huber, Robert	Critical Intelligence
Hudson, John	CenterPoint Energy
Hughes, Joe	EPRI
Humphrey, Robert	Duke Energy
Humphries, Scott	SmartSynch
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Huntman, William	Department of Energy
Hurley, Jesse	Shift Research, LLC
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Ilic, Jovan	
Ilic, Marija	Carnegie-Mellon University
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Iorga, Michaela	NIST
Ivers, James	SEI
Jacobs, Leonard	Xcel Energy
Jaffray, Travis	
Jaokar, Ajit	Futuretext
Jarrett, Terry	Missouri Public Service Commission
Jeirath, Nakul	Southwest Research Institute
Jepson, Robert	Lockheed Martin Energy Solutions
Jin, Chunlian	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Joffe, Rodney	NeuStar
Johnson, Freeman	NIST
Johnson, Oliver	Tendril
Jones, Barry	Sempra
Jones, Derrick	Enteredge Technology, LLC
Jones, Derrick	Merlin International, Inc.
Joshi, Makarand	
Kahl, Steve	North Dakota
Kahn, Ely	FriiPwrLtd
Kaiser, Lisa	Department of Homeland Security

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Katz, Martha Lessman	Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, LLC
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Kellogg, Shannon	EMC
Kelly, Lee	
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Kenney, Charlie	IBM
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Kiss, Gabor	Telcordia
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Klerer, Mark	
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Lebanidze, Evgeny	Cigital
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Lima, Claudio	Sonoma Innovation
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Martinez, Ralph	BAE Systems
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McCaffree, Matt	OPOWER
McComber, Robert	Telvent
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McDonald, Jeremy	Southern California Edison
McGinnis, Douglas	Exelon
McGrew, David	Cisco
McGuire, John	American Electric Power, Inc.
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McKay, Brian	Booz Allen Hamilton
McKenna, Erin	
McKinnon, David	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

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McNay, Heather	Landis+Gyr
McQuade, Rae	NAESB
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Metke, Tony	Motorola
Michail, David	Zuber & Taillieu LLP
Milbrand, Doug	Concurrent Technologies Corporation
Millard, David	Georgia Tech Research Institute
Miller, Joel	Merrion Group
Miller, Melvin	Nulink Wireless
Mirza, Wasi	Motorola
Mitsuru, Kanda	Toshiba
Mitton, David	Ambient Corp.
Modeste, Ken	Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
Mohan, Apurva	Honeywell
Moise, Avy	Future DOS R&D Inc.
Molina, Jesus	Fujitsu Ltd.
Molitor, Paul	NEMA
Mollenkopf, Jim	CURRENT Group
Moniz, Paulo	
Monkman, Brian	ICSA Labs
Montgomery, Jason	American Electric Power, Inc.
Moody, Diane	American Public Power Association
Morese, Alex	State of Michigan
Morris, Tommy	Mississippi State University
Mosely, Donald	FriiPwrLtd
Moskowitz, Robert	ICSA Labs
Mulberry, Karen	Neustar
Munoz, Tony	Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies
Nahas, John	ICF International
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